As the West continues to fret over an “imminent” Russian invasion of Ukraine, the crisis in Europe has opened a narrow window of opportunity for Turkey. Ankara has realised that if it plays its cards correctly, it stands to reap significant economic and strategic benefits.
This is exactly why Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Kyiv earlier this month and met with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky. During the meeting, while both leaders sought to strengthen ties in all fields, a major portion of the talks were dedicated to the ongoing crisis between Ukraine and Russia, and Turkey’s role in mediating the dispute.
Erdoğan was vocal about his opposition to a Russian invasion of Ukraine and openly stated his support for Kyiv. “We continue to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Crimea,” Erdoğan proclaimed. He also urged both sides to “defuse” tensions by engaging in diplomatic negotiations and even offered to host a summit to resolve tensions between Kyiv and Moscow.
In fact, Turkey’s support for Ukrainian sovereignty is not a new development. Ankara called the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 “unlawful” and even rejected Russian parliamentary elections held in Crimea in September last year as having “no legal validity.” In this respect, it was not surprising when Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu recently said that “it would not be right for Russia to invade” Ukraine.
Also Read: The Success of Turkey’s Drone Programme is a Product of US Sanctions
Unlike Western powers, who have approached the Ukraine crisis with a more value-laden approach that is centred around concerns about democracy and sovereignty, Turkey’s motives are entirely rooted in economic, geopolitical, and cultural outcomes.
For instance, the main focus of Erdoğan’s visit to Ukraine was to secure a drone deal. As part of the visit, Ukraine and Turkey signed an MoU to coproduce the highly vaunted Bayraktar TB2 drones, which completely destroyed Armenia’s Russian military hardware and gave Azerbaijan a comprehensive victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Ukraine had already signed a contract with Turkey in 2019 to purchase six TB2s for $69 million; however, given the drones’ game-changing performance in 2020, Kyiv ordered an additional 24 drones. Moreover, in October last year, Ukraine tested a Bayraktar in the Donbas region against Russian-backed separatists to deadly effect, a move that angered Moscow, which has called Turkey’s sale of TB2s to Ukraine “destructive” and “provocative.”
The sale of drones to Ukraine not only benefits Turkey economically, especially at a time when the country is facing an economic crisis, but also allows Ankara to project power in a new region. So far, drones alone have enabled Turkey to shape outcomes of conflicts in the South Caucasus, Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, and Iraq in its favour and entrench itself as a major player. In this respect, Ukraine’s use of Bayraktar’s against Russia would ensure that Ankara has a major say in any negotiations.
Ankara’s support for Kyiv also stems from the fact that Turkey and Russia are Black Sea states and have conflicting interests in the region. For example, Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Russia accuses of defensively expanding near its border, and Ankara has objected to Moscow’s expansion of its Black Sea fleet.
While Turkey has traditionally been considered to hold leverage in the Black Sea (as it controls the entry of traffic through the Bosporus Strait in and out of the region), Russia has been attempting to alter the Black Sea’s status quo. In 2008, it invaded and occupied the Georgian Black Sea province of Abkhazia and in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and took control of the port of Sevastopol. According to experts, Russia’s annexation of Crimea “tipped the balance of military power in the Black Sea in favour of Russia.”
Since 2014, Moscow has expanded its Black Sea fleet by stationing new warships and submarines in Sevastopol and also established a network of defensive equipment across the region, including the S-400 and S-300 missile defence systems. Against this backdrop, Erdoğan said in 2016 that the Black Sea has become a “Russian lake” and urged NATO to take a proactive role in the Sea.
Moreover, despite the tensions, Turkey has largely abided by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates the passage of warships of non-Black Sea states through the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits. Last week, Turkey even allowed a Russian submarine to cross the straits into the Black Sea. As per the Convention, Turkey is obliged to permit warships of Black Sea states to pass through the straits.
While this was a display of Turkey’s commitment to the Convention, an outbreak of war in Ukraine could change the situation. NATO could pressure Turkey to allow the entry of US warships into the Black Sea and close the straits to Russia. Therefore, Turkey’s call for mediating the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is meant as a measure to prevent such a scenario from taking place as well to halt Russia’s expansion in the Black Sea.
On the cultural front, Crimea is home to a significant population of Tatars, a minority Turkic ethnic group that follows Islam and is indigenous to the region. Turkey has historically supported the Crimean Tatars; in fact, Erdoğan met with a delegation of the ethnic community during his recent visit to Ukraine. Crimean Tatars have also been a historically marginalised community and were subject to expulsions from the region during the Soviet era. Given that Erdoğan has positioned himself as a leader of Muslims globally, Turkey is also motivated by its desire to support the interests of the Crimean Tatars, who believe they are a part of Ukraine.
However, while backing Kyiv will provide Ankara with several benefits, Turkey’s Ukraine policy could also prove to be a double-edged sword. Turkey and Russia are historical rivals, and the Ottoman and Tsarist empires fought a dozen times between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. More recently, both countries have clashed in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
That being said, both sides have also tried to resolve their differences and engage in mutually beneficial ties. For instance, Turkey defied its NATO allies when it decided to purchase Russia’s S-400 missile defence system in 2017, a move meant to please Moscow after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border in 2015. The incident led to a major diplomatic spat between both sides, and Moscow even went as far as imposing economic sanctions on Ankara, including a ban on flights, tourism, and natural gas exports.
Since 2016, both sides have managed to improve ties and normal relations have been restored. However, by supporting Ukraine, Turkey is walking a tightrope and is no doubt aware that it risks Moscow levelling renewed sanctions. Such a situation would prove to be devastating for both Turkey’s already withering economy and Erdoğan’s cloudy political future. For example, if Russia were to cut off gas supplies to Turkey, energy prices in the country would skyrocket, compounding its severe inflation and Erdoğan’s declining popularity.
Given this precarious scenario, it would theoretically be ideal for Turkey to take a neutral stance in the conflict and try to appease both sides, but neutrality would hardly serve Ankara in this case. Given that Russia has emerged as a major challenger to its historical dominance in the Black Sea region, Turkey has no choice but to court Ukraine, which will inevitably lead to friction between both countries. Therefore, while Turkey stands to make major gains by backing Ukraine, it also risks sparking a confrontation with Russia, and as long as Ankara continues with its current policy, frequent skirmishes with Moscow are bound to happen.