Over the last four decades, the conflict in Afghanistan has played like a distressing background noise in the lives of people around the world. Marred by domestic contradictions, regional rivalries and lofty geopolitical ambitions of international actors, this hostile crisis is often characterized as a ‘forever war’, especially since the US invasion in late 2001 post-9/11. Prospects for peace in the region remain elusive due to high levels of mistrust between conflict parties, their uncompromising demands, and a lack of clear direction and strategy to address the situation. Given the protracted nature of this conflict, and the unrelenting destruction and suffering that it has resulted in, any ray of hope for peace is bound to arouse tremendous interest. This is exactly what is happening with the upcoming US-Afghan peace accord, to be signed tomorrow if the seven-day “reduction in violence” truce holds between US forces and the Taliban.
While it is being hailed as a potentially historic agreement between two bitter rivals, it’s worth thinking about the context and circumstances preceding it. The United States, which as of 2020 has approximately 12,000 troops in the country (a significant reduction from the 100,000 eight years ago), has faced immense domestic pressure in recent years to bring soldiers home. Efforts to tackle the Taliban issue have not yielded any positive results, and the US has shown time and again that it has absolutely no idea how to effectively engage the group while simultaneously advancing its own national security objectives.
Given that the US has incurred overwhelming monetary and human costs with no real return, the Trump administration has made it clear that it has no interest to continuing its pursuit to find a solution to this complex crisis. However, rather than stating the obvious–that America has failed miserably in Afghanistan and there is no understanding on how to fix it–Trump focused his campaign on the promise to lift the United States out of such “senseless” military engagements abroad. This “peace” deal serves to deliver on that promise, as he eyes a second term in the Oval Office. The terms of the current agreement state that if there is a cessation of hostilities until February 29, America would reduce its military presence to 8,600 troops from the current 12,000 over the course of 135 days.
As the troops begin to withdraw, the Taliban are expected to start fulfilling their commitment to not assist terrorists. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said that the “conditions-based withdrawal” will set the stage for intra-Afghan negotiations that will eventually lead to peace and reconciliation in Afghan society. However, the intense decentralization within the Taliban, the power struggle between incumbent President Ashraf Ghani and Afghan chief executive Abdullah Abdullah, and the US’ eagerness to get out of the country as soon as possible are only a few of many factors that significantly complicate any move towards stability.
There are plenty of things that could yet go wrong. The withdrawal of US troops could create a power vacuum for the infiltration of radical elements, plunging Afghanistan further into the depths of terrorism. One mustn't forget that Al-Qaeda and ISIS are still operating in the country. Ghani and Abdullah may not be able to come up with an amicable power-sharing agreement, and Pakistan–concerned about increased Indian influence in Afghanistan–could put pressure on the Taliban to resist any settlement that does not align with its interests.
However, given the current American attitude towards this deal, there is no indication of the US’ determination to be patient and walk back on its promise to reduce troop presence if the situation goes awry. Hence, it wouldn't be wrong to suspect that the Taliban is simply 'behaving' until the US departure after which they can establish “peace” in the country on their own terms. Considering the deep fragmentations within the Taliban, such a situation is likely to result in yet another era of violence.
As former CIA officer Douglas London states, there is absolutely no incentive for the Taliban to agree to a deal that requires serious concessions on their part. And that is because they believe they are winning. They have successfully challenged the Afghan government for control of rural areas and infrastructure, and continue to make territorial gains. Under such circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that the Taliban leadership would be willing to convince its fighters to moderate their demands and accept tamer propositions. However, if it senses the Trump administration’s impatience to leave, it could prompt restraint by Taliban, as it then would have nothing to lose from signing an agreement that it could stray away from at a later date.
The Trump administration would also benefit this way, as it would have a “historic” deal that would need only to survive until November's election, at which point he can celebrate the fulfilment of his campaign promise of bringing troops home. In Trump’s words, it would be a win-win, and “the greatest” deal.
Given that the finer details of the agreement remain ambiguous, it’s unclear whether the United States understands–or frankly cares about –the severe repercussions of such a hasty deal. Today is the 7th day without violence in the region, and there is significant excitement and hope in the international community that this is a positive step towards enduring peace. However, the scope and stakeholders of this "peace" remain elusive.
At present, there seems to be no real deviation from the US strategy of seeing the primary partners in this process as being limited to the Afghan government and the Taliban. While US officials have stated that negotiations will involve other members of the Afghan society, the extent to which civilians, women, and civil society–who have faced the brunt of this crisis–are engaged remains to be seen.
For now, it seems like Washington’s definition of peace in Afghanistan is merely the absence of hostilities between its forces and the Taliban. While the upcoming deal may formally “end” the war for the United States and its allies and give the US an exit strategy with a successful narrative, it in no way guarantees the end of violent conflict and insecurity within Afghanistan.
UPDATE: The United States and the Taliban signed the deal on Saturday, February 29, 2020. Speaking to the press in the White House on Saturday, President Trump stated that 5,000 US troops would leave Afghanistan by May. The US and its NATO allies are scheduled to withdraw all troops within 14 months if the deal is upheld by the parties.
However, the deal has already hit a roadblock, with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani rejecting the timeline for a prisoner swap between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The agreement calls for the release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government in exchange for up to 1,000 Afghan security forces held prisoner by the Taliban. This was intended to be a confidence-building measure between the two parties before their talks later this month in Oslo. President Ghani has stated though the subject can be a part of the negotiations, it cannot be a precondition, given that key issues regarding the Taliban need to be considered first. [The Guardian; NPR; BBC]
Reference List:
Atwood, Kylie and Jennifer Hansler (February 25, 2020) “Pompeo says US will sign an agreement with Taliban 'if and only if' reduction in violence is successful” CNN. Retrieved from: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/25/politics/pompeo-afghanistan-peace-violence-troops/index.html
Editorial Board (February 21, 2020) “The Afghan peace plan has the potential to be historic. But there’s a big caveat” The Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-afghan-peace-plan-has-the-potential-to-be-historic-but-theres-a-big-caveat/2020/02/21/d1355c42-54ce-11ea-929a-64efa7482a77_story.html
Feroz, Emran (February 25, 2020) “With Taliban Talks Soon to Start, Afghan Government Splits Apart” Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/25/taliban-afghanistan-talks-ashraf-ghani/
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Kermani, Secunder ( February 28, 2020) “Afghanistan conflict: US-Taliban deal raises hope for peace” BBC. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51663573
London, Douglas (February 27, 2020) “Why the Taliban Will Never Agree to a Real Peace Deal” The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/opinion/afghanistan-war-taliban.html
Malkasian, Carter (February 27, 2020) “The Real Test in Afghanistan Is Still to Come” Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-27/real-test-afghanistan-still-come
Sheikh, Mona K. and Maja T. J. Greenwood (2013) “Taliban Talks: Past, Present and Prospects for the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan” Danish Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/97044/1/774665149.pdfer
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