“I am not imposing change on anyone. That is tyranny. All of us have our opinions, and these opinions can change. Sometimes we put all opinions together, and then extract from them a single point of view. This is our democracy.”
-Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (former President of the UAE)
During Sheikh Zayed’s term as President over almost four decades, the United Arab Emirates became the biggest success story among Arab nations. Its desert land was developed into a skyscraper-clad metropolis, its highways and metro systems designed to be as advanced as those in Singapore, and it soon became home not only to the world’s tallest and most innovative buildings, but also an overwhelmingly large population of immigrants and expatriates from all over the world. In the 2018 World Bank rankings, UAE was ranked 11 out of 190 countries in the ease of doing business, overtaking its counterparts in the Gulf. The country’s liberalization stands out starkly in contrast to other nations in the region, yet, it strongly upholds its traditional oligarchic roots. Perhaps, the interesting marriage of modern federal structures with more customary forms of governance is a major underlying reason for its resounding economic success. To understand how this liberalization pans out despite the absence of democracy, and to find out whether the UAE has the potential to adopt democracy at all, I will be looking at the various political, economic, and social structures that govern the state.
Before getting into any analysis of the UAE in particular, it is important to see how ideas of liberal democracy made their way into the Arab Middle East. Unlike other parts of the globe, the democratization of this region has followed a cyclical rather than a linear course. Drawing closely from Samuel Huntington’s waves of democratization, Mustapha Al-Sayyid inferred that the ‘first wave’ of political liberalization in the Arab countries was heralded by Egypt’s modernist Khedive Isma’il Pasha in 1866, ending 14 years later with the country’s British occupation. The ‘second wave’, which was concentrated in mashriq or the Arab East, covered an almost 50-year time span and ran parallel with freedom struggles - in 1922 from British forces in the Egyptian parliament, to the escalation of the civil war in Lebanon by the 1970s. According to Al-Sayyid, the ‘third wave’ of parliamentary experimentation in the region started after the crushing defeat of the Arabs in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This defeat plunged the Arab regimes into an ideological crisis, as it discredited the legitimacy of their military power. The ‘third wave’ can be considered to have gained further impetus after the 1991 Gulf War; however, it has taken place at different paces in different parts of the Arab world, since the countries seem to be in a precarious space with respect to democratization. The Arab spring had a resounding effect on the socio-politics of certain MENA countries, but oil-rich nations such as the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait escaped this as they began liberalizing much earlier. On paper, their new constitutional, legal, and electoral reforms are quite remarkable, but whether these reforms are momentous enough to constitute democracy, is a matter of contention. The unfolding of democratic organization seems to be a long-term and complex process, especially in the Gulf, where varying degrees of authoritarian rules are still resistant to the idea of liberal democracy. Despite the popularization of state-led elections, there are many political, social, and even divine factors that act as barriers to the success of liberal democracy in Arab nations. Yet, this does not mean that the existence of Arab democracy is oxymoronic, or wrong in any sense; it just follows its own course and sets its own limits.
At its core, the UAE is a federal constitutional monarchy, and at the highest level, there exists a constitution that classifies the duties and responsibilities of the Federation as well as those of the individual emirates that govern the country. On a national level, the constitution identifies a Federal Supreme Council, which is comprised of the ruling Sheikhs of the seven emirates. Every five years, the leaders in the FSC elect a President and a Prime Minister — usually the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, respectively. The constitution also recognizes a Federal National Council which is made of 40 members from across the emirates, based on the population density of the individual sheikhdoms. Of these 40 members, 20 are elected through an electoral college, while the other half is selected by the leaders on the FSC. The FNC has the power to “question any Federal minister regarding Ministry performance”, and is also responsible for legislation. At the emirate level, each sheikhdom has its own government, which is not democratically elected in the traditional sense of the term. Rather, the Sheikh, who is traditionally the leader of the most powerful tribe of the area, maintains his authority insofar as he is able to garner and retain the support and loyalty of his people, notionally not so different from direct democracy. The unwritten democratic practice in this structure is the strong principle that the masses must have unbridled access to their Sheikh, who in turn must hold frequent open council, or majlis, where the tribesmen can voice their concerns.
Theoretically, this system reads like a liberalized oligarchy, where the royal families of the emirates are at the helm of affairs of their sheikhdoms but with political consensus being the driving force of influence in the federation, rather than political competition. The people are not provided with a direct voting mechanism in their emirates, but traditional councils and lobbying methods are provided so that they may channel their needs to the emirs. In 2006, the UAE held its first-ever election for the FNC, with less than 6,689 citizens (1% of its total population) coming in to vote, of which only 1,203 were women. Since then, the government has made consistent efforts to include more names on the electoral college list, ensuring a higher representation of women and youth. For the upcoming FNC elections in September 2019, the electoral college list features 337,738 members, of which 50.62% are women, and the list also reflects a significant population of young Emiratis aged 21-40, which is a positive step towards representation. As with any other democracy, the electoral roll only recognizes UAE nationals, while foreigners are excluded. However, it is crucial to note that only 10% of the total population in the UAE is made up of Emirati citizens, while the remainder comprises of foreign nationals, of whom 58% are South Asian, 17% are from other Asian countries, and 8.5% are Western expatriates. The naturalization process can take up to 30 years, and even then the practice has a limited success rate due to the fear of national identity loss, as well as the declining Emirati population. Given that there are only 20 seats in the FNC up for election, this disparity lends a significant gap in inclusive politics where foreigners, who are crucial wealth-makers in the nation, are completely excluded from the political realm. That being said, inclusive political representation is a far-reaching expectation from a country that is just about loosening the reigns of its monarchy.
The UAE’s unique model of state capitalism is characterized by its complex system of state ownership/intervention, where the Leviathan is the sole, majority, or minority investor in almost every sector of economic activity, locally and internationally. It has the most diversified economy in the GCC, and while almost all the emirates still rely on oil revenues, Dubai’s small, open, and free-moving economy has been the cornerstone of the nation’s development strategy. Over the years, Dubai has developed a regime that implements liberal economic policies with minimal restriction on capital inflows and outflows, and little to no taxes on labour and capital (with the exception of oil companies and foreign banks that are liable to pay 10% as corporate tax). The city-state’s “build it and they will come” development strategy has served its rulers well so far, barring the massive hit during the financial crisis of 2008, which it overcame thanks to the support of the federal system. Its many attractions bring in millions in tourism alone, as locals continue to capitalize on foreigners' Orientalist fantasies and conglomerates bring the best of the world's luxuries to one place, making it Hollywood's new Las Vegas. Dubai has also managed to capitalize on diasporic desires, as it is the new hub of the International Cricket Council, hosts numerous international sporting tournaments, and even has a Bollywood-inspired theme park. But while Dubai’s economic success is different from that of the other emirates, it is highly influenced by UAE’s common federal policies: exchange rate policy, fiscal policy, ownership policy, taxation, and company law is all federal, as is the policy of aligning the Dirham with the US Dollar and the resultant alignment with US monetary policy.
It is this diversification and free movement of capital and labour that make Dubai and the UAE so attractive to foreign investors and skilled workers. The foremost driving factor for immigration into the UAE is, of course, the enticing promise of a tax-free income. Dubai and Abu Dhabi’s glamorous, luxurious malls, attractions, and availability of world-class restaurants and brands make life there very exciting, and the idea of a multicultural environment in the workplace and at educational institutes is also appealing to many expatriates. Many, like Lindsay Lohan, find a sense of peace, privacy, and security in the UAE that does not exist in the West, and even their exclusion from the public sphere comes wrapped in the façade of a welcoming sense of anonymity. Else, they tend to accept the loss of certain rights as a package deal that comes with the high quality of life and financial stability in the UAE. Most needs of expatriates and skilled migrant workers are already being met by the current administration and their competitively high incomes in so many different ways, that the demand for a pure democratic institution does not really exist.
That being said, this cushy sense of belonging is only shared by those expatriates that work white-collar jobs. The focus of the country's economy on real estate and infrastructure development makes it heavily reliant on migrant labour from South and Southeast Asia. The UAE has been subject to grave criticism with respect to the mistreatment of this migrant labour class, who often complain of brutal working conditions, having their paychecks and passports withheld by their employers, and having to work shifts of more than 12 hours. The Kafala visa sponsorship system that governs this migration has been singled out by the Human Rights Watch for perpetuating some of the worst worker abuse in the world, and has been considered widely to be a modern form of indentured labour. Yet, labourers continue to migrate in flocks, many of whom voluntarily give up these rights so as to earn a much better salary to send back home to their families.
With respect to human rights in general, the UAE leaves much to be desired. Its Federal Judiciary, which is founded on the principles of Sharia law, civil law, and international law, has been criticized for being discriminatory to women and minorities. Many of the extremely harsh punishments provided under UAE law - lashing, stoning, flogging, and even hanging - have proven to be successful deterrents, but perhaps some of the laws themselves need reconsideration to keep up with the changing demography of the country. For example, with the exception of pregnant women and children, it is illegal to eat or drink anything in public during fasting hours in the month of Ramadan, and this rule is applicable to tourists and non-Muslims as well, who constitute around 14% of the country's population. Current laws do not really provide women recourse from domestic abuse, and many who report sexual violence are charged with the crime of zina or illicit sex before the investigation even begins. Furthermore, women in the UAE require permission from their male guardian for marriage, divorce, and even employment. The UAE’s abysmal consideration for free speech seems to be an urgent matter of contention too — it is illegal to be critical of the government, police officials, and the royal family. The HRW has called this a 'sustained assault on freedom of expression', as UAE residents who speak about human rights issues are detained, imprisoned, or tortured. For this article itself, expatriates living in the UAE declined to comment on their experiences fearing legal action, even though these experiences have been largely positive.
The UAE’s case of free-market experimentation is an outlier in the Arab world, and while it has a long way to go to reach even a semblance of what we understand as a true liberal democracy, its structures reflect a lot of the market values that govern it. The merger of modern political institutions with religious and cultural traditions, the creation of a constitution to guide political systems, and the independent status of the judiciary all reflect the benefits of decentralization and power-sharing, even without the existence of political parties. This undeniable economic liberalization in the UAE, however, does not really warrant a very pressing case for democracy, as its leaders and people are mostly content with the existing system. The opinion in several parts of the Arab world, whether true or untrue, is that democracy hinders high economic development, and not vice versa. With the exception of Kuwait, the richest Arab states are the farthest away from democratization or electoralism. Hence, even if democracy does eventually arrive in the UAE, the country’s already liberalized, educated, and prosperous citizens are likely to strongly oppose it. The sovereign state’s unique position will, however, continue to draw criticism in the international system for its seemingly hypocritical blend of free-market principles and continued human rights infringements. It is remotely possible that the UAE's dependence on its non-Emirati immigrant population will force it to undergo a new wave of social liberalization sans democracy, but given the proven economic success of the current model, it is highly unlikely to change anything in this regard, at least in the near future.
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