Escalation of tensions, in any part of the world, raises global concerns, leaving countries to evaluate what is at stake for them and how they should respond. West Asia is no different; in fact, it’s been at the center of the biggest geopolitical shifts over the last few decades. Quite often, what may seem like a tinderbox of military conflicts or religious divide, actually causes ripples across the globe.
America’s assassination of Iranian General Qassem Sulemani and the subsequent Iranian missile attacks might be the single most significant event in world politics since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Events are being closely monitored by all nations for different reasons with varying degrees of interest. India, though, has more at stake than most, with multiple diplomatic and foreign policy challenges emanating from the ongoing conflict. It is crucial not just because of the unprecedented level of animosity and destabilizing actions by both parties involved, but also because of the critical juncture at which India’s relationship with the two countries currently stands.
Even before the use of direct military force, the Indian government and the commentators at home envisaged the challenges of balancing relations with the two countries while simultaneously protecting regional interests. Indian concerns center around energy security, connectivity initiatives, and the safety of the Indian diaspora in the region.
India currently imports 84% of its oil and gas, much of it from the Middle East. In a faltering economy with a revenue crunch, oil price increases risk exacerbating India's trade deficit and inflation, potentially forcing the government to slash taxes.
Presently, the economic ramifications of the ongoing conflict have been limited as oil prices have only increased by 4%. Moreover, over the last few years, in anticipation of such destabilizing global events, India has diversified its trade portfolio and secured assurances from Gulf countries such as the UAE to make up any shortages in oil supply.
The larger issue is not whether India has secured continuous energy supply, but whom it is more dependent on now. This dilemma is not new and precedes Donald Trump. For instance, from 2014 to 2015, American policymakers framed Indian purchase of Iranian oil as non-compliance to American requests undermining American strategy.
Recently, after Donald Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, the US unleashed harsh and comprehensive sanctions on Iran. Under the “maximum pressure strategy,” the US hopes that internal and external pressure will force Tehran to renegotiate the terms of the deal. Thus, secondary sanctions were introduced against anyone who traded with the Iranians, resulting in punitive actions, even against traditional US allies and partners. At the end of 2018, in a bid to grant some relief to its allies, America exempted eight countries from sanctions and allowed them to purchase Iranian oil temporarily, which included India, China, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. This temporary measure was America giving them a deadline, by the end of which they needed to have essentially substituted Iran as an importing source for their energy requirements.
Even before the expiration of the exemption, Delhi reduced its Iranian imports. Until last year, India was the second-largest purchaser of Iranian oil; it stopped Iranian oil imports completely from May last year. Some have suggested that this is indicative of India ceding its “strategic autonomy” to American whims and fancies and losing sight of its partnership with Iran. The fallout was immediate; Iran's foreign minister said India was being bullied and that “it had expected its allies to be more resilient in the face of US pressure.”
Nevertheless, the portrayal of India's actions as a betrayal of its 70-year diplomatic relationship with Iran may be slightly exaggerated. Rocked by internal strife and protests against the regime, combined with economic challenges, Iran is not in the position to dictate terms to long-term allies and isolate itself further.
Interestingly, in 2005, when Indo-Iranian relations were at height of instability, after India voted against Iran at the IAEA, the same man whose death has sparked the ongoing Iran-US conflict was the one who defused tensions between Iran and India. When tempers flared, then Brigadier General Qassem Sulemani, smiled and said that “Iran would remain India’s friend” in a meeting with Indian officials.
Although Narendra Modi has aligned India more closely with the US, India has also reiterated that it won’t be a global lieutenant for America, like Great Britain, during the Cold War. The US, too, recognizes that it cannot force India to explicitly choose sides.
By reducing its oil imports, India has done its bit, and the Trump administration recognizes it needs to meet India halfway. This is seen in the form of American waivers or exemptions to India on issues where Trump seems uncompromising. For instance, India was exempted from sanctions despite buying Russian arms, including the S-400 missile systems, while others such as Turkey were not extended the same courtesy. In addition, Washington also issued an exemption for the Iranian-Indian venture of Chabahar Port, acknowledging its strategic and economic importance to India.
Simultaneously, India has sought to assuage Iranian fears that it is reneging on longstanding diplomatic ties. On his way back from the 2+2 dialogue in Washington DC with his American counterpart, the Indian foreign minister visited Tehran, announcing an $85 million purchase of equipment for the Chabahar port. This was merely a week before Sulemani’s death. Critics might argue that US strikes and Iran’s retaliation changes things, but there is very strong political will and consensus in India with regards to the port, making an Indian retreat unlikely.
The Chabahar port presents an opportunity for India to counter Chinese naval presence in the region and act as a check on Chinese power as a whole. This is of significant value to the US, especially at a time when Trump has called on allies to indulge in greater burden-sharing.
On the other hand, given the unpredictability of Trump's approach to foreign affairs–with an unmatched willingness to leverage and weaponize trade, and dictate terms to allies–one cannot entirely dismiss the possibility of India being forced to pick a side. Trump is often consumed by his desire to win 'bigly' at all costs and force enemies and allies alike to massage his ego and bend to his will.
Today, Trump asks India to cut imports from Iran. Tomorrow he could ask it to impose tariffs on China or ban Huawei; the day after, he could ask it to walk back on weapons trade with Russia. The periodic pacification of American concerns cannot be replaced by a permanent self-imposed marginalization of India's other interests and partnerships.
India must exercise restraint in picking between a growing strategic partnership with a global power and preserving traditional partnerships with regional allies, and not make a choice before it is asked to do so. Currently, India is one of the few nations with good relations with both Iran and the US, which is of indispensable importance to both nations in de-escalating tensions. If India is to pick a side, it risks losing diplomatic agency and flexibility by indicating that it can be bullied into submission.
Therefore, unlike many Iranian allies, India has referred to Soleimani's death as a "killing," rather than an assassination. Simultaneously, it has called for a de-escalation in a region “of the utmost importance.” Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, in fact, "shared India's concerns and interests" to his US counterpart Mark Esper indicating clearly how India, much like other nations won't be too supportive of further escalations.
Intervention is unnecessary when India has all to lose and seemingly very little to gain. American reluctance to impose sanctions and Iranian reticence to explicitly call India out is an endorsement of India's economic and strategic value to both nations. Under Modi, India has professed multi-alignment over non-alignment, and thus while India is unlikely to speak out in favour or against either nation, it can use its growing diplomatic capital to act as a mediator between Iran and the US.
Reference List
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