Unlike any Indian skirmish with Pakistan, which immediately exudes distressing nuclear noises and creates panic worldwide about a potential nuclear showdown in South Asia, the current stand-off between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh has seen no mention of nuclear weapons. Experts credit this peace to the countries’ adoption of a no first use (NFU) doctrine, which has enabled the nuclear-armed neighbours to maintain a more relaxed nuclear posture. So what is the NFU, and what is its significance in the Indian context?
A policy of No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons has long formed the bedrock of India’s nuclear doctrine and diplomacy. Adopted formally in 2003, the NFU is essentially a promise, backed by a survivable nuclear arsenal, to only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack by an adversary. The underlying logic is of simple deterrence: if you don’t nuke me, I won’t nuke you.
While critics argue that the doctrine—in waiting to be attacked first—reflects a certain kind of strategic passivity and political idealism, that is not the case at all. As Rajesh Rajagopalan rightly points out, such an approach in fact signals a deep understanding of the limits of nuclear weapons in the security strategy of any nuclear power, and especially in the case of a country like India.
The primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to ensure national survival. For India, the only real threat to such survival is a nuclear attack, which means threatening retaliation—and therefore deterring the adversary from pursuing such action, to begin with—is the only tangible solution to such a problem, given that there is no defense against such weapons, which can completely obliterate societies within seconds. Furthermore, the objective of India’s acquisition and developments of nuclear weapons has always been purely political, as a means to safeguard it against nuclear blackmail and coercion.
The NFU was borne out of this reasoning and has been a core element of India’s nuclear weapons posture since its inception. It works in favor of India’s interests, in that the commitment not to use nuclear weapons serves as proof of India being a “responsible” international power, and therefore becomes a way for New Delhi to resist any external pressures to sign any treaties or agreements that would affect its nuclear armaments.
Despite its advantages, the NFU has always been a contentious proposition, especially with respect to India’s ability to adequately respond to threats from Pakistan. Of the nine nuclear weapons states (NWS), only India and China have declared no first use doctrines, while Pakistan and the United States (US), among others, do not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict situation. The major argument against NFU then is that it limits India’s options to respond, and that deterrence would be much more effective if India’s adversaries (read: Pakistan) were in fact concerned about provoking New Delhi to strike first. Many have even fantasized about India conducting a full comprehensive preemptive counterforce strike against Pakistani nuclear sites to prevent it from being able to attack India with nuclear weapons. Last year, following the Modi government’s decision to split the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories (which heightened tensions with Islamabad), defense minister Rajnath Singh caused a stir in Indian foreign policy circles, after he chose Pokhran, the site of India’s nuclear tests, to suggest that, although India had remained “firmly committed” to the NFU doctrine until now, the future of the country’s nuclear policy would depend on changing “circumstances”.
Though Singh’s comments have not led to any diversion in India’s official nuclear stance, it’s worth thinking about what India would have to do, and the costs it would have to bear in order to make a credible first-strike threat. Let’s start with the idea of a counterforce strike against the adversary’s nuclear weapons. Firstly, such an endeavor guarantees retaliation. To eliminate that threat, India would have to completely destroy its opponent’s entire nuclear arsenal, which would require, according to nuclear security expert Manpreet Sethi, “large numbers of nuclear-tipped missiles of very high accuracy, an early warning and intelligence capability of a very high order given the mobility of the adversary’s nuclear assets, nuclear targeting coordination, and logistics of a very high capability”. Given that this is not an easy proposition, and would need staggering amounts of monetary and technological investments, which India does not currently possess, it’s safe to assume that completely disarming an adversary is not a realistic objective. In such circumstances, attempting to strike first in would in no way strengthen deterrence, but rather, as Lt. Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon aptly describes, “amount[s] to suicide for the fear of death”.
Additionally, abandoning NFU and building up first-strike capabilities could pull India into an arms race with its nuclear neighbours, which could heighten tensions and insecurity in the broader region. Until now, India has relied on its conventional weapons strength and managed to take action against any security threat and aggression from both Pakistan and China without it escalating to the nuclear level—a stability that could be hampered without the NFU. Furthermore, the outright and indefinite expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in the absence of an NFU commitment would directly contradict the country’s efforts to cement its role in the international system as a responsible world power, as India pursues lofty goals like a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Not just that, but such aggressive measures will also pave the way for more international scrutiny on India’s actions.
Ultimately, moving away from the NFU will not only contradict the original purpose of India acquiring its nuclear capabilities (which was to avoid the use of nuclear weapons in war) but also taint India’s image as a responsible power, which will negatively affect its (vigorously sought after) foreign policy objectives. Luckily, it seems like India recognizes the merits of this policy for now since New Delhi has made no real move towards altering or watering down the doctrine, despite many musings of the ‘what ifs.’
The Logic and Significance of India’s No First Use Nuclear Policy
Is abandoning the doctrine even a realistic objective?
August 18, 2020
SOURCE: THE DIPLOMAT