On August 18, following weeks of anti-government protests throughout Bamako, a group of mutinous military officers arrested the country’s embattled president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK), and forced him to resign and dissolve the parliament on national television.
Leading the populace of a country exhausted by leaders failing to adhere to term limits, by crippling and persistent economic woes, endemic corruption, and a spiraling security crisis (courtesy of a jihadist insurgency and ethnic violence), the coup leaders swiftly declared that their intervention was an effort to prevent the country’s descent into irreparable chaos, blaming the incompetent government for failing to tackle Mali’s multiple crises. Though the identities of the commanders of the revolt and their plans moving forward were initially unclear, the military officers now in charge—who are calling themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) and are led by Colonel Assimi Goita—have promised to lead an inclusive process to establish civilian rule and revive the “health of the nation”, which they have declared will happen within an undefined but “reasonable” timeframe.
The putsch in Mali has unsurprisingly drawn widespread (international) attention and concern at a new hotbed of instability in a region that is already struggling to cope with the devastating effects of climate change, violent extremism, and now a raging pandemic. Foreign leaders are concerned that the absence of a swift transition to a civilian government will undermine their military campaigns against Islamic insurgents in the Sahel, exacerbate an already overwhelming crisis, and risk it spilling over into the broader region.
Following the coup, France, Mali’s former colonial ruler and the most militarily involved actor in the country, immediately sounded the alarm on the risks of delaying the transfer of power, and led the call urging the CNSP to speed up the timeline for the transition, arguing that “terrorists feed on the weakness of states”. Additionally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) denounced “the putschists and their partners” and suspended Mali’s membership from the body. Likewise, the European Union (EU), United States (US), and the United Nations (UN) all called for the immediate restoration of civilian rule, fearing heightened insecurity.
Also read: The Crisis in the Sahel is Spiraling. And You Should Know About it.
Of course, this isn’t the first coup in Mali; in fact, this is its fourth such experience since 1960. And if the country’s history points to anything, it is that a mere transition to a new civilian government will not bring peace to the country. Following the last coup in 2012, Keïta’s government took on the lofty task of resurrecting Mali, but he, too, inevitably became transfixed by the country’s political culture, which is marred with widespread corruption, carefree rule-breaking, and rampant abuse of state institutions.
Tackling this broader issue of systemic and cultural reform should be the first thing on the priority list for Mali before one can even begin to think about the resurrection of the Malian state. However, the international community’s priorities appear to be different. Western powers’ immediate responses to the coup prioritizing counterterrorism objectives point to the continuing (and problematic) persistence of a security-focused approach to the region, which has clearly not only failed to achieve its intended objectives but perhaps made the situation worse.
According to the UN, terrorist attacks have increased fivefold in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in recent years, with more than 4,000 deaths reported in 2019 in the border areas between the three countries, as compared to the 770 deaths reported three years prior. The African Centre for Strategic Studies has reported that violent activity from militant groups in the Sahel has doubled every year since 2015. Terrorism, organized crime, and inter-communal violence is spreading in areas where the State’s presence is weak, and attacks against civilians have been on the rise, both in number, and frequency. Civilian deaths in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have increased fourfold since 2018. More than 1,000 civilians lost their lives in the first four months of this year alone. All of this despite the presence of a massive (~15,000 soldiers strong) UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA), French forces under ‘Operation Barkhane’, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, and the UN-AU-EU-backed G5 Sahel Joint Force.
While funding shortfalls, conflicting and insufficient mandates, and coordination disputes have been a contributing factor in the failure of multilateral forces to stem the tide of violence in Mali, the western world’s obsession with employing military solutions to extremely complex crises is also a massive part of the problem. A purely security-focused approach risks overshadowing the governance needs of the country and if it persists, will only push Mali deeper into a vicious cycle of unending instability.
The international community must realize that the sole way to realizing security in Mali is by addressing the root causes of its collapse, and focusing on the much needed civil, economic, and institutional reforms in the country. Of course, this will begin with a peaceful transition of power, but that can only take place through a sustained and inclusive dialogue between the various factions in the country. However, that, too, is easier said than done.
Deep distrust between the parties is already proving to be extremely challenging to achieving any tangible progress. The main alliance of opposition groups that spearheaded the August 18 protests—known as the M5-RFP (June 5 Movement – Rally of Patriotic Forces), led by conservative cleric Mahmoud Dicko—has accused the military government (CNSP) of excluding it from any talks regarding the transition. Talks between the CNSP and the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), the main coalition of armed rebel groups in the north, have also reportedly stalled due to “lack of compromise” between the two sides. The parties are clashing over the length of the transition as well; the CNSP originally proposed a three-year period, while the M5 movement wants one lasting between 18 and 24 months. Meanwhile, ECOWAS has called for elections within the next twelve months. However, rushed elections will most definitely not solve the problem, especially when the credibility of polls in the country is already in question after the Keïta regime recently overturned the results of a parliamentary election in order to consolidate power, which was a key driver of the August protests. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing insurgency and violence will not make this process any easier, and unless tangible measures can be taken to ensure the independence of the electoral commission and the safety of voters, any election will be meaningless.
Keïta’s ousting has unleashed a pandora’s box of security and governance challenges, and there is no doubt that what happens in Bamako over the next few weeks will have a significant impact on the Sahel and beyond. While security concerns have been the driving force behind foreign interference in the country, the global community must be willing to invest the time and resources needed to rebuild the Malian state, its economy, and its institutions. The coup should serve as a wake-up call to global powers who view the situation in Mali primarily as a counterterrorism struggle and help them realize the consequences of the failure to address political problems that plague complex crises. This understanding must underpin any mediation and diplomatic efforts moving forward—whether they are led by ECOWAS or Paris—because, in the absence of such a resolve, there can realistically be no hopes for long-lasting peace and stability in the country.