!-- Google tag (gtag.js) -->

On Tuesday, in a rare action, the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) announced the sentencing of three military officers for human rights violations in Northern Rakhine during its strike against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The decision was made by a court-martial investigating atrocities against the Rohingya in the western state, and according to the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, the soldiers were found guilty of not “performing their duties for defense, security and regional peace”. However, no further details were revealed about the perpetrators, their crimes, or their sentences.

While this may appear to be uncharacteristically honest for an otherwise defiant military, a deeper examination reveals this move to be superficial and aligned with the Tatmadaw’s long history of averting international punishment and criticism for crimes against humanity, by simulating domestic efforts towards accountability.

The announcement comes as Myanmar faces charges of genocide at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stemming from its brutal 2017 crackdown against the Rohingya. Over the last 4 years, approximately 750,000 Rohingyas—including 400,000 children—have fled to neighboring Bangladesh, carrying with them horrifying accounts of widespread murder, rape, torture, and arson inflicted by security forces.

Myanmar authorities have consistently denied these claims, maintaining that the strikes were not targeted attacks against the Muslim minority, but rather necessary operations to root out insurgents and terrorists near the western border. However, in the face of mounting international pressure, in July 2018, the Myanmar government set up the Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICOE) to investigate allegations of human rights abuses during the 2017 crackdown. In January of this year, the findings of the ICOE indicated that “war crimes” may have occurred in Rakhine an admission particularly extraordinary, given the military’s reputation for suppressing dissenting information. The ICOE conceded some security personnel had used disproportionate force and committed serious human rights violations, including the “killing of innocent villagers and destruction of their homes”. Conversely, and perhaps most importantly, the panel concluded that the crimes did not constitute genocide, saying: “There is insufficient evidence to argue, much less conclude, that the crimes committed were undertaken with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”

The commission’s conclusions were hardly surprising, given its composition, vague mandate, and serious lack of independence. Philippine diplomat Rosario Manalo who led the ICOE had previously said that there would be “no blaming of anybody”, calling it a “very bad approach” to peace, despite the panel’s website stating its intentions to assign accountability for any violations. Additionally, a spokesperson from Myanmar’s president’s office said earlier this year that the commission was created to respond to “false allegations” made by the UN agencies and other international organizations about the situation in Rakhine. Myanmar has regularly stifled any independent investigations into its affairs and banned UN special rapporteur Yanghee Lee from the country, arguing that international justice must come into play only if domestic accountability fails.

Simply put, the ICOE exercise was Myanmar’s get-out-of-jail-free card—a means to show the international community that Myanmar was serious about setting up accountability measures and human rights, while Naypyitaw retained the power to decide the nature of measures to be taken against the “perpetrators”. Given the strong influence of the military on the civilian government, it is not a stretch to say that there was too much impunity, with little-to-no accountability. Given this background, there is no reason to believe that Tuesday’s announcement—which was devoid of any crucial details—is any different from such efforts to peddle a kind of closure about what happened in 2017 and move towards business as usual.

Myanmar has constantly faced criticism—in the form of General Assembly resolutions, sternly worded statements from UN envoys, and targeted sanctions against Tatmadaw commanders—from various international powers and bodies for its actions against the Rohingya. However, no measures have really worked to alter the country’s troubling behaviour, and the recent ICJ rulings do not provide any major breakthroughs either.

On January 23, 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Myanmar to take immediate measures to prevent the genocide of the Rohingya population. In contrast to the ICOE’s findings, the court observed that “there is a real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights invoked by The Gambia”, and indicated four specific “provisional measures” in this regard, as requested by the West African nation in its November 2019 application to the ICJ. The Gambia sought proceedings against Myanmar for violating the 1948 Genocide Convention. The court demanded that Myanmar take steps to prevent further genocidal acts by its own forces or by groups over which it has any “control, direction, or influence.” It also ordered Myanmar to preserve any evidence of wrongdoing under the Genocide Convention. The court further stated that Myanmar would be required to submit a report to the ICJ on the steps it is taking to comply with these orders and that The Gambia was entitled to submit comments on Myanmar’s report.

Though the decision has been heralded as an important step towards establishing accountability for the deadly violence inflicted on the Rohingya, there are multiple challenges that stand in the way. For starters, it is completely unreasonable to expect the very institutions that committed the crimes to investigate and punish themselves. Myanmar authorities have shown time and again that they have no interest in bringing perpetrators of mass rape and killings to justice, and have themselves been known to cover up evidence of their wrongdoings. In late April of this year, Yanghee Lee, in her final statement as UN special rapporteur, warned that the Tatmadaw is escalating its assault on ethnic communities in the Rakhine and Chin states while the world remains preoccupied with COVID-19.

Since June 2019, eight townships in Rakhine and Chin states have been under the world’s longest government-enforced internet shutdown, leaving large swathes of people unaware of the coronavirus pandemic and significantly hampering efforts to relay information about COVID-19, protocols on self-quarantine and other practices to restrict the spread of the disease. The government claims that it is within its rights to impose such restrictions, as Article 77 of Myanmar’s Telecommunications Law authorizes the Ministry of Transport and Communications to suspend or restrict certain forms of communication during “an emergency” situation. Amidst increasing hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army, UN Human Rights Chief Michelle Bachelet said on Tuesday that at least 2,800 people have already fled Rakhine in the last few weeks, and the number could reach 10,000, due to rising concerns of the military engaging in “clearance operations” against insurgents. The 2017 crackdown was called a “clearance operation” by the Tatmadaw as well.

The biggest roadblock to any tangible justice, however, lies in the basic structure of the UN court itself. The ICJ has no mandate to enforce its judgments. This means that the onus of any real progress lies in the hands of the Myanmar government and military if it chooses to follow the court’s provisional measures order. Given that Myanmar authorities continue to claim that they have not committed genocide— and the ICJ is still finding ways to prove genocidal “intent” — they have no reason to change anything that they are currently doing. In the case of a violation of the decisions of the ICJ, actions can only be taken through the UN Security Council, and with China—a veto-wielding power—by Myanmar’s side, it is unlikely that the Council will be able to make any significant headway towards greater accountability. With international agencies essentially serving as wrist-slapping mechanisms with little enforcement power, statements by any international bodies or officials are just that—statements. While the court’s ruling is an important symbol of international recognition of the Rohingyas’ plight, it, unfortunately, cannot do the one and only thing the Rohingyas have asked for—guarantee their protection.

Author

Janhavi Apte

Former Senior Editor

Janhavi holds a B.A. in International Studies from FLAME and an M.A. in International Affairs from The George Washington University.