United States (US) House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei has drawn international attention to the China-Taiwan conflict, with countries including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Russia reaffirming their opposition to actions that endanger the peace and security of the region. India, however, has maintained a “studied silence” by not issuing any statement on the visit or voicing support for the ‘one-China’ principle. Even during the recent ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit, when members reaffirmed their support for the one-China Policy in a joint statement, Indian officials refrained from making any comment on the issue.
However, while India has successfully balanced its Eastern and Western alliances during the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the same silence will not be sustainable in a seemingly inevitable military conflict between Beijing and Taipei, particularly in light of India’s growing economic ties with Taiwan and its geopolitical ambitions across the Indo-Pacific.
India has historically supported the ‘one-China’ policy and has not recognised Taiwan as an independent nation or established formal diplomatic ties with the island since its split from China in 1949. In fact, for decades after the split, all of India’s communications with China made a ceremonial mention of India’s compliance with the policy and its respect for Beijing’s historical sensitivities.
Since 1995, all diplomatic engagements with Taiwan have been conducted through the India-Taipei Association, which is headed by Indian diplomats, and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre in New Delhi.
However, in recent years, India has begun taking a softer stance on Taiwan in light of simmering tensions with China, particularly at their border. India has been further unsettled by Chinese development projects with Pakistan in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and has also previously been irked by China’s decision to issue stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir instead of regular documents.
This confluence of factors prompted a meeting between the erstwhile Indian Prime Minister (PM) Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2010. The heightened tensions at the time were exemplified by the joint communiqué’s omission of any mention of the ‘one-China’ policy, which had been a staple in joint statements until that point. In fact, even the Chinese statement on the meeting made no mention of the policy.
While India has largely maintained that its position on Taiwan remains unchanged, over the years, it has slowly and steadily inched away from its commitment to the ‘one-China’ policy.
For instance, in 2014, PM Narendra Modi invited Taiwanese Ambassador Chung-Kwang Tien for his swearing-in ceremony. More recently, after the 2020 Galwan Valley skirmish, India’s erstwhile joint secretary (Americas) in the Ministry of External Affairs, Gouranglal Das, was deployed to Taipei as the ambassador.
The loss of soldiers in Galwan is deeply disturbing and painful. Our soldiers displayed exemplary courage and valour in the line of duty and sacrificed their lives in the highest traditions of the Indian Army.
— Rajnath Singh (@rajnathsingh) June 17, 2020
In the same year, two members of parliament from the ruling party, Meenakshi Lekhi and Rahul Kaswan, virtually participated in the swearing-in ceremony of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.
Apart from India’s flourishing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, another incentive for New Delhi to break its silence and support Taiwan’s cause against China is their expanding economic partnership.
Following the implementation of the Bilateral Investment Agreement in 2005, bilateral trade with Taiwan rose from $2 billion in 2006 to $5.7 billion in 2020. In fact, India was Taiwan’s 17th largest trade partner in 2020, while Taiwan was India’s 31st largest trade partner.
Taiwan has also become a crucial part of India’s “Act East Policy,” while India is likewise one of the pillars of Taiwan’s “Southbound Policy.”
At this year's @YushanForum, I shared how #Taiwan & our New Southbound Policy is part of the solution to a range of key challenges facing Asia & the world. Taiwan stands with our like-minded partners in support of regional security, prosperity & peace. pic.twitter.com/sexF4wEYKl
— 蔡英文 Tsai Ing-wen (@iingwen) October 8, 2021
In fact, last December, when asked if India is looking to elevate ties with Taiwan even further, Indian Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs V. Muraleedharan said in the Rajya Sabha that India is actively looking to expand “interactions in areas of trade, investment, tourism, culture, education and other such people-to-people exchanges.”
In particular, Taiwan is a critical player in the global semiconductor supply chain, accounting for 64% of the global foundry market and semiconductor manufacture and export. Given the global trend of a rise in the demand for electronic parts and equipment since the onset of the pandemic, this could give India yet another reason to abandon its “loud silence” on Taiwan.
On the diplomatic front, India’s increased involvement in the Quad may also see it take a stronger stance against China’s destabilising and expansionist activities in the region at large, including the Taiwan Strait. In fact, one of the founding principles of the Quad is the push for a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
My remarks at the Quad Leaders Meeting in Tokyo. https://t.co/WzN5lC8J4v
— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) May 24, 2022
Moreover, while India has previously refrained from wading in on the Taiwan issue due to its respect for what it saw as China’s internal affairs, its motivation to do so may be diminishing in light of China’s own repeated comments on India’s Kashmir dispute with Pakistan.
As other Quad allies step up their support for Taiwan—as evidenced by Japan’s 2022 White Paper describing it as an “extremely important parter” and the US’ “New Guidelines” on ties with Taiwan as well as Biden’s vow to defend Taiwan “by force”—India could soon follow suit and elevate its diplomatic ties with the island nation.
Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose members have delivered billions in military assistance to Ukraine, the Quad has thus far been described as “more symbolic than substantive.” However, there are indications that this could be beginning to change. For instance, in May this year, the alliance pledged $50 billion to expand monitoring and surveillance as a counterweight to China, which can be deployed to check its military aggression in the Taiwan Strait.
Against this backdrop, Indian opposition MP Shashi Tharoor has suggested using Taiwan as a means to recover the pre-2020 status quo along India’s Line of Actual Control with China. However, it is the very importance of achieving this goal, alongside China’s economic indispensability, that is likely to inhibit India from taking the risk of elevating its friendship with Taiwan beyond “episodic and momentary highs.”