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The Challenges to Denuclearization and Peace on the Korean Peninsula

Washington must recognize that denuclearization is a long-term objective that will take decades to fully achieve - assuming that it is possible at all.

October 28, 2020
The Challenges to Denuclearization and Peace on the Korean Peninsula
SOURCE: AXIOS

The US’ policy approach towards North Korea (DPRK) has been far from successful, making little headway in both reducing the nuclear threat and enhancing peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Severe economic hardships and crippling sanctions have done nothing to deter the Kim regime from maintaining its stockpile of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these capabilities appear to have only grown in recent years, even in the face of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure and engagement” strategy.

Trump’s critics argue that his mercurial attitude towards Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un (in going from pressuring him to directly engaging with him) has reduced the US’ leverage in being able to demand meaningful concessions from the country, and undermined the government’s own “maximum pressure” approach. However, the most damning problem that has plagued Washington’s policy towards Pyongyang across administrations has been the unshakeable belief that it can somehow bully North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons, despite decades of evidence suggesting that such strategies are fruitless.

In fact, pressure from the US only seems to have intensified DPRK’s pursuit of a credible nuclear deterrent. Following the breakdown of talks between the two nations at the 2019 Hanoi Summit, Kim Jong-un not only disavowed his self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile testing but also committed his country to further strengthening its nuclear arsenal. Kim has since then said that such capabilities will ensure that his country never has to fight wars again and guarantee its safety from “imperialist and hostile forces”.

While the US forms an important part of this reasoning, North Korea is equally skittish about its neighbors as well—Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan are all significantly more developed than Pyongyang on military, economic, and diplomatic fronts. In such an isolationist environment, it would be difficult to get any country to give up its greatest security guarantee, let alone one like North Korea, who has time and again demonstrated that it values self-preservation above all else and deems its nuclear program as fundamental to its survival. This means that any approach that places denuclearization as a precondition to meaningful engagement without simultaneous efforts to build trust between the nations is doomed to fail. And trust cannot be built overnight.

To make any real progress towards achieving peace and security on the Korean peninsula, Washington must recognize the reality that denuclearization is a long-term objective that will take decades to fully achieve — assuming that it is possible in the first place. Not only because of the severe lack of confidence and trust between the US and North Korea but more importantly because the definition of the term is completely different on either side. While Washington and Seoul have demanded a “fully verified denuclearization of North Korea”, Pyongyang wants it to be extended to the entire Korean peninsula, which isn’t just a semantic distinction. These are two completely different goals.

Kim Jong-un has long said that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was his father’s dying wish, but that did not involve the North giving up the bomb. Instead, it referred to the US reducing its presence in the region. Mr. Chung In Moon, a top foreign affairs and national security aide to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, told The Atlantic that North Korea essentially seeks the ceasing of “deployment of American nuclear-capable vessels and aircraft during training exercises with South Korean forces, a non-aggression pledge from the US, and eventually a normal diplomatic relationship with America”. In the absence of such guarantees, it is unlikely that Pyongyang will agree to come to the table and discuss any changes to its nuclear arsenal, and these refer to limits on any developments of new technologies. North Korea has already made clear that it will not negotiate any reductions to its existing nuclear capabilities. Kim Jong-un has seen what happened to Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi after they relinquished their weapons, and he will not do anything that leads him to the same fate as them.

Reconciling these two different interests and expectations should be the top priority for the US government in order to minimize the chances of a confrontation and introduce some semblance of predictability and understanding among the parties. Peace and stability in the region is the ultimate goal for all sides, and while the definitions of what that “peace” entails may look different, treating North Korea as a negotiating partner through sustained and sincere dialogue will help address this challenge. The US should also support any inter-Korean peace efforts, and encourage Seoul to pursue them without the fear of repercussions.

Working towards peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula has been an important agenda item for South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who has repeatedly advocated for dialogue between the two neighbours, and has even called for the US’ support in formally declaring an end to the Korean War, which ended in 1953 with an armistice rather than a peace treaty. Taking small and incremental steps towards building trust—between the Koreas and between the US and the DPRK—will be crucial to establish a framework for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and could also help America set the building blocks for potential talks on a shared understanding of denuclearization in the future. The US has been wary of doing anything that could “legitimize” North Korea without getting anything substantial in return. However, Washington must be willing to take a more realistic and practical approach to the situation, because, ultimately, if it keeps treating North Korea as a pariah and rogue state, it will continue behaving like one.

Author

Janhavi Apte

Former Senior Editor

Janhavi holds a B.A. in International Studies from FLAME and an M.A. in International Affairs from The George Washington University.