Once a reliable military ally, the Philippines now appears poised to walk out on a long-standing military agreement with the United States of America. Last week, President Rodrigo Duterte announced his decision to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the US, signed in 1998, which gives US government jurisdiction over its personnel and allows US troops visa-free access to train at military installations across the Philippines.
By unilaterally abrogating the VFA defence partnership, Duterte has single-handedly upended the security calculus of not just the Phillippines, but also the entire region, and maybe even the world. And although Trump has downplayed the importance of the VFA, top military officials in Washington believe it to be a significant turning point in American strategy in Asia.
The Philippines' strategic importance to the US is evident in its foreign policy and military presence in the country. However, relations between the two have been fraught with tensions, stemming from cultural grievances and the complexities of their shared 120-year-old history.
The relationship between the two countries dates back to 1898, the end of the Spanish- American war, when Spain ceded colonial control of the island to the United States. The American occupation led to a brutal struggle, the Philippine-American war, which according to some estimates, resulted in the death of as many as a million Filipino citizens. But under American guidance, the southeast Asian country became an autonomous Commonwealth in 1935, which will eventually lead to the country gaining independence in 1946 and the adoption of democratic values and political institutions. Since then, the Philippines Islands have been pivotal in furthering America's presence in the Asia-Pacific.
Despite their differences and historical baggage, the military-to-military plank of the alliance has always been healthy. America has around 20 bases or military facilities spread over 90,000 hectares, with at least 25000 US military and civilian personnel in the country. On top of that, the archipelagic nation is home to the only US Veterans Administration office and the largest American military cemetery outside the United States. Today, both countries have at least 300 bilateral engagements and military exercises each year. America, along with being the largest source of grants to the Philippines government, also provided around half a billion dollars in military assistance to Manila in the last three years.
So why is the Philippines hell-bent on disrupting a historical and favorable partnership, and why does Trump not seem to care about another southeast Asian nation potentially moving into China's orbit?
The tensions escalated last month when Manila banned two US senators who inserted provisions into the US 2020 State & Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill that targeted Philippines officials over human rights abuses. These prohibitions banned Filipino officials involved in the wrongful imprisonment of former Filipino Senator Leila De Lima from entry to the US. Making matters worse, in late January, former national police chief and Duterte's long-term confidant, Dela Rosa, who had presided over the brutal crackdown on drugs, was denied entry to the US.
In the early part of this decade, the Philippines was a key part of the US' "Pivot to Asia" strategy, aimed at counterbalancing China's growing power and assertiveness. In fact, Manila was seen as a bulwark against Chinese aggression in the region, especially in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute, taking Beijing to the international tribunal in The Hague over its actions and controversial claims in the contested region. In early 2016, right before the national election and subsequent victory of President Duterte, the court ruled against China, which China refused to acknowledge and accept.
Nobody predicted that Duterte–someone who pledged to stand up to China, even if it meant riding a jet-ski with the Philippines flag into disputed waters–would agree to "shut up" about the SCS in return for some Chinese investments once elected President. Everyone assumed that his mildly critical views of the US and its presence were just a part of campaign bluster and a part of a hedging strategy vis a vis China.
Occasional disagreements with the Obama administration's position on human rights and his subsequent rants against the alleged US hypocrisy and imperialist mindset were somewhat concerning. Yet, his threats were not taken seriously. Donald Trump was much more focused on revisiting and re-evaluating the US' decade-old partnership with NATO and other traditional allies in his election rallies.
Once in power, while courting the Chinese for investments and aid, Duterte declared that the US and the Philippines were inevitably moving towards "separation", famously saying, "I want, maybe in the next two years, my country free of the presence of foreign military troops. I want them [Americans] out."
Nevertheless, with his populist image and a Trumpian approach to international affairs, it was predicted that with Trump in the Oval office, things would change for the better. However, Duterte moving away from the US has less to do with disagreements with American sermons on human rights and values than is recognized.
Although there are widely-held expectations of reconciliations, the scrapping of the VFA cannot merely be seen as a Filipino attempt to leverage its position and recalibrate the partnership. This is not a sudden pivot, and as Duterte said himself, he is "not joking this time." He has stood his ground in the face of opposition from both Defense and Foreign Security officials, who highlight how this move is potentially detrimental to the nation's security, even at sub-regional and multilateral levels.
By terminating the VFA, one of the three pacts governing the US-Philippines defence relationship, the rest of the agreements will be weakened as well, diluting the two countries' strategic convergence even further. For Manila, a diminished US presence will hurt its fight against terror groups like Abu Sayaf, and force it to fend off an aggressive China by itself. Apart from losing $12 billion in revenue, it will also lose vital access to intelligence, training, and support during natural disasters and other non-traditional threats.
Donald Trump–who despises alliances in general and was dismissive of the development, saying, "I really don't mind, if they would like to do that"–should also seriously asses what's at stake. His emphasis on 'allied parasitism' and burden sharing with NATO and other allies might not have had an immediate impact on the regional security architecture, but this approach in Asia will be counterproductive. Trump administration has welcomed this move and tried to highlight the futility of the pact, whose termination will "save the US a lot of money". But in reality, it is a big blow to the Asian maritime order, especially given that the next closest US ground base in the region is 1300 miles away in Okinawa.
Following Trump's comments, the American security establishment went into damage control mode with US Defence Secretary Mark Esper terming the event "unfortunate" and "a move in the wrong direction". But this time, the damage may be irreversible, especially if you consider the possibility of this becoming a grudge match between the two headstrong leaders.
Even if things change within the 180 days cooling-off period, this will be seen as the first tangible retreat by an Asian country under Trump's watch. America's power projection capability will be paralysed in the region, hurting its credibility as a dependable ally. This hole in the US security umbrella will also embolden China, which will be encouraged to continue its adventurism and push boundaries, both figuratively and literally.
Reference List
Bernstein, R. (2020). The Paradox of Rodrigo Duterte. Retrieved 24 February 2020, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/02/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-china/606754/
Javad Heydarian, R. (2020). How Duterte Turned the Philippines Into China's New Play Thing. Retrieved 24 February 2020, from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-duterte-turned-philippines-chinas-new-play-thing-125946
Kurlantzick, J. (2020). US-Philippines Relations Take a Hit as Duterte Axes a Key Military Pact. Retrieved 24 February 2020, from https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28549/us-philippines-relations-take-a-hit-as-duterte-axes-a-key-military-pact
Panda, A. (2020). Duterte’s Gamble on the US-Philippines Alliance. Retrieved 24 February 2020, from https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/dutertes-gamble-on-the-us-philippines-alliance/
Stavridis, J. (2020). The U.S. Can’t Afford to Lose the Philippines. Retrieved 24 February 2020, from https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-02-21/the-u-s-can-t-afford-to-lose-the-philippines-to-china
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