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Does the Armenian Diaspora in the West Really Understand What Armenia Wants?

Support from young Armenians in the US & EU has mainly been advocacy, but is this enough?

July 24, 2020
Does the Armenian Diaspora in the West Really Understand What Armenia Wants?
Kim Kardashian West with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in 2019
SOURCE: THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Since the rekindling of fighting at Nagorno-Karabakh over the past few weeks, Armenian diaspora in the West—particularly in the United States—have been extremely vocal on digital platforms regarding their concerns for the “occupation” of Artsakh and “Armenian land” by Azerbaijan. This is not the first time that Armenian-Americans and Europeans have rallied popular support for their homeland, but growing ‘illiberalism’ and disconnection with modern sentiments of the Armenian diaspora among the nation’s leadership brings in to question the effectiveness of such advocacy abroad.

Armenia is one of the few countries in the world whose diaspora is more than double its own population—the country houses 3 million people, but 2 million ethnic Armenians live in the US alone. And although Armenians have been living in Russia, Turkey, parts of Europe, and North America for centuries, the 1915 genocide, followed by the 1920 Soviet takeover of the country, were stirring points in not just the exodus of people from the country, but also the creation of a new sentiment deeply entrenched in the collective memory of trauma and loss. As noted by Ulrike Ziemer, a senior Sociology professor at the University of Winchester, “Being Armenian thereafter also meant being a survivor of the genocide and a member of a community of sufferers, whose suffering continues to be denied by the perpetrators and their allies.”

The stubbornness of Turkey and its allies to recognize the genocide further fuelled these sentiments and has carried onto hostilities between diaspora communities abroad as well. For example, several Armenians still insist on calling Azerbaijanis “Turks” due to their shared ethnic, linguistic, and, of course, Ottoman legacy with Turkey. The resolve of foreign Armenians was further strengthened by their concern and care for the very existence of their homeland after the 1988 earthquake and in the backdrop of the ever-looming Karabakh conflict. Therefore, understandably, Armenian communities abroad are knit in a way that is similar to those of Israel. One could argue, however, that the desire to return home in the former is far less than the latter, which is espoused by the fact that more and more Armenians leave the country every year than those who go back. This is despite Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s insistence that “any Armenian living outside their homeland should realize that their ultimate goal is to return”. 

It is undeniable that Armenians from across the world have been instrumental in financing the state since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The political power of the disproportionately large diaspora community was so high at one point, that, in 2007, foreign groups were able to overturn a 1995 ruling that outlawed dual citizenship. Further, Armenian laws provide for a special passport for families and descendants of those who survived the genocide, with all rights except that of voting. The government has, for several years, regarded diaspora relations as a “significant component” of their foreign policy and national security, recognizing the role of foreign communities as being able to provide “a serious degree of economic and cultural potential, especially as a means to promote trade, tourism, preservation, development and publicizing of the cultural heritage…to foster Armenia’s global integration and consolidation of democracy”.

In the US, where ethnic lobbying is rampant—as illustrated by the highly significant pro-Israel lobby and the heavy involvement of the Donald Trump administration in the Palestine issue—the Armenian-American lobby has stood out as a close contender. Even though they account for less than 1% of the country’s population, the community is well-organized and has ample financing mixed with celebrity support, making it highly significant to the political sphere. And despite differences in origin, socioeconomic status, and political opinions, the universal recognition of the Armenian Genocide and international support to the homeland seem to be points where all Armenians unite, not just in the US but across the world.

Public pressure from the Armenian-American lobby led to the passing of Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act in 1992, which banned US aid to Azerbaijan for nearly 9 years, making the country the only Post-Soviet state that did not receive assistance from Washington in establishing economic and political stability post-independence. The Section was amended in 2001, however, with powers given to the President to waiver it if necessary, an option which has been exercised by each President since George W. Bush. Further, several high-profile members of the US Congress who were closely connected with the Armenian National Assembly of America (ANCA), a leading lobby group, were instrumental in passing a landmark October 2019 resolution in the House of Representatives that officially recognized the genocide. Turkey’s President Recep Erdoğan, on his visit to Washington later that year, said that the move had deeply hurt sentiments in his country and that it has the “potential to cast a deep shadow over [our] bilateral relations”.


See also: Turkish National Security Council Reiterates Support to Azerbaijan in Armenia Conflict


Despite these ‘wins’ in the US, there is a major discord among the new generation of Armenian-Americans regarding their demands and wishes for their homeland. Some experts believe that it was the diaspora who blocked the diplomatic rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan via the 2001 Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, due to their objections to the mission and timing of the initiative, as well as the representatives involved in the process. Further, their demands from the Turkish state for an official confession, public apology, and possible reparations for the damage hampered the possibilities of further mediated talks between the two states.

Hence, the popular sentiment within Armenia is that the Western diaspora is more interested in international issues and recognition and does not necessarily understand the cultural heritage of the country that predates the Genocide by over 3,000 years. The liberal nature of the US and Europe to openly discuss international politics and criticize policies has also led to a sense of alienation with Orthodox Armenians and those living in the increasingly conservative society back home, especially with respect to their free condemnation of political practices in the nation. For example, in 2016—a year that saw a reignition of violence in Karabakh—a group of 23 Armenian diaspora celebrities signed an open letter that appealed to international communities to solidify their commitment towards the collective advancement of Armenia. The late Charles Aznavour, a French singer-superstar, wrote in the letter, “The goal of our enemies, whoever they may be, is to destroy Armenia […] however, the greatest threat comes from within us, and it is through inaction.”


See also: Armenia National Assembly Hastily Passes Constitutional Court Amendments


Further, a movement spearheaded by political science professor Anna Ohanyan in the US to involve the diaspora in election monitoring in the 2017 parliamentary elections irked locals. In July 2016, a Beirut-born war veteran from Karabakh took over a Yerevan police base for two weeks, citing grievances over the government’s handling of the Karabakh situation and the rampant corruption in the administration. In an obvious dig to his foreign-born opponents, then-President Serge Sargsyan responded to the criticism by saying that the Armenian capital “was no Aleppo or Beirut”. It is worth noting that no diaspora-born leaders have held any prominent governmental positions in Armenia since 2008, with US-born former foreign minister Raffi Hovannisian losing the country’s 2013 presidential election.

The resurgence of the Karabakh conflict, however, has seen a parallel resurgence of performative nationalism from diaspora Armenians in the West, especially on social media during the current pandemic. With celebrities like controversial Armenian-American reality star Kim Kardashian West openly calling for support to Yerevan in Artsakh as her husband, rapper Kanye West, rallies unsuccessfully for a Presidential seat, new platforms and voices have certainly sparked a novel international interest in the regional security interests of the South Caucasus—although one does not know how long this buzz will last. Simultaneously, ethnic lobbies in the US and the EU have been rallying with their respective governments to impose punitive measures on Azerbaijan to force it into solving the issue non-militarily, but to no avail as yet.

In the backdrop of all this, it is important to note that the country’s diaspora across the world is highly diverse in its thought and organization, especially with respect to what should constitute the future of the nation. Recent efforts by the Armenian government to attract diaspora investments into the country from the West, especially in the wake of the pandemic, have been thwarted by growing distrust in the administration and the country’s investment climate in general. In contrast, they have had far more luck with diaspora communities living in Russia and Turkey in terms of tangible involvement in internal affairs like business and infrastructure development.


With reports of a car bombing outside the Armenian consulate in Berlin just yesterday, the conflict has taken a new dimension of physicality outside the disputed territories. We are now are waiting to see how diaspora from all sides of the conflict residing in Germany, as well as local leadership, react to the attack. This move may push the EU into taking a more proactive stance towards the issue, which it has skirted so far. Ultimately, however, the reality is that governments on all sides of the Karabakh conflict are stubborn and unwilling to negotiate, at least right now, to reach a conclusive end to their conflicting and uncompromising demands. The Pashinyan government has been quite unrelenting in its support for the Artsakh Republic, whose legitimacy Baku refuses to even acknowledge. All sides are simultaneously struggling to deal with the public health and economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic. Therefore, Western Armenian diaspora may continue to perform its lip service and internationally rally a regional issue, but their efforts may just be in vain, as the ideas of what the nation expects from them—investments, infrastructure, development—does not seem to take priority in their advocacy.

Author

Hana Masood

Former Assistant Editor

Hana holds a BA (Liberal Arts) in International Relations from Symbiosis International University