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The Threat of China’s Security Deal With the Solomon Islands Has Been Grossly Overstated

China has signed numerous agreements like this in the past, with far more volatile actors than the Solomon Islands. that have amounted to no substantial increases in regional instability.

April 12, 2022

Author

Chaarvi Modi
The Threat of China’s Security Deal With the Solomon Islands Has Been Grossly Overstated
The Chinese flag is raised during a military parade at the Zhurihe training base in China’s northern Inner Mongolia region on July 30, 2017. 
IMAGE SOURCE: STR/AFP/Getty Images

On March 31, the Solomon Islands officially confirmed that it had signed a wide-ranging security pact with China that Western governments fear will increase Beijing’s foothold in the South Pacific. Regional players such as Australia, New Zealand, and Micronesia have raised concerns about the possibility that the deal will allow China to set up a military base in their sphere of influence. However, are these fears legitimate?

The Chinese Embassy in Honiara said at the signing ceremony that the agreement will “further strengthen the bilateral cooperation between China and the Solomon Islands in areas such as disaster response, humanitarian aid, development assistance and maintaining social order to jointly address traditional and non-traditional security challenges.”

While no further explanation was offered, an unverified leaked draft of the agreement had been circulating online prior to its signing, the contents of which have generated alarm. According to these leaked documents, Beijing will be allowed to bring in “police, armed police, military personnel, and other law enforcement and armed forces” to assist in maintaining “social order” and “other tasks” agreed upon by both countries.

Foreign governments have raised concerns over the broadly worded language of the document, as there is no explanation regarding what these “other tasks” or “other law enforcement” may include. In particular, the draft fuelled suspicion about whether these forces will only be called in to deal with domestic instability or if they may also be deployed to tackle other more region-wide elements that China may deem to be disorderly and thus use as a pretext to engage in aggressive manoeuvres. 

The document also hints at the possible establishment of a military base, as it outlines that Beijing may, according to its “own needs” and with the consent of the Solomon Islands, make ship visits, carry out logistical replenishment, and make stopovers and transitions in the Solomons. Regional actors are concerned about the vague wording about Beijing’s “needs.” Moreover, the addition of a confidentiality clause has cast an even larger shadow on the transparency of Beijing’s intentions on the Islands.

Given this secrecy, international concerns do at first glance seem legitimate, especially given China’s tendency to bully smaller nations in the South China Sea and infringe on the territorial rights of other territories such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, upon closer inspection of the deal in isolation, these concerns about imminent Chinese aggression appear to be exaggerated.

In fact, describing the international backlash from its neighbours as
insulting,” Solomon Islands PM Manasseh Sogavare has clarified and assured that “contrary to the misinformation promoted by anti-government commentators,” the agreement does not allow for China to establish a military base in the country. “[The] Government is conscious of the security ramification of hosting a military base, and it will not be careless to allow such initiative to take place under its watch,” a statement released by Honiara said.

Similarly, China has denied seeking a military foothold in the islands and said the criticism of the deal has contributed to regional instability. The “security cooperation between the two countries is not directed at any third party” and will only “complement regional structures and other countries,” the Chinese embassy in Honiara said in a statement. It reassured that the agreement “is conducive to [the] stability and security of the Solomon Islands” and “promote [the] common interests of other countries in the region.” 

Admittedly, taking China at its word is a questionable exercise. However, an examination of similar agreements it has signed with other countries could provide a preview of what is to come in the Solomon Islands. 

Last March, Tehran signed the 25-Year Iran-China Agreement with Beijing. Following China’s deal with a nation notorious for enriching uranium beyond civilian capacity, there was speculation of a massive influx of Chinese investment and substantial military and political cooperation. However, so far, these predictions have failed to come to fruition, with the most scandalous result of the deal being that China is now purchasing record amounts of Iranian oil. In fact, the only deals the two have inked since the signing of the agreement have been related to films and museums.

Similarly, back in 2002, China helped Pakistan develop the Gwadar port. Following this, speculation was rife that the port would act as a disguise for China’s military ambitions, as it allows Beijing direct access to the Indian Ocean via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). However, despite its value as a strategic stronghold, the Gwadar port sits idle most of the time. Only seven container ships and three quay cranes arrived at the port in 2019. Based on this inactivity, no military utilisation of the port seems to be on the horizon.

In fact, to put the activities and ambitions of global powers in perspective, the US maintains nearly 800 military bases in more than 70 countries and territories. Several of these US bases are also located within China’s regional sphere of influence, i.e. Southeast Asia, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and even Taiwan, which China considers to be part of its own territory. In comparison, China maintains a solitary foreign military base in Djibouti that it set up in 2017.

Moreover, the deal with Honiara isn’t unique to Beijing. In fact, Australia has a similar Bilateral Security Treaty with the Solomon Islands, which allows for Australian security forces to be deployed to the island when the situation arises. The same security deal allowed Canberra to lead a policing mission to restore order in the wake of riots on the island in 2021. Moreover, Australia has also recently expanded its AUKUS security deal with Britain and the US to develop hypersonic weapons, which it claims is to stabilise the Indo-Pacific.

Similarly, New Zealand countered the Solomon Islands’ deal with China by signing a similar cooperation agreement with Fiji on March 29. The Duavata Partnership agreement affirms the countries’ “joint ambition to elevate their relationship to a new level of expanded strategic cooperation” in five priority areas for cooperation: social wellbeing, security, economic resilience, democracy, climate change, and disaster resilience.

In this light, Beijing’s latest move appears to be more symbolic than anything else. Attesting to this, Iati Iati, a senior lecturer of Political Science and International Relations at the Victoria University of Wellington, has said that the deal is business as usual in the realm of geopolitics. “I think one of the problems from New Zealand and Australia’s end is, they’ve always viewed this region through a strategic lens. Whenever you put ‘China,’ ‘military,’ and ‘the Pacific’ into a sentence, you get everybody freaking out. But I think they probably want to just calm down a bit, see how this plays out. It’s nothing to be too worried about right now, it’s just normal relations.”

All things considered, when compared to other world powers, the pace and scope of Chinese international military operations and activities remain modest. While the deal’s vagueness allows for the inclusion of varied military activities, China’s largely benign activities with its previously acquired ports and deals tell us a different story. Therefore, until Beijing overtly even hints at aggression, it is clear that the international community is grossly overstating the threat posed by the security deal China has signed with the Solomon Islands.

Author

Chaarvi Modi

Assistant Editor

Chaarvi holds a Gold Medal for BA (Hons.) in International Relations with a Diploma in Liberal Studies from the Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University and an MA in International Affairs from the Pennsylvania State University.