Following a much-awaited moment, Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh addressed the Parliament regarding the ongoing India-China border dispute. “India has conveyed to China that attempts to forcibly alter Sino-Indian boundary is not at all acceptable. Respect Line of Actual Control [LAC], no unilateral attempts to change the status quo and respect bilateral protocols. These are three principles for peace at the border. China has violated 1993 and 1996 agreements on boundary dispute,” Singh stated. The statement reflects New Delhi’s growing antipathy towards its neighbour, which stands in stark contrast to when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi initiated a “reset” policy in 2018 to improve relations with Beijing after the Doklam military standoff.
Interestingly, India is not the only country to take offense to China’s growing assertiveness. The United States (US), for instance, is currently embroiled in a trade war with China, and is simultaneously challenging Beijing’s military maneuvers in the troubled waters of the South China Sea (SCS). At the same time, Australia approached the United Nations (UN) on the SCS issue, rejecting China’s claims and calling them a violation of international law. The move made Australia the first country outside the SCS region to file a petition against China at the UN. Similarly, ties between China and Japan have been strenuous, with the latter working to keep Chinese fishing boats away from the disputed waters around Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.
These incidents indicate point to two factors: first, there is visible hostility towards China’s growing expansionism amongst the US, Japan, Australia, and India; second, and more importantly, the growing anti-China sentiment in India and Australia is creating tangible opportunities to resuscitate the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
The strategic grouping, comprising of the US, Japan, Australia, and India, originated under non-political circumstances in 2004, when the four members got together to respond to the massive earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. At the time, the Quad’s response was viewed as a “multilateral disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operation”. What began as a humanitarian venture, soon assumed a strategic dimension in 2007, when the four countries informally met on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum. What followed was Quad’s first naval exercise, which was perceived as an attempt to “facilitate conversation and cooperation between the four maritime democracies in the context of the rise of China”. In the aftermath of this exercise, however, China took offence to what it saw as an anti-China venture, resulting in Australia pulling out, as it did not want to jeopardize its bilateral ties with the economic giant.
In 2017, the four countries once again came together, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the countries “like-minded” partners and called on them to back his call for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. Referring to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Abe remarked that “the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and prosperity. A “broader Asia” that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.” The remark was widely interpreted as a significant step towards consolidating the Quad. However, since the speech, only modest developments have taken place—until this year.
Amidst burgeoning anti-China sentiment in all four countries, the group now has the potential to become a more serious endeavour. At the same time, China itself has hastened the resolve of the countries by expanding its Belt and Road Initiative projects, wherein China’s previous strategy of “hide your strength, bide your time” has been replaced by a bolder policy of “community of common destiny”. In recent months, this climate of increasing hostility towards China has been further crystallized by its obfuscation of the spread of COVID-19, its increased assertiveness along the Indian border and in the SCS, and the growing discord in Taiwan, all of which have given rise to the possibility of the Quad emerging as an effective counter to China.
Derek Grossman, a Senior Defence Analyst at RAND Corporation, argues that, so far, the Quad has been hesitant to identify Beijing as its “primary target”. However, in what appears to be a significant new development, the two outliers, Australia and India, now appear to be changing their position. Unlike in 2007, in its 2017 Foreign Policy White paper, Australia affirmed its support for dialogue with Japan, India, and the US, stating, “Australia is open to working with our Indo-Pacific partners in other plurilateral arrangements.”
Furthermore, in July, there was speculation that India planned to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise to be held later this year. The trilateral maritime drill is conducted between India, Japan, and the US. Currently, the decision to include Australia, according to an Indian official, has been delayed due to the ongoing standoff with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Another reason for the delay is likely due to the COVID-19 situation. The addition of Australia, if it materialises, will bring all the Quad countries together as part of the annual war games and signal a major shift in India’s Indo-Pacific plans. In this context, at the sidelines of the annual US-India Strategic Partnership Forum, the deputy secretary of the US State Department, Stephen Beigun, said, “It is a reality that the Indo-Pacific region is actually lacking in strong multilateral structures. They don’t have anything of the fortitude of NATO, or the European Union,” and added, “There is certainly an invitation there at some point to formalize a structure like this.”
Although there are positive indications that the Quad will soon be formalised, the grouping has some inherent obstacles. Benjamin Zala, a researcher at Australian National University, contends that “seeking to constrain Chinese power is an extremely important downside”. On the surface, China appears to be the uniting factor for the Quad’s formation. However, upon closer inspection, China is also revealed to be the dividing factor, wherein the members continue to be reluctant to strain ties with Beijing. For instance, Japan, whose commitment to the Quad is unquestioned, had once sought to move closer to China, but its policy fell through in 2010 due to tensions in the East China Sea.
Similarly, India has tried to engage China both economically and strategically by joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2017. In fact, New Delhi has been labelled as “hardest to read” within the Quad regarding its stance on China. This can be attributed to India’s divergent threat perception of China when compared with that of the US, Australia, and Japan. New Delhi’s policy is shaped by its geographical proximity to Beijing, making it more vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. Furthermore, India’s practice of strategic autonomy stands in contrast to Japan and Australia, who both have security guarantees from the US.
The Japanese and Indian examples demonstrate how threat perceptions amongst the Quad members are highly varied, posing a challenge to synergise the grouping as a formal anti-China bloc. Moreover, labelling Quad as a grouping that exclusively aims to contain China could hamper other crucial domains of cooperation—such as disaster policy coordination and the interoperability of navies in the Indo-Pacific—as states, as seen in the past, are wary of engaging with each other in a manner that can be perceived as isolating China. While there does seem to be somewhat of a change in this dynamic, PM Scott Morrison, for example, has engaged in damage limitation during Australia’s current tensions with China by continuing to highlight the “mutually beneficial” relationship the country shares with the East Asian giant on whom they are so economically dependent.
Another challenge the strategic idea of Quad faces pertains to its very membership. There have been calls by Washington to expand the grouping to include South Korea, and a case has been made for Indonesia as well. Therefore, there is a discernable vagueness within the Quad, both in agenda and membership. At the regional level, the Quad has been viewed as a competing framework to ASEAN. A survey conducted by Huon Le Thu on perceptions of Southeast Asians regarding Quad indicates a distinct difference in opinion among ASEAN members. The survey found that Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia were most favourable in their perception of Quad, while Indonesia, Singapore, and Cambodia viewed Quad as “challenging ASEAN centrality” and “sidelining ASEAN architecture”.
Nevertheless, in spite of these obstacles facing the formulation of Quad 2.0, the current environment continues to present a unique and perhaps unprecedented opportunity to concretise this grouping. However, this requires a coherent set of objectives that do not only centre around China, better policy coordination, and perhaps an expansion of membership so that it isn’t seen as a challenge to existing multilateral organizations. In doing so, the Quad can signal its intent of opposing Beijing without becoming a formal grouping, thereby retaining its strategic relevance without compromising the members’ autonomy.
Growing Anti-China Sentiment is Strengthening the Quad
The Quad—a grouping which originated in 2004 and comprises of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States—has a unique and unprecedented opportunity to be resuscitated in the ongoing environment.
September 17, 2020
Heads of Quad states (left to right): Australian PM Scott Morrison, Indian PM Narendra Modi, Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, and US President Donald Trump. SOURCE: REUTERS/THE WIRE