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The Taliban Cannot Be Trusted to Honour Its Promise Not to Interfere in Kashmir

The Taliban has gone back and forth on its position on the Kashmir issue, with certain leaders backing the “voice of Kashmiris” and others vowing to adopt a policy of non-interference.

August 25, 2022
The Taliban Cannot Be Trusted to Honour Its Promise Not to Interfere in Kashmir
There has already been a surge in militancy in Kashmir since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021.
IMAGE SOURCE: KARIM JAAFAR/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 dealt a severe threat to India’s security. While several Taliban leaders have vowed to remain neutral on the Kashmir dispute, India remains sceptical of the group’s commitment to this promise.

New Delhi has attempted to keep the group onside by recently “upgrading” diplomatic ties as well as through continued humanitarian and medical assistance and the possible resumption of various infrastructural projects such as the Shahtoot Dam and the Chabahar Port. Crucially, it has vowed not to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs in the hope that the Taliban will do the same.

To this end, the Taliban has affirmed its commitment to maintaining the “very positive” momentum in bilateral relations, with foreign ministry spokesperson Abdul Qahar Balki saying the group will not “interfere in the internal matters of other nations.”

However, the Taliban’s willingness to keep to its word is shaky at best. In fact, it has already gone back and forth on its position on Kashmir several times since it came to power.

Just days after the group violently ousted the West-backed government, spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid spoke of the need to resolve the Kashmir conflict through dialogue. Soon after, however, foreign ministry spokesperson Ameer Khan Muttaqi said the Taliban “stands with those who are oppressed” by “tyranny,” in “Kashmir and everywhere else.”

Similarly, in September 2021, Anas Haqqani and Suhail Shaheen, both influential leaders within the Taliban, gave conflicting statements on the regime’s position on the issue. While Haqqani vowed to adopt a policy of non-interference, Shaheen reiterated the Taliban’s “right to raise [its] voice for Muslims in Kashmir.”

Regardless of whether this indicates a rift within the Taliban or that the group as a whole constantly changes its position on Kashmir, it is clear that it cannot be trusted to take a neutral stance.

Alongside the promise of trade, development, and diplomacy, with 59% of Afghanistan requiring humanitarian assistance, over 90% of the country living below the poverty line, 92% of the population suffering from hunger or malnutrition, a $500 million budget deficit, and recurring natural disasters, there is a compelling argument that the Taliban may be forced to adopt a more measured stance, even on issues it may feel strongly about, such as Kashmir. However, expecting rational decision-making from a terrorist group is likely a risk New Delhi is not willing to take. 

The Taliban’s rise to power has already emboldened Pakistan-based terror organisations such as Jashn-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

In this respect, the former director-general of Jammu and Kashmir Police, Sheh Paul Vaid, warned last September that the Taliban has a “psychological influence” on groups in the Kashmir Valley by boosting their “morale.”

Taliban leaders also met with JeM Chief Maulana Masood Azhar soon after coming into power, wherein Azhar called on the Taliban to help operations in the Kashmir Valley. Similarly, Hizbul Mujahideen leader Syed Salahuddin celebrated the Taliban’s takeover as “extraordinary and historical” and said he expects the group to support its fight in Kashmir. 

In fact, reports suggest that several LeT and JeM members joined the Taliban in the battle to oust Western forces and West-backed government (as administrators, advisers, commanders, and fighters) and planned to infiltrate Kashmir after securing victory in Afghanistan. The Taliban also released several members of these groups from prison after coming into power.

Keeping this in mind, Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda, the former military commander for Northern India, warned that terror groups in Pakistan would “certainly try and push men” into Kashmir after the Taliban’s rise to power. Similarly, India’s former ambassador to Kabul, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, asserted that Afghanistan would become a “bottomless hole” for “radicalism, extremism, and jihadi groups.”

Corroborating their claims, reports suggest a rise in underground tunnels and the inflow of weapons into the Kashmir Valley, which have fuelled increased bouts of violence in the region over the past few months.

While the Indian government or security officials have not explicitly linked the rise in violence in Kashmir to the Taliban, India’s experience with a Taliban-run Afghanistan in the past indicates that the group has likely played a major role. During the previous Taliban regime in the 1990s, India witnessed an unprecedented rise in violence in Kashmir. From 1988 to 2021, Kashmir recorded 45,171 deaths due to separatist violence. Of these, 17,373, or 38.4%, were reported from 1996 to 2001, when the Taliban was last in power. 

Since then, India has significantly upgraded its security presence and operations in Kashmir, giving it greater protection against militancy. Moreover, by increasing its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, New Delhi can counterbalance China and Pakistan’s growing influence in Afghanistan and continue to pressure the Taliban to deter activities detrimental to India’s security interests. 

Keeping this in mind, India has maintained arm’s length contact with the Taliban but insisted that the resumption of infrastructure projects and trade and the reappointment of an ambassador to Kabul are dependent on the Taliban ensuring that Afghan soil is not used by Pakistani terror groups.

However, seeing as how the Taliban has repeatedly reneged on its promise to adhere to international standards of rights and freedoms and failed to crack down on groups like the Al-Qaeda (which was a part of the deal that eventually resulted in Western forces’ departure from Afghanistan), any assurances it gives about protecting Indian diplomats or not interfering in the Kashmir dispute cannot be taken at face value. It is thus no surprise then that India continues to play the waiting game to see whether a mutually beneficial relationship can be forged, regardless of whether or not the Taliban can be trusted.

Author

Erica Sharma

Executive Editor