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Hong Kong’s Loyalty Law Is Another Nail in the Coffin of its Autonomy

Hong Kong’s new Loyalty Law is a reflection of an already brewing reality that dissent against China will be met with sticks and stones.

May 28, 2021

Author

Chaarvi Modi
Hong Kong’s Loyalty Law Is Another Nail in the Coffin of its Autonomy
SOURCE: ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP/GETTY

On May 12, Hong Kong’s legislature approved a new law that will allow the government to remove public officials from office and bar candidates from standing in elections if they are deemed “disloyal” to local authorities or China. Aptly called the Loyalty Law, the law is the latest effort in a series of measures taken by Beijing to intensify its crackdown on the sovereign freedoms of Hong Kong, which is legally designated as an autonomous region under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy, enshrined under the Basic Law. Though the Loyalty Law has attracted a lot of criticism, it is merely another nail in the coffin of Hong Kong’s autonomy, as China moves ever closer to unifying the region under a single system.

In recent years, Beijing’s efforts to quash dissent have gained swift momentum. Last June, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) unanimously approved the national security law (NSL), bypassing Hong Kong’s own legislature. The draconian law’s open-ended and ambiguous language punishes activities of secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces. Realistically, this can be applied to the simplest acts of resistance. Even while the NSL was still in its drafting process, international actors began wondering what this would mean for Hong Kong; and the United States (US), in fact, went one step further and stopped recognising the region as autonomous.

Almost immediately after the passing of the NSL, hundreds of protestors, including leaders such as Jimmy Lai and Joshua Wong, were immediately arrested and those caught fleeing to Taiwan were jailed. Next, Hong Kong’s Education Bureau called on schools to review and revise textbooks in order to “stress Chinese identity” and make sure they do not violate the law. In July, a dozen pro-democracy candidates were disqualified from running in the September election for “colluding with foreign forces”. In November, four opposition members were expelled from the Hong Kong legislature shortly after Beijing passed a resolution allowing local authorities to expel legislators who were deemed a threat to national security without having to go through the courts. Making matters easier for Beijing, the remaining 15 opposition members of the 70-seat Legislative Council also resigned en masse in a show of protest. Furthermore, the Basic Law was amended to ensure that only “patriots” vetted by Beijing could contest elections. Finally, with the latest law, those found guilty of violating their loyalty oath can be subject to criminal prosecution.

There is no doubt that the road to freedom has been downhill for the former British colony since the passing of the watershed law. But the newest law raises questions whether it really makes things worse for the financial hub or if it just puts into law a reality that has long been quietly brewing in Hong Kong. To ascertain this, we must survey the freedoms that the financial hub had and those that have already been taken away prior to its passing. 

Responding to Statecraft on how the law has changed decision-making in Hong Kong, Michael C. Davis, the Professor of Law and International Affairs at O. P. Jindal Global University, said “Yes, Hong Kong did have a vibrant opposition in most of the years since the handover… Previously, this heavily pro-Beijing Election Committee only chose the Chief Executive. Legislators only had to swear loyalty to the Basic Law. (Now,) In violation of the Basic Law, the NSL put in place mainland controlled bodies to enforce the law and set up special police and prosecution units.” Referring to the newest law, he said “This new package effectively requires loyalty to the new NSL and effectively to China’s Communist Party.”

Therefore, while it can be said that some direct change will come about from the imposition of the loyalty law in terms of which candidates even stand a chance to be elected and enjoy popular support in the term they will be fated to serve, it has been agreed by international affairs analysts that Hong Kong’s sovereignty has been an illusion since the imposition of the NSL itself, which resulted in a complete and blatant overhaul of its remaining democracy. However, it is essential to consider here that sovereignty can comprise a wide variety of facets and especially so in the case of Hong Kong, whose premise of autonomy had many layers of complexity ever since its handover from the United Kingdom (UK) to China in 1997.

Elaborating on these nuances further, a UK-based doctoral student researching Hong Kong told Statecraft that because Hong Kong still officially operates under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework, wherein the city is independent to make decisions on certain issues, but must defer to China for other decisions such as foreign affairs and defence. He opined that Hong Kong, in theory, still possesses the freedom to decide on its internal affairs completely independently.

Pointing out that Hong Kong’s ability to agree on international treaties on its own is set out in the Basic Law, Article 151, the researcher said: “On external relations too, we see that Hong Kong is a separate entity from China in institutions such as the WTO (World Trade Organisation), various customs agreements, etc. All [of] Hong Kong’s external relations, however, are vetted by the Chinese central government and they have the ultimate say on how Hong Kong positions itself vis-a-vis the world. So, if you are talking about being sovereign in the international relations kind of sense: Hong Kong is sovereign up to a point—it is a very important financial centre, and the city gets plenty of freedom to enter into agreements on economic/customs affairs, basically most things that help to solidify Hong Kong’s position as a trading centre because that ultimately benefits China too.”  

However, the researcher expressed concerns about how this theory manifests itself in reality, saying: “Hong Kong’s capabilities of making its own decisions on internal affairs were in serious doubt for a while already. I think the implementation of the national security law really threw out any last notions of Hong Kong being ‘sovereign,’ if you will.” He concluded by saying that the new loyalty law “is only a further confirmation of the tight grip that the central government has had on Hong Kong’s internal affairs for the last couple of years.”

Keeping this in mind, it seems clear that the Loyalty Law does not drastically alter a situation that has already seen a near-complete erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy, sovereignty, and democracy. However, it does offer legal support for actions that were already being carried out in a clandestine manner. The new law acts as
another safeguard measure for the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government, under instructions from the mainland, to impose vague requirements of patriotism on civil servants, through which anyone who doesn’t fit Beijing’s required profile legally disposable. In essence, the NSL is now acting as a launching board for additional laws like the Loyalty Law to allow Beijing to tie up any loose ends and punish even the smallest acts of subversion in its so-called “autonomous” territory.

Author

Chaarvi Modi

Assistant Editor

Chaarvi holds a Gold Medal for BA (Hons.) in International Relations with a Diploma in Liberal Studies from the Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University and an MA in International Affairs from the Pennsylvania State University.