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What’s Really Behind Turkey’s Opposition to Finland and Sweden’s NATO Applications?

The Erdoğan government understands that Turkey is crucial to NATO’s strategic ambitions, especially when it comes to quelling the Russian threat.

June 1, 2022
What’s Really Behind Turkey’s Opposition to Finland and Sweden’s NATO Applications?
Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan holds a news conference during the NATO summit at the Alliance’s headquarters in Brussels, Belgium June 14, 2021.
IMAGE SOURCE: REUTERS

Amid Russia’s intensifying assault on Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has dramatically stepped up its support for Kyiv and taken a raft of measures to contain Moscow. As part of these measures, NATO has sought to bring Finland and Sweden into its fold in a bid to expand the alliance and pressure Russia along its borders. However, the two Nordic countries require the unanimous approval of all members.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, however, has insisted that he will not support Finland and Sweden’s entry as long as they continue supporting Kurdish militants. Ankara’s opposition to opening NATO’s door to Helsinki and Stockholm is thus not based on any ideological differences, even if they may exist; rather, it indicates that it will protect and advance its strategic and security interests at any cost, even if it means endangering ties with critical allies. 

For instance, Turkey has supported Ukraine and condemned Russia’s assault on the country and has even backed other NATO initiatives aimed at countering Russia. However, it is no secret that Turkey and other NATO countries, including the United States, continue to disagree over certain policies of the Erdoğan government, like Turkey’s wars in Iraq and Syria, and its decision to purchase Russian S-400 missile defence systems. Therefore, Turkey’s latest stunt is evidently aimed at pressuring the alliance to cave in to its demands.

A case in point is Ankara’s opposition to Kurdish militants like the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and the People’s Defence/Protection Units (YPG), which it views as terrorist organisations. Both the PKK and YPG have launched attacks against Turkey for years and intensified their operations following the eruption of the Syrian civil war in 2011. In particular, Turkey has fought a decades-long war against the PKK, which seeks to carve out an independent Kurdistan, a part of which lies in Turkey

In this regard, Turkey has accused Finland and Sweden of harbouring Kurdish militants and their supporters as well as providing them with support. To this end, it has demanded that the two Nordic countries extradite these “terrorists” as a precondition for supporting their NATO application.


According to Turkey expert Sinan Ülgen, Ankara understands that as a long-standing member of NATO, it has significant leverage over the policies of the group and hence is using its power to pressure Helsinki and Stockholm to alter their stance on the PKK and YPG. “Turkey wants these countries to acknowledge its own security concerns related to terrorism,” Ülgen says, adding that, “NATO has to have unanimous support for new members, so this reality will compel Stockholm and Helsinki to give serious consideration to Ankara’s concerns.”

Turkey took its pressure politics to the extreme last week after announcing that it would launch another operation in northern Syria to create a safe zone from Kurdish militants. Knowing that NATO members require its support to enable the expansion of the alliance, Turkey has carefully picked this period in time to expand its operations, knowing that opposition is likely to be subdued. Containing Russia is the alliance’s biggest concern at the moment and therefore its plans to invade Syria are likely to be quickly forgotten or ignored.

Additionally, the Erdoğan government understands that Turkey is crucial to NATO’s strategic ambitions, especially when it comes to quelling the Russian threat. From a geopolitical perspective, Turkey provides NATO and the West with significant advantages over Russia. Firstly, Ankara is located at the crossroads between Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, allowing NATO countries to easily access regions close to Russian zones. For instance, Turkey shares a maritime boundary with Ukraine and controls the only border crossing with Syria, in which Russian troops have an active presence. It also shares a border with Georgia, the only country that stands in the way of NATO territory near Russia’s southwestern border. Additionally, Turkey’s sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits gives it control over traffic going in and out of the Black Sea. This means that Turkey could cut off Russian access to the Black Sea as well as the Mediterranean Sea, which would prevent Russia from being able to supply logistics from its base in Syria to its Black Sea bases, including Crimea.

Acutely aware of this indispensability and having come upon the most opportune moment to use it to its advantage, Turkey has even threatened to quit NATO if its demands are not met, a threat that it is unlikely to follow through with but one that members cannot dismiss out of hand due to the potentially disastrous repercussions it could have. 


Turkey’s intransigence also has to do with its ambitions of becoming a global power. In recent times, Turkey has played a crucial role in shaping conflicts in Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ethiopia, and Ukraine, emerging as a major mediator in most of these conflicts. Furthermore, Turkish-manufactured weapons have also been used by belligerents in these conflicts to devastating effect. For instance, Ukraine has used Turkish Bayraktar drones to demolish Russian artillery, tanks, and armoured vehicles. In this respect, forcing Finland and Sweden and indeed all 29 other NATO members to accede to its demands would significantly boost Turkey’s ability to project itself as a global power.

Keeping this in mind, it is possible that Turkey’s preconditions for accepting their applications won’t stop at expelling PKK and YPG militants. It could also manipulate this situation to re-enter the US’ F-35 fighter jet programme, after it was kicked out of the initiative by Washington over its decision to purchase the Russian S-400 anti-missile system. Indeed, it could also demand the removal of sanctions over its purchase of the Russian equipment.


Another reason for Turkey’s decision to block Finland and Sweden’s bids is to boost the government’s popularity. Especially since Erdoğan’s Justice and Development (AKP) party has become increasingly unpopular over a largely government-manufactured economic crisis. Erdoğan has been blamed for the country’s economic woes due to his reckless lowering of interest rates even as inflation has continued to skyrocket. Turkey’s inflation rate touched almost 70% in April, with basic food prices jumping by 89.1%. Its currency lost 44% of its value last year and has dropped by an additional 11% since January. In t

Keeping this in mind, his decision to stand up to the West and present himself as protecting Turkey’s interests could bring the public back onside, particularly with the presidential election less than a year away. In fact, according to Ülgen, “The government’s approach [to Finland and Sweden] has bipartisan support in Turkey and is not a dividing line in domestic politics” and has helped Erdoğan “gather political support domestically and to appear as the strong man internationally.”


All things considered, Turkey has taken a calculated gamble in opposing the NATO applications of Finland and Sweden, determining that being viewed as an unpredictable partner is an acceptable cost in order to virtually guarantee that it is able to advance its strategic interests, project its power, and consolidate domestic support. 

Author

Andrew Pereira

Senior Editor