The Middle East has been ravaged with violence for over a decade, resulting in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and a never-ending situation in Libya that seems to be attracting newer foreign actors as time passes. With several calls from the United Nations for ceasefires given the global pandemic, temporary truces in both war-torn countries seem to have worn off. And while several media houses are reporting on the increasing influences of regional and international players in the conflicts, one country stands out in particular as a reckoning force in both hotbeds–the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Over the past few decades, the UAE’s foreign policy has put forth a strong emphasis on status and recognition–its Vision 2021 espouses the importance of Emirati self-confidence in emerging as a leading power in the region, portraying itself as a “role model” in the Middle East for its ability to combine Arab tradition with globalization and trade liberalization. And the theory of status dissatisfaction could explain why, despite its booming economy, Abu Dhabi has found itself in the throes of two highly volatile conflicts.
The theory argues that state actors looking to shift their status positions are likely to carry out “status-altering” moves in the public eye, which is usually dramatic and undertaken with the hope of attracting international attention towards a change in posturing. Since the 2011 Arab spring created a status vacuum in the region, the UAE seized upon this opportunity to use its military power to alter public perception about where it is positioned in the regional hierarchy.
Initially, Abu Dhabi joined Riyadh in its 2015 intervention in Yemen–Operation Decisive Storm–with the foremost goal of defeating the Iran-backed Houthi rebels, as well as extremist elements like the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (ISIS). With respect to the Houthis, the UAE’s engagement alongside the coalition was undoubtedly successful in curbing Houthi expansionism in the Eastern and Southern governorates. Robust efforts by Emirati forces to liberate Aden in 2015 and Mocha in 2017 also curtailed Houthi presence at the Gulf of Aden and on the Red Sea, mitigating threats to regional maritime security and solidifying Abu Dhabi’s strategic stronghold at the waters. The UAE was also successful in pushing the AQAP out of Mukalla in 2016 using a blend of coercive and peaceful tactics and training the Security Belt Forces (SBF) to undertake counterterrorism exercises.
But instead of expediting its withdrawal from the war, Abu Dhabi strategically laid out the foundation for indirect engagement by backing local forces, including the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC). The STC has, over the past few months, severely clashed with the Yemeni government in its liberated territories, and also declared self-rule in the country’s southern governorates on 25 April. These newer conflicts have diverted attention and weakened the capacity of the Saudi-led coalition and President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government to simultaneously contain Houthi militias in the north and the STC in the south.
Therefore, the UAE’s financial, military, and political assistance to the STC in penetrating the southern governorates has helped the country in its strategy of securing the southern ports as well as its regional status. Along with Abu Dhabi’s thorough disdain for the increasing influence of political Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Islah, the STC’s foothold in the south gave it a timely impetus to begin retracting its own troops in June 2019 and complete its withdrawal in February 2020. But even though Emirati troops are gone, the country’s influence is starkly visible as the war wages on.
See also: Understanding the Yemen Crisis Through the Lens of Foreign Actors
The lacuna of effective governance in the south is also a breeding ground for volatility, leaving a conducive environment for the possible resurgence of the AQAP. The STC’s activities continue to impede political resolution efforts, exacerbating the on-ground military situation. In addition to the coronavirus pandemic, a cholera epidemic, and natural disasters hitting the war-torn country, the STC is trying to emerge as an alternate leader to provide relief to ordinary Yemenis with heavy humanitarian aid from the UAE. Simultaneously, as the Saudis struggle to keep up their financial and military commitments to the Hadi government, the Yemeni government has also claimed that they have received no humanitarian or financial assistance from the Emirates in combating the same issues in the North.
“What gets underestimated is how high the level of antagonism is between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, particularly when it comes to support for Islah. The personal rapport between [Saudi crown prince] Mohammed bin Salman and [ruler of Abu Dhabi] Mohammed bin Zayed is what keeps the relationship together. If it were left to institutional channels the coalition would collapse,” said Abdulghani al-Iryani, an analyst at the Sana’a Center.
On the other hand, in Libya, the UAE has been consistently supporting renegade general Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in its fight against the UN-recognized and Turkey-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Just yesterday, Libyan Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha reportedly blamed the country’s crisis on UAE’s interference, accusing the state of breaching a UN armaments embargo by equipping Haftar’s anti-democracy forces.
Since April 2019 alone, Abu Dhabi has sent hundreds of mercenaries and conducted over 850 jet and drone strikes on Haftar’s behalf. In fact, just since January 2020, over 100 aircraft suspected of carrying weaponry have flown from the UAE to an airbase that it has set up in eastern Libya. The Emirati air strikes have reportedly killed scores of civilians and have caused immense infrastructural damage, severely exacerbating the humanitarian situation in the country. Through bilateral lobbying efforts, the UAE has also protected Haftar from public condemnation, especially from the West, where policymakers have done little to challenge the LNA or question its power-sharing strategy.
And while the international community–including the UAE–is constantly calling for a political solution as the GNA gains back strategic strongholds with Ankara’s help, it is worth noting that Abu Dhabi has very carefully covered the tracks of its own foreign policy footprints from the region. While it has intervened for “humanitarian” purposes and to rid Libya of “terrorist” Islamists, it has also used proxy forces and its track record of massive financial aid to hide its actions in the region.
A major reason that the UAE has sustained such extensive financial and military aid to the region so far is due to its massive arms support from the West. It is worth noting that the UAE is the highest-ranking Gulf country on the World Bank's coveted Ease of Doing Business List–at number 16–and is the highest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment in the entire Middle Eastern region. Several countries were also slated to participate in the now-postponed 2020 Expo in Dubai, an Emirate whose go-to policy has been to avoid public scrutiny by censoring the domestic narrative and offering an attractive tourist destination with a high quality of life for foreigners and expatriates.
Hence, while the US Congress and the European Parliament have called for arms sanctions on Saudi Arabia, no such call has been made for the UAE so far despite multiple allegations of the Gulf power violating UN embargoes in Libya and Somalia. But this hasn’t necessarily meant that all states have followed through with these calls–in April, Canada resumed its military exports to Riyadh, who in turn has begun setting up its own military-industrial complex with foreign support.
In fact, ignoring evidence that Abu Dhabi had carried out unauthorized transfers of US military equipment to Yemen, the White House approved another sale of thousands of armoured vehicles to the country. Germany also approved $8.5 million in arms sales to the UAE this year, while at the same time extending its embargo on Saudi Arabia till the end of 2020. In the past five years, UAE’s arms imports have reached $4.58 billion, yet there is little data on any additional expenditures or financing of its own military forces except its interventions in Libya and Yemen.
In sum, while members of the UN Security Council have called for ceasefires in the Middle East’s conflict zones, they have simultaneously provided millions in arms to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other actors to enable and worsen fighting in the region. For this to end, the international community must hold UAE as accountable as it does Saudi Arabia and call for a sanctioning of arms trade with the country as well, lest it continues to support disruptive forces and violently expand its regional status without any ramifications.
Image Source: The National