For decades, the Bodos, a Tibeto-Burmese ethnic group and the largest plains tribe in Assam, have sustained a bloody armed struggle demanding their own separate state. In a historic move on 27 January, the Government of India signed a tripartite peace accord with insurgent groups that would lead to over 1600 cadres laying down their arms. But how is this deal different from previous accords, and is it enough to sustain long-lasting peace?
It is essential first to understand the complicated history of this conflict. The Bodos were once the sole inhabitants of the Brahmaputra north bank, but during the pre-colonial era, they were victims of large-scale land alienation; large portions of their traditional land were either expropriated by the government or transferred to other communities. Doubled with internal and illegal international migration to these areas, the Bodos became reduced to a minority population in Assam, brewing discontent among the community since the 1960s. By 1979, Bodo leadership decided to actively support and participate in the rebellion led by the All Assam Students’ Union against illegal Bangladeshi migrants, in the hope that an anti-foreigner move would evict settlers on Bodo land.
However, the resultant 1985 Assam Accord and the increasingly popular Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) seemed to only serve the interests of Assamese-speaking people. The AGP continued to discriminate against the Bodos, leading to growing indignation and a clear demand from the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) for the creation of a new state called Bodoland.
When this demand was ignored by the government, Bodo insurgents issued notices to non-tribal residents warning them to vacate their homes, and also executed many pro-administration Bodo leaders. The ensuing violence resulted in 350 deaths between February and August 1989 alone.
The first attempt to end Bodo violence by way of regional autonomy came about in the 1993 tripartite accord signed between the Central government, the Assamese government, and the Bodo people, who were represented by the ABSU and the Bodo People’s Action Committee. This agreement paved the way for the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) to partially fulfill the factions’ demands for maximum autonomy in matters of “social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement” in designated Bodo-majority areas.
But the 'failure' of the government to comply with their demand of incorporating non-Bodo majority villages into their new territory convinced many that the struggle needed to become more violent to be able to protect Bodo interests and eventually form a new state.
During this period, violent clashes also began between the two major militant Bodo groups–the Bodo Liberation Tigers (“Tigers”) and the National Democratic Front for Bodoland (NDFB)–on the basis of conflicting interests. The Tigers, who demanded a Bodo state within Indian territory, primarily targeted communal groups and also conducted several devastating bombings, including one in 1997 that killed over fifty people. On the other hand, the NDFB sought complete state sovereignty and deemed Indian security forces to be their enemies.
The 1997 train blast incident prompted the Government of India to re-initiate peace talks with the Bodo guerillas, and at the time they found the Tigers to be receptive partners, due in large part to their involvement in the Kargil War against Pakistan. The Tigers agreed to a ceasefire in 2000, and by 2003 they signed the Bodoland Territorial Council Accord with the Centre and the Assamese government.
The 2003 accord founded the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD), including the districts of Udalguri, Baksa, Chirang and Kokrajhar and spanning an area of 27,100 km. Kokrajhar was declared as the capital of the BTAD, where the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) assumed power over education, social welfare, forest management, and other areas covered under modified provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. It also recognized the Bodo language as the first tribal language to be included in the Eighth Schedule.
In return for laying down over 600 weapons, the Tigers were allowed to form a political party, the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF), which went on to win elections in 2005, with former Tigers leader Hagrama Mohilary becoming the BTAD’s Chief Executive Member. Mohilary has since tightly concentrated all power to exclude the interests of the ABSU and the NDFB.
The main failure of the 2003 Accord was that the government only negotiated with one Bodo party despite the movement involving several equally important militant and political groups like the NDFB who resorted to more violence to retaliate against this. This, doubled with the fact that the area granted to the Tigers was one where the Bodos were a minority, is a major reason as to why political and physical insecurity is still rampant in the region. These also allowed the Tigers to monopolize power and retain their arms.
To counter this and to put an end to the insurgency once and for all, on 27 January, the Prime Minister Narendra Modi-led Central Government signed a new tripartite peace accord with the Assamese Government, the NDFB, the ABSU and other smaller factions. Such an agreement was no surprise given that a peaceful and insurgence-free Assam is crucial for the Centre’s regulatory and military strategies.
The new Accord renames the BTC as the Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR), and increases the fiscal and administrative powers of the body. Further, it calls for the creation of a Bodo-Kachari Welfare Council for the development of Bodo villages in areas outside the BTAD. The Accord also recognizes the Bodo language (in Devanagari script) as an official State language and establishes a directorate for Bodo-medium schools.
The Government of Assam will also be withdrawing all criminal cases registered against NDFB factions for non-heinous offences and will be reviewing heinous crimes on a case-by-case basis. This is on the grounds that the same factions will have to “abjure the path of violence, surrender their weapons, and disband their armed organizations within one month of signing of the agreement”. Those with a clean record will also be offered positions in paramilitary forces.
The government has also sanctioned an amount of INR 1,500 crores to implement this accord over the next three years, which also includes an INR 5 lakh compensation to the families of those who have died in this movement.
Home Minister Amit Shah hailed the agreement as a permanent solution to a decades-long conflict that has claimed over 4000 lives. ABSU president Promod Boro and NDFB leader Ranjan Daimary, who was released on bail for this event, have also made statements in support of the accord and its “inclusive” nature.
But amidst celebrations in Assam that plan to continue until the Prime Minister arrives on 7 February, other ethnic groups living in BTAD areas have voiced their fears and hesitations against the new Accord on grounds that it does not represent their interests since it gives more power to the Bodos who are already perceived as aggressive. Working president of the All Bodo Minority Students Union, Ibrahim Ali Ahmed, also pointed out that non-tribal stakeholders were completely left out of any conversation regarding the agreement.
The accord also provides Scheduled Tribe (Hills) status to Bodos living in Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao districts, which officials have noted may cause complications and unrest since the Bodos are primarily a plains tribe.
There is also a legitimate concern that the insurgency may resurface if the demand for a separate state continues, especially given the long history of dissatisfaction with previous accords. Even Boro mentioned that the decision to discontinue this demand will only be taken in a special ABSU session to be held later this month. But such a demand can only be fulfilled if the Bodos concentrate to a contiguous area that can easily be turned into Bodoland, and with the consent of the Assamese state assembly, both of which seem highly unlikely.
Currently, one cannot help but view this move as a positive step towards building stability and peace in Assam. Further, it is a feather in the BJP’s cap, which is currently dealing with the intense fallout from the divisive NRC/CAA debacle in the state. By inking this pact, the BJP hopes to make sustainable inroads in the BTR, where its ally BPF is already in power.
The expansion and sustenance of the BJP's footprint into the north-east is essential for it to maintain its power given the uncertainty of support in the Hindi heartland. The country's eastern border also holds great strategic and geopolitical importance to the Centre, and its development is a key aspect of the Modi government's Act East foreign policy. To solidify their support in the region, the Centre also signed a similar four-way agreement on 16 January with Bru-Reang refugees from Mizoram in Tripura, where after eight repatriation efforts over the past decade, allotted land and cash assistance will be provided to more than 30,000 displaced persons who have resided in the area since 1997.
Only time can tell whether such agreements will lead to sustained peace in the north-east, but it is definitely a step in the right direction for communities that have endured years of suffering, despite the BJP's underlying electoral agenda. The new Bodo accord, as opposed to its previous iterations, provides a far more comprehensive solution plan that also includes the rehabilitation of certain militant fighters, thereby mitigating their motivations to continue the agitation. While it does not promise a new state, it gives official recognition to the Bodos and elevates their political status in Assamese society, which is definitely much more than any previous deal has promised.
Still, there is a need to be vigilant about rising dissent from other tribal and ethnic groups against the agreement, and both Assam and the Centre must ensure that the rights of these people do not suffer in this process. The interests of the Assamese, the Adivasis, the Muslims, and the Koch Rajbongshis, especially with respect to land rights, must be protected since these groups constitute the majority and fear Bodo monopolization of political power.
Over the next three years, The BJP and its allies must ensure that the terms of the agreement are implemented timely and fairly. Else, it may meet the same fate as its predecessors and result in more violent conflict.
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