In a recent article, my colleague Janhavi Apte questioned the international practice of using economic sanctions as foreign policy tools, arguing that these are usually acts of “political theatre” and have historically been ineffective in achieving their objectives. Sanctions do not tend to affect those that they intend to pressure, and more often than not, innocent civilians bear the financial brunt of these politically motivated decisions. However, even this brunt is not equally borne—those belonging to privileged groups with access to political and economic resources are highly unlikely to face many difficulties, while vulnerable communities are pushed deeper into inequity.
For example, the United States has imposed crippling sanctions on Iran in a bid to arm-twist the Hassan Rouhani regime into reconsidering terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, while weakening Tehran’s economy and thwarting its oil exports, the sanctions have also led to a systematic decline of the country’s public health system. This has been especially apparent during the current pandemic
A 2011 quantitative assessment that looked at the impact of economic sanctions on public health in general revealed that sanctions imposed by the US were, on average, more detrimental to targeted sanctions regimes than other sanctioning countries, even when other costs are controlled. It was also found that the involvement of intergovernmental organizations in the imposition of the sanctions regimes did not show any statistical difference with respect to child mortality rates, which had already worsened due to sanctions. Even the economic wealth of the target countries did not play any role in mitigating the effects of sanctions on public health.
In former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Millennium Report, the world leader had said, “When robust and comprehensive economic sanctions are directed against authoritarian regimes, a different problem is encountered. Then it is usually the people who suffer, not the political elites whose behaviour triggered the sanctions in the first place. Indeed, those in power, perversely, often benefit from such sanctions by their ability to control and profit from black market activity, and by exploiting them as a pretext for eliminating domestic sources of political opposition.” In particular, humanitarian workers in conflict zones of targeted states face several challenges due to financial and trade embargoes, which directly affects their ability to provide aid and assistance to vulnerable groups.
In Syria, the situation is rather complex as the war-torn country has been subject to unilateral and multilateral sanctions, against the government as well as for counterterrorism. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267 allows the international body to impose sanctions regimes on designated terror groups like the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, which have operations in Syria.
The existing UNSC sanctions regime for counterterrorism in Syria imposes a crucial arms embargo and a travel ban for listed outfits, but also includes an asset freeze to ensure that no funding or financial resources are available to any of the targeted entities. The UNSC stresses that states must comply with obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights laws, and refugee laws. It also calls upon states to protect non-profit organizations from abuse by terrorists and to mitigate the impact of the sanctions on legitimate operations.
At the same time, Russia and China’s vetoes in the Council have prevented the body from passing any draft resolutions that directly target Bashar al-Assad’s government. While many of these drafts have included sanctions on military equipment and vehicles like helicopters to prevent the Assad regime from carrying out chemical attacks, Moscow and Beijing have maintained that restrictions would hamper progress being made towards peace with the administration. Most recently, however, both powers also vetoed a crucial resolution that aimed to extend independent aid to the country through multiple checkpoints, wherein they insisted that the Assad regime be a part of the aid process.
These inconsistencies at the UNSC, which are exacerbated by the stunning power embodied by the veto vote, have created a situation where the body is consistently trying to undo the humanitarian wrongs of its own members, who are directly or indirectly involved in violent domestic conflicts. For instance, the US, UK, France, and several other European countries are regular arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia, whose coalition is directly involved militarily in the “world’s largest humanitarian crisis” in Yemen.
See also: UNSC Rejects Russia’s Draft Resolution on Syria Aid
Further, Syria has been subject to unilateral sanctions regimes by the US and the European Union (EU) against the incumbent government and actors who support it. These have been deemed as “some of the most complicated and far-reaching sanctions regimes ever imposed” since they include everything—financial and trade sanctions, arms embargoes, travel bans, and asset freezing. The US can also impose stricter sanctions on Syria since it has designated the state itself as a sponsor of terrorism. This allows for the US to impose controls over dual-use exports and prohibit American citizens from conducting financial transactions with Syria without a Treasury license. President Donald Trump’s latest imposition of the Caesar Act on Syria gives the White House more powers, allowing it to freeze assets of individuals and groups of all nationalities involved in a wide range of dealings with Syria. The Act also targets Assad’s allies, extending sanctions on those dealing with Iranian or Russian entities in the country.
And while both US and EU sanctions regulations include clauses for competent recognized authorities to seek exemptions from restrictions for humanitarian action, these mechanisms are quite complicated and are difficult to navigate, often offering no respite. It is worth noting, that in the cases of both US and EU sanctions regimes, requests for humanitarian exemptions are considered on a case-by-case basis, and organizations are required to undertake authorization processes to obtain licenses for the import of goods by relevant authorities. This process is often lengthy and costly, barely matching the urgency usually required for responses. During the current pandemic, sanctions-issuing bodies have assured the prioritization and fast-tracked review of exemption requests. Yet, due to the severity and the nature of the crisis, authorities are overwhelmed and understaffed, and are unable to respond in time.
Especially in the cases of Middle Eastern sanctions, these mechanisms prove that requests for exemption are almost always required to allow humanitarian actors—international and local—to conduct operations in targeted states. In the Yemeni armed conflict, for example, the UNSC has extended its sanctions to the Houthi rebels due to their violent activities as well as their blockade on aid entering the country. However, the Saudi-led coalition is equally responsible for the destruction and lack of aid available to citizens. In the face of the pandemic, states with vested interests in the conflict have offered conditional aid to the country. And despite the applicability of IHL in the war-ravaged country, the UNSC’s bureaucracy requires humanitarian workers in Yemen to obtain special consent to allow unimpeded relief work. Once approved, all involved state actors are supposed to oblige, which is precisely where the paradox lies, since the sanctions have been imposed on them for violating these norms in the first place.
On the other hand, the mechanism of exception, as followed by the UN in Somalia, is a more helpful provision as it did not require permissions. However, its drawbacks included its limited scope and absolute inability to coerce member states to comply. As argued by the International Peace Institute, the UNSC lacks pointed safeguards and clarity in its principles to protect humanitarian activities in their Resolutions. There are no written rules stating that sanctions measures should not apply to humanitarian and medical activities carried out by independent organizations. Currently, there are also no mandates to assess, report, or monitor the real impact of sanctions on said activities.
Humanitarian workers also face issues accessing financial services and imported goods. Particularly in Afghanistan and Syria, donors are risk-averse and impose clauses in agreements that limit the amount of flexibility offered to humanitarian operations. Workers on the field also face the constant fear of being prosecuted or fined for violating unilateral sanctions, leading to something known as the ‘chilling effect’. This means that the challenges posed to humanitarian actors lead them to self-regulate, often far beyond their contractual requirements. In Somalia and Afghanistan, organizations have completely avoided large regions that are outside of Western-recognized governmental control, majorly due to the fear of sanctions violations even though the work that they are carrying out is meant to protect the vulnerable and the displaced.
Therefore, as reiterated by IHL experts and international actors for decades now, the UN must introduce robust reforms that include mechanisms to safeguard humanitarian work in sanctions regimes in tandem with international law. This would include the provision to create timely reports by monitoring the events closely and reporting specifically on the impact of sanctions on humanitarian work. External communications and classified information-sharing between intervening actors must also be encouraged, as well as strict imposition of existing norms for unilateral state sanctions to ensure that they do not go on endlessly. Ultimately, the UNSC, the US, and the EU must uphold their Responsibility to Protect and prioritize human security when making decisions to impose sanctions regimes, especially in regions that are already facing severe humanitarian crises, else the entire exercise stands to be quite futile.
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