Alongside India and China’s enduring dispute along their shared border, the two Asian giants are also facing up to become the front-runners in supplying coronavirus vaccines to developing countries. The groundwork for their ventures was laid by the void created by American and European “vaccine nationalism”, which has widened the gap between the global demand for the COVID-19 vaccine and its availability in the market. Both India and China have stepped in to create an economical and easily accessible vaccine, as compared to the Pfizer and Moderna alternatives. Their endeavours to supply vaccines to partnered countries also have serious implications for their battle for geopolitical influence, particularly in South Asia, which forms a crucial backbone of both countries’ foreign policy strategies. Against this backdrop, it is becoming increasingly evident that India will inevitably emerge victorious in this diplomatic tussle, allowing it to make a giant leap in its long-term vision of being crowned as the leader of the South Asian region.
As the “pharmacy of the world” and the largest vaccine manufacturer, India plays a crucial role in meeting the global demand for vaccines. Keeping this in mind, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to use India’s “vaccine production and delivery capacity to help all humanity in fighting the coronavirus crisis.” In fact, since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, India has ramped up its production and export of medicines such as paracetamols and hydroxychloroquine, and supplied crucial medications to around 133 countries worldwide, drawing the praise of States and global bodies like the World Health Organisation (WHO).
Although India has used this unique opportunity to satiate global demand to expand its footprint worldwide, it has continued to reaffirm its commitment to its “friendly neighbours” across South Asia. Consequently, India pledged $10 million to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’s COVID-19 emergency fund. Its vision to emerge as a humanitarian leader in South Asia was further materialised after Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla reassured that India’s “first priority” for the delivery of Made-in-India vaccines will be its “closest neighbours”. Accordingly, India launched the “Vaccine Maitri” campaign, a “grant assistance programme” for COVID-19 vaccines. In pursuance of this campaign, India has already begun delivering the vaccines to several neighbouring countries, including Bhutan, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal.
Its efforts, though, have been closely matched in the region by China. As most countries have ruled the Western candidates out due to their prices and the difficulties posed by their storage and delivery requirements, China provides an alternative to India’s more economical vaccine. In fact, China beat India in the race to enter into bilateral agreements with several countries, such as Nepal, Myanmar, and Pakistan, for its Sinovac Biotech vaccine candidate. Nepal, whose government is headed by the pro-China K.P. Sharma Oli, has been used as a testing ground for China to conduct its vaccine trials. Meanwhile, both Myanmar and Pakistan have already placed enormous orders for the Sinovac candidate. Chinese officials have also held meetings with representatives from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
Despite its affordability and accessibility, however, the Chinese vaccine candidate has engendered misgivings about its efficacy. For example, a survey conducted by Bloomberg Quint in Karachi concluded that most people did not trust a Sinovac Biotech vaccine. Likewise, in Myanmar, whose government has already signed up for an enormous supply of the Sinovac vaccine, media reports questioning the candidate’s efficacy have instilled distrust amongst the population. These fears have further been materialised through the research conducted by the Butantan Institute in Brazil, which contradicted the Chinese government’s claim that the vaccine had shown over 78% efficacy rates, and instead suggested that the Sinovac vaccine was merely 50.4% effective.
The scepticism surrounding Chinese-made products has become somewhat of a theme over the course of this pandemic. For example, in March 2020, millions of Chinese-made masks, protective gear, and rapid testing kits were returned to their sender after the recipient countries claimed that the products were defective. These incidents sparked widespread discontent, with several leaders being accused of purchasing sub-standard equipment in a bid to boost their friendship with China. For India, who can now capitalise on the cloud of distrust surrounding the Chinese vaccine, this has paved a smooth path to market its domestically produced candidates and emerge as the region’s top vaccine supplier.
Since the beginning of this year, India has evidently prioritised its South Asian neighbours in its vaccine diplomacy. For instance, during his recent meetings with Nepalese and Sri Lankan leaders, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar vowed to ensure the supply of the two India-made vaccines to both countries. This potentially allows India to invoke a pro-India sentiment among the masses in those countries. This could, in turn, cause a course correction in their governments’ foreign policy approaches, which have in recent times sought to expand ties with China, possibly at the expense of harmonious relations with India.
This vaccine diplomacy can allow for India to reconcile ties with Bangladesh, which reached an all-time low after the passage of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act in 2019, when Home Minister Amit Shah called Bangladeshi migrants “termites”. Since then, India has engaged in multiple diplomatic visits and bilateral conversations and recently “gifted” two million vaccines to the country.
Similarly, Afghanistan, which has adopted a relatively balanced approach with regards to the India-China power tussle, has also been included in India’s “Vaccine Maitri” vision. Furthermore, aside from using these troubling times to mend ties with scorned allies and countries who are growing closer to China, India can also leverage this opportunity to foster closer ties with countries who are growing increasingly wary of China, such as Bhutan, whose Sakteng wildlife sanctuary was claimed by China in July 2020, and the Maldives, which has adopted a more pro-India stance since the 2018 electoral defeat of Abdullah Yameen and the instalment of President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. Therefore, Bhutan and the Maldives have unsurprisingly been the first beneficiaries of the “Vaccine Maitri” campaign, thereby strengthening their already flourishing friendships with India.
In what represents perhaps a bit of a longer shot, India could potentially use vaccine diplomacy to steer negotiations with it Pakistan, its age-old rival. Pakistan is already a part of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations’ (GAVI) COVAX initiative, through which it will receive enough doses to meet the demand of 20% of its population. Hence, this leaves 80% of its population dependent on accessing the vaccine through bilateral ties. However, due to financial and infrastructural constraints, along with the Pakistani government’s promise to provide vaccines “free of cost”, the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines have been ruled out as a realistic option. With distrust amongst the Pakistani population tainting the Chinese vaccine, Pakistan could turn to India to meet its domestic vaccine needs. In fact, the Oxford-Astrazeneca vaccine, which is being produced by the Serum Institute in India, has already been approved by the Pakistani Drug Regulatory Authority, showing that Pakistan appears to be optimistic about being at the receiving end of India’s humanitarian approach.
However, India is unlikely to make this negotiation an easy one for Pakistan. While officials from the India government have said that tensions between the two counties are not going to impact the supply of “life-saving” medicines and vaccinations, India will likely use this as a tool to pressure the Pakistani side into implementing policies to crack down on terror financing and state-sponsored terrorism. The vaccine can also be used as a starting point for bringing Pakistan to the negotiating table for critical issues such as Kashmir. However, keeping in mind the history of rivalry and hostile relations between the two countries, this is unlikely to result in any material change between the two sides, perhaps forcing Pakistan to rely on the Chinese alternative.
Despite the allure of securing long-term geopolitical and security interests in South Asia, India must tread carefully in its efforts to win its vaccine diplomacy race with China. Numerous questions have already been raised regarding the Indian vaccine candidates’ approval procedure, and several states have reported “adverse” reactions to the vaccines. Against this backdrop, any untoward incident could impact India’s carefully weaved diplomatic relations, even with its friendliest allies. Hence, in order to avoid the same fate as China, India’s drive to emerge as the leading vaccine supplier for South Asia also must be complemented with ensuring overall safety in production, delivery, and administration of the vaccines. Failing to do so may lead to further worsening of diplomatic relations with its South Asian neighbours, and risk causing the exact opposite result that India’s vaccine diplomacy effort sought to achieve—that is to expand its diplomatic footprint.
The Vaccine Battle With China is Set to Yield Monumental Benefits for India in South Asia
With India spearheading the deliveries of its two domestically produced vaccines, it is one step closer to realising its vision of containing China’s growing influence in South Asia.
January 21, 2021
SOURCE: ECONOMIC TIMES