Sudan’s two-and-a-half-year experiment with democracy came to a sudden halt in October after the military ousted the civilian-led transitional government in a coup. In what seemed to be a meticulously planned affair, the military swiftly took power by arresting civilian leaders and placing Prime Minister (PM) Abdalla Hamdok under temporary detention. Immediately following the military’s usurpation of power, the streets of Khartoum and other important Sudanese cities were overwhelmed by thousands of protestors demanding an end to the military’s hold on power.
However, despite the massive protests and the international outcry that followed, it is unlikely that Sudan will be able to reverse the impact of the coup and once again place the country on the path to democratic transition. One needs to look no further than numerous examples of previous military coups, which suggest that scaling back the impact of a military takeover is no easy feat.
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Probably the most important factor considered by the military before launching a coup is foreign support. With the backing of strong regional or international actors, the organisers of a coup can be reassured of long-term success, thereby reducing the chances of their efforts being overturned.
For instance, China had covertly backed Myanmar’s junta that ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021. Beijing even announced the provision of millions of dollars in aid to the military for development projects. It is hardly surprising then, that the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) remains firmly entrenched in power, despite international pressure.
In the case of Sudan, the country appears to have the support of Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have remained silent about the military’s actions so far and they have a history of backing army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, mostly through financial aid.
Usually, when a military is successful in toppling the government in power, it is slapped with sanctions and denied aid. Therefore, following the ouster of Sudan’s civilian government, it came as no surprise when the United States announced that it was withdrawing $700 million in economic funds, the European Union (EU) threatened to cut off financial support, the World Bank halted aid deliveries, and the African Union (AU) suspended Sudan’s membership.
However, while these measures might result in financial hardships for the military and Sudan, they provide little to no guarantee that the coup will be reversed. The US, EU, and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s armed forces following its power grab as well. Yet, after almost nine months since the coup, the Tatmadaw has given no indication of taking serious steps to ease the crisis.
Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU had imposed sanctions and suspended Mali after the 2020 military coup, only to backtrack on their decision a few months later. This strongly indicates that measures taken by the international or regional community will have a limited effect in persuading a junta to undertake positive steps.
It is also a common practice for military leaders to pacify international actors by promising changes after it forcibly taking power. For instance, Gen. Burhan has promised to appoint a new Prime Minister and hand over power to an elected civilian government by 2023. Yet, military leaders are known for not honouring these pledges.
For example, immediately after the February coup in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw promised to hold elections after a year. However, the military soon denied that it staged a coup, appointed its own leader as the new Prime Minister, and delayed the promised vote to 2023. Myanmar’s junta has in the past declined to accept election results whenever it felt its power was threatened.
Likewise, in Mali, military leader Assimi Goïta, who led the August 2020 coup that deposed the President and the Prime Minister, had promised to hold elections in February 2022 and restore civilian democratic rule. In a second coup in May, Goïta deposed the civilian interim government appointed by the military after the 2020 coup and declared himself President of the transition. By September, however, the Malian transitional government appointed by Goïta said the scheduled vote would be further delayed by months.
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Apart from the broken promises, militaries, in most cases, justify the coups as a measure to prevent the country from descending into instability and often present themselves as the actors most capable of dealing with any internal crisis. In fact, Gen. Burhan justified the coup as a way to avoid a civil war and prevent violence, especially in regions like Darfur and Kordofan. He further defended the military intervention by saying that infighting between military officials and civilian leaders were threatening the country’s stability.
However, coups tend to create more instability than whatever situation prevailed before. In his 2020 research paper on the nature of military coups, Jean Lachapelle, an expert on political instability and coups, argues that rather than creating an atmosphere of stability, “coups appear to make matters worse.” He notes that there is very little evidence to support the argument that coups can prevent instability, even if it was against a repressive ruler.
Lachapelle’s argument holds up in the case of Myanmar. The military justified the coup to prevent the country from descending into lawlessness. But rather than prevent instability, the coup has led Myanmar to the brink of a full-scale civil war and has further ignited ethnic tensions. Even the United Nations expressed concerns that Myanmar could head towards a “full-blown conflict” on par with Syria.
Militaries also tend to launch coups when they already have a significant grip on power. The 2019 protests against former Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir were only successful when the military intervened on behalf of the protestors and ousted Bashir. Following his ouster, a joint military-civilian transitional government was established and the military maintained its hold on power. Gen. Burhan was the leader of the Sovereignty Council, the collective head of state of Sudan, and is widely believed to be the country’s most powerful man.
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Similarly, in Myanmar, the military has always been able to influence the country’s politics. In the aftermath of the 1988 uprisings that called for the military to step down, the junta promised to hold elections and in 1990 Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won 81% of seats in the parliament. Shocked by the vote, the military nullified the results and refused to hand over power to the civilian government. It also kept Suu Kyi under house arrest for almost two decades. Once again, following the 2020 election that was swept by the NLD, the military deposed the government and detained all civilian leaders.
Therefore, militaries tend to wield a lot of power before launching a coup and are not keen on giving that power up. Moreover, in most cases, massive protests that follow the toppling of a government by the military are met with violent repression and usually have little impact in reversing the impact of the coup.
So far, more than 10 Sudanese protestors have been killed and over 100 injured by security forces. In Myanmar’s case, widespread protests and even the formation of a parallel government against the military have done very little to remove the army from power. On the contrary, the military has only increased its repression and strengthened its grip on power.
The cases of Sudan and Myanmar show that overturning the impact of a military coup is an extremely challenging prospect. This is further proved by past military coups in countries like Azerbaijan, Chile, Egypt, Pakistan, Thailand, and Tunisia. Against this backdrop, the irreversible nature of coups gives little hope for several African nations, including Chad, Guinea, and Mali, that have witnessed recent hostile takeovers of power by the military.