Public demonstrations in Iran that started last month over an arbitrary hike in gasoline prices and the removal of fuel subsidies have morphed into a nationwide protest against the regime. The level of unrest and the unprecedented brutal crackdown underscore the severe political and economic challenges facing the Iranian leadership.
Multiple videos depict the Iranian forces opening fire on unarmed protesters, leading to the death of more than 300, and injuries of several thousand. The use of machine gunfire and the nationwide shutdown of the internet illustrate that is no ordinary protest.
Iranian leaders and the Ayatollah have deflected blame towards the "foreign hand" in the protests, alleging that citizens have been helped by American authorities in evading censors during the internet shutdown.
However, while Tehran's brutal retaliation might indicate desperation and fear of losing its grip over its population, it does have a history of stifling anti-government protests, be it during the 2009 Green movement over allegations of fraudulent elections results or the 2017-18 protests over increasing prices.
While the Trump administration praises itself for the strong impact of its sanctions on Iran, it remains unclear whether these protests will translate into furthering US objectives. In May 2018, President Trump withdrew from the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal–in which Iran pledged to reduce its nuclear stockpile and ensured that it wouldn't develop nuclear weapons–and reimposed economic sanctions on Iran, believing that Iran was not complying with the terms of the deal. The economic sanctions have crippled the Iranian economy and created internal challenges for the regime. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo believes that this strategic brinksmanship and unrelenting pressure will force Iran to accede to the US' “12 demands”, which revolve around Iran halting its nuclear activities and supporting militias in the region.
However, is the US persuading the Iranian establishment to halt its belligerent activities in the region or merely encouraging it to advance its nuclear capabilities?
Under Trump, tactical climbdowns or reciprocative negotiations are seen as losses, as they undermine US power. Trump believes that the primacy of US power should command the terms of negotiations. For example, after a successful prisoner exchange between the two countries last week, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called for “comprehensive prisoner exchange.” Though both sides welcomed the prisoner exchange, Washington was mum on the proposal even after Iranian spokespersons have shared their willingness for an “all-for-all release."
That being said, Tehran is unlikely to negotiate under terms that make it seem submissive to the US. Hence, demanding concessions–such as immediately halting the nuclear and ballistic missile program–while simultaneously doubling down with new sanctions risks the Iranian regime further entrenching itself to consolidate its power.
Furthermore, Iranian reliance on the US is undermined by $5 billion in Russian aid and the relative resurgence of the economy in recent times. Although the economy contracted by 10% and inflation is at 40%, it has shown some signs of recovery. The Iranian currency has reclaimed a third of its lost value, and an increase in employment by 3.3% has led to the lowest unemployment figures in seven years. World Bank projections, too, indicate an uptick in economic growth. While this is hardly indicative of long-term economic growth or sustainability, this does illustrate the regime's resolve and political will.
In addition, it is unclear what regime change will mean for Iran-US relations and Iran's nuclear program. With the registration for Presidential elections already underway in Tehran, moderate forces are already under siege by hardliners portraying President Hassan Rouhani as the cause for peoples' suffering. Additionally, 60 parliamentarians signed off on impeachment charges against President Rouhani brought forth by the chair of national security and foreign policy commission, and hardliners. Growing support and mobilization of hardliners against the more moderate parties might throw up new challenges for Washington. In fact, Rouhani has repeatedly warned of the possible consequences of losing out to the hardliner clerics and the effects it will have on the trajectory of the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, while Trump pats himself on the back for crippling the Iranian economy, there is little suggest any changes in the status quo. There is no point in having leverage over someone who refuses to sit at the negotiating table, especially when Iranians are wary of the veracity of American promises and reluctant to make concessions at the expense of appearing submissive. When the US withdrew from the Iranian Nuclear Deal citing Iranian non-compliance, it merely strengthened the resolve of forces within the Iranian leadership in their belief that Iran should become a nuclear-weapon state.
Besides, since the imposition of sanctions, Tehran has not only increased its enrichment of uranium but also stepped up its efforts to hurt the US and interests in the region in an increasingly belligerent manner. Either directly or through state-sponsored actors, it has attacked two oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, a Saudi oil facility, US-Iraqi military installations, and Iraqi airports; upped the ante in Yemen; increased military spending; and increased aid to outfits like Hezbollah.
Therefore, rather than softening up and asking for negotiations, Iran seems to have understood the strategic strength it possesses in the region and the rewards of having a more aggressive approach. It has been able to justify its gradual withdrawal from its commitment to the Nuclear Deal by emphasizing how it has been forced to do so. In fact, the EU, Russia, and others have condemned US actions, arguing that it allows Iran to reject claims of it being a revisionist and destabilizing force in the region while doing precisely that in neighbouring countries. It also establishes a pretext of outside pressure and domestic instability justifying tightening their grip on power.
Hence, although anger against the clerics and political leadership has reached unprecedented levels, not seen since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, it appears unlikely that this is the prelude to a revolutionary regime change as some hope or suggest. At a time when Trump faces pressure at home with a tough re-election bid and the impeachment inquiry, Iran has consolidated its power in the region rather than sitting at the negotiating table.
While the US' 'maximum pressure' strategy might have contributed heavily to economic hardship and nationwide protests, misreading Iran’s resolve might backfire, particularly when its regime has begun to think that confrontation yields better outcomes than restraint.
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