!-- Google tag (gtag.js) -->

China is Unfazed by Marcos’ Decision to Recalibrate Ties With the US

Marcos Jr's administration has made clear that its loyalty lies with Washington. However, Beijing has not given any indications that it is concerned by this new development.

October 18, 2022

Author

Chaarvi Modi
China is Unfazed by Marcos’ Decision to Recalibrate Ties With the US
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (L) with President Joe Biden in New York.
IMAGE SOURCE: AP

During his meeting with his American counterpart Joe Biden along the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly Debate last month, Filipino President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. underscored that Manila views and has always considered Washington as an ‘ally, friend, and partner,’ particularly as they confront “the challenges of this new century.” 

Likewise, just a few days before their meeting, Marcos said he could not envision not having the US as a partner, declaring, “When we are in crisis, we look to the United States.”

Biden reaffirmed the sentiment by acknowledging that although bilateral ties had been through “some rocky times” under Marcos’ predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, their alliance remains “a critical, critical relationship.”

At first glance, this appears to be a marked shift away from the Duterte administration, under which the Philippines
repeatedly threatened to tear up the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), a crucial military pact governing the presence of American troops in the Philippines. In this respect, Marcos’s recent remarks have been interpreted as an attempt to undo some of the damage done to ties with the US under Duterte, who once declared that the Philippines had “separated” from the US and aligned itself with China, both militarily and economically, proclaiming: “America has lost.”

Throughout his six-year-long presidency, Duterte did his utmost to improve ties with China, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, during which he even agreed to set aside their historic territorial spat in exchange for millions of free doses of Chinese COVID-19 vaccines and billions of dollars in loans, aid, and investment.

Last May, the former president also issued a gag order on his cabinet preventing his ministers from talking about the South China Sea (SCS) dispute in public, saying, “China remains to be our benefactor. Just because we have a conflict with China does not mean to say that we have to be rude and disrespectful.”

The Philippines also explicitly acknowledged its inability to challenge China’s territorial claims, with Duterte saying that Beijing is “in possession” of the disputed waters and that Manila cannot afford a military confrontation. 

Against this backdrop, Marcos ran on a platform that promised to maintain the Philippines’ strong alliance with the US and be warier of China. To this end, he said he was considering “extending” and “redefining” the VFA due to the “changing environment” in the region.

He has also hinted that he will take a strong approach against China by upholding the 2016 international ruling that upheld the legitimacy of the Philippines’ maritime claims against China and denied Beijing’s historic claims, declaring that they are “incompatible with the Convention” and “exceed the limits of China’s maritime zones.”

Although China has refused to abide by the ruling, Marcos has emphasised, “We have a very important ruling in our favour and we will use it to continue to assert our territorial rights. It is not a claim. It is already our territorial right.” He has thus vowed to take on China with a “firm voice” and not cede a “single millimetre of [the Philippines’] maritime coastal rights.”

In fact, the Philippines filed 52 protests against China over their dispute in the SCS in the first 70 days of the Marcos presidency, with Bloomberg’s Andreo Calonzo noting that this was “more than a tenth” of the 388 such protests lodged during Duterte’s six-year presidency.

Marcos has also made several thinly-veiled references to Chinese aggression during meetings with regional partners. For instance, during his meeting with Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong last month, Marcos called for the “peaceful resolution of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, in accordance with international law.”

Likewise, during their meeting in New York, both Marcos and Biden “underscored their support for freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes.” In particular, Marcos hailed the United States’ (US) role “in maintaining the peace in [the] region,” which he said is “something that is much appreciated by all the countries in the regions and the Philippines especially.” “We continue to look to the US for that continuing partnership and the maintenance of peace in our region,” he stated, effectively confirming that he has no plans to abandon the VFA.

Keeping these developments in mind, Chinese President Xi Jinping told Marcos in their first phone call: “If you do not know where you have come from, you cannot go far,” urging him “to carry forward the friendship” and maintain the Philippines’ “independent foreign policy.” He noted that
“In the past six years, China and the Philippines have adhered to the good-neighborly friendship, worked together for common development and established a comprehensive strategic cooperative relationship.”

Referring to Duterte’s willingness to keep aside thorny issues in his dealings with Beijing, Xi said that both sides have thus far “effectively managed differences through dialogue and consultation, actively promoted practical cooperation in various fields, and achieved fruitful results in bilateral relations.” 

Yet, despite this vaguely worded rhetoric, China has taken little action to prevent the Philippines from recalibrating ties with the US. For example, it said nothing this month after 2,500 Filipino and American marines, as well as 3,000 troops from the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, participated in the Kamandag exercises, off the coast of Japan’s Hokkaido. The exercise featured the use of the US’ High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which recently helped Ukraine gain a leg up in its war with Russia, and its F-35B supersonic fighter jets. 

Similarly, unlike in the case of Taiwan, China made no public retaliation after US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in August vowed that the US would militarily defend the Philippines in the SCS in the event of an armed attack by China. 

It has also refrained from commenting on the host of protests the Marcos administration has filed over their SCS dispute.

This is in large part due to the fact that it does not consider the Philippines to be a threat.

 

For instance, last May, after hundreds of Chinese boats were found within the Philippines’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), then Filipino Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin put out a harshly worded tweet comparing China to “an ugly oaf,” and “politely” asked Beijing to “get the f*** out.”

Duterte also took a number of aggressive measures such as increasing the Philippines’ naval presence in the SCS, with his administration describing Chinese incursions as “a threat of war.” 

Eventually, however, China called the Philippines’ bluff and forced it to back down, ultimately resulting in Duterte saying that Beijing is in full possession of the SCS and barring his Cabinet from speaking on the matter. This point has been echoed by analysts such as Jay L. Batongbacal, the head of the University of the Philippines Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea, who said,
Duterte’s antics have never impressed them to change their strategic views or postures.”

Other analysts have said this could also because China does not place a huge price on its relationship with the Philippines and is therefore willing to risk it. Herman Joseph S. Kraft, the head of the University of the Philippines’ Political Science Department, argues that the lack of action from Beijing may be due to the fact that “there is really very little substance to the relationship beyond mutual declarations of friendship expressed by the Chinese government and vice versa.”

It thus comes as no surprise that China views Marcos’ outwardly strong stance as nothing more than bluster. China remains the Philippines’ second-largest trading partner and a key regional ally. Therefore, despite Marcos attempting to recalibrate strained ties with the US, China clearly does not foresee any significant change to the status quo. 

Author

Chaarvi Modi

Assistant Editor

Chaarvi holds a Gold Medal for BA (Hons.) in International Relations with a Diploma in Liberal Studies from the Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University and an MA in International Affairs from the Pennsylvania State University.