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Understanding India’s Position on the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Though India has historically fiercely supported Palestine, it is now taking a more measured and de-hyphenated approach to the issue, in an effort to preserve its blossoming ties with Israel as well.

May 25, 2021
Understanding India’s Position on the Israel-Palestine Conflict
SOURCE: TWITTER (@ambtstirumurti)

In the 11 days between May 10 and 21, the world watched in horror as fighting between Israel and Hamas reached levels unseen since 2014. Triggered by the suppression of Palestinian rights in Jerusalem during Ramadan and their forced evictions from the Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan neighbourhoods by Israeli settlers, the region saw intense exchanges of rocket fire, airstrikes, and violence that ultimately led to the death of over 200 Palestinians in Gaza and 12 Israelis.

While world powers rushed to condemn the brutal conflict, many defended Israel’s actions, offering their “unwavering support” for Israeli security and “its right to defend itself.” Others fiercely denounced the Netanyahu government’s disproportionate response to the situation and reaffirmed solidarity with Palestinians and their right to self-determination. India, however, took a more measured approach. In carefully worded statements delivered at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on May 16 and 21 respectively, India reiterated its “strong support for the just Palestinian cause and its unwavering commitment to the two-state solution.” Without explicitly naming Hamas or the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), it also condemned the hostilities, and called for de-escalation, urging both sides to exercise restraint and work towards creating conditions for the resumption of direct talks between them. Though India’s position on the recent events has most widely been described as a ‘balancing act,’ this was not always the case.

Historically since its independence, India fervently supported Palestine, most notably voting against the UN’s proposed Palestinian partition plan in November 1947. Reeling from its own partition experience just a year earlier, Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru (despite some pressure and words of encouragement from Albert Einstein) chose to reject the proposal for a Jewish homeland in Palestine at the UNGA to not only maintain India’s values centred on de-colonialisation and the right to self-determination but also to avoid internal unrest, given that Muslims in the nation were instinctively pro-Palestine. Though India’s vote was eventually overruled by the majority, which led to the creation of Israel and Palestine as two independent states, New Delhi still chose to stay away from normalising ties with Israel in the years that followed, even though it recognised the country in 1950. Rejecting Israel and siding with Palestine was also done to ensure continued Arab support for India’s fight for Kashmir.

Despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties, India and Israel began their defence cooperation in secret in the 1960s. India reportedly received urgently required military assistance during the crises of 1962, 1965, and 1971 through covert and informal Israeli military channels, but the countries never publicly acknowledged the transactions. At the same time, India was boosting its relations with Palestine, becoming one of the first countries outside of the Arab world to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to open an office on its territory, even though many nations had designated it as a terrorist group. Furthermore, in 1975, India even voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, which “determine[d] that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.”

In the mid to late 1980s, however, there emerged a shift in Indian policy on the Israel-Palestine issue. With the decline of the Soviet Union and a thaw in relations with the United States (US), Indian leaders began engaging with their Israeli counterparts in an effort to strengthen ties with Washington. In 1985, PM Rajiv Gandhi made history by meeting Israeli PM Shimon Peres at the UNGA. The Gulf War of 1991 also forced India to rethink its foreign policy options and priorities, and after the Israeli and Arab leaders met for the first time at the Madrid Peace Conference, it moved to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, becoming the last major non-Arab, non-Muslim nation to do so. India did this not just to support its Arab allies (whom it depended on heavily for its energy needs), but also to adapt to the changes in the international order in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Since then, the country has been slowly de-hyphenating its approach to the Israel-Palestine issue and moving towards a more neutral position on the matter. Though New Delhi has continued its support for Palestine, Indo-Israel relations have witnessed a significant boost, both in the economic and military spheres. Today, India is the largest importer of Israeli military equipment, and Israel is the second-largest defence supplier to India after Russia. The countries also have extensive trade ties, with India being Israel’s third-largest trade partner in Asia and tenth-largest trade partner overall. The two sides have additionally coordinated on matters relating to agriculture, water accessibility, and oil and natural gas cooperation. Bilateral ties have undoubtedly become more pronounced since 2014 when Narendra Modi took office. Modi’s entry into power was followed by the first-ever PM-level visits and overt declarations of friendship between the two nations.

At the same time, there has also been a significant shift in India’s position on the Israel-Palestine conflict at the UN, moving from a fiercely vocal pro-Palestine stance to a more measured angle, aimed at giving New Delhi the flexibility to move from one side to another depending on the situation and its own strategic interests. For instance, in 2017, India opposed the US’ unilateral decision to recognise Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, but at the same time abstained from voting on a UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) vote on a resolution declaring Israel’s claim to Jerusalem “null and void.” Similarly, New Delhi voted against Israel in three UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolutions earlier this year—one on the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, a second on Israeli settlement policy, and a third on the human rights situation in the Golan Heights—but abstained on a fourth that called for a UNHRC report on the human rights situation in Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

This was evident in India’s speeches at the UNSC and UNGA mentioned previously as well, wherein, in a clear reference to Israeli settler policy, the country urged conflict parties to “refrain from attempts to unilaterally change the existing status quo, including in East Jerusalem and its neighbourhood,” but withheld bluntly naming the perpetrators. Simultaneously, it also specifically condemned the “indiscriminate” rocket firings from Gaza but did not do the same for Israel’s disproportionate retaliatory strikes, only mentioning that they had “also resulted in deaths and destruction.”

While this may have served India’s interest in the short term by not putting the country in a situation where it had to explicitly pick sides, its shaky approach to the issue has not gone unnoticed. In the absence of New Delhi’s vocal support for Israel’s right to defend itself, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu on May 16 left India out of a message of appreciation for 25 other nations who “resolutely” stood by the country as it faced “terrorist attacks,” an omission particularly stark, given the close ties between Modi and Netanyahu. Though this may not affect India’s broader approach to the situation, The Hindu’s Suhasini Haidar says that moving forward, there are three things that much will depend on, namely the Biden administration’s next steps on the Middle East peace process, the future of the Abraham accords, and India’s upcoming term at the UNSC, where it could be forced to take a stronger stance on the matter as it seeks global recognition as an important world power.

Author

Janhavi Apte

Former Senior Editor

Janhavi holds a B.A. in International Studies from FLAME and an M.A. in International Affairs from The George Washington University.