Owing to retreating ice sheets and melting ice-caps, it is predicted that the Artic's traditionally unforgiving landscape will become navigable for the majority of the year by 2030, and become a hotbed for exploratory missions and energy expansion. These geophysical upheavals make Arctic passages and resource-rich areas more accessible, thus exposing new and critical trade routes and introducing huge geopolitical ramifications.
Some estimates suggest Arctic ice melt will cut transit time from East Asia to either Europe or North America's east coast by a third. Hence, the fact that regional and extra-regional countries are vying not just to expand their footprint in the region, but also their ability to set agendas and make rules, is unsurprising.
It is generally assumed that no country is better positioned and prepared to dominate the region than Russia. In recent times, however, Russia's muscle-flexing and sparring with Canada and Denmark over sovereignty disputes have been overshadowed by the introduction of a new player to the Arctic–China. Despite increasing Russian efforts to militarize and commercialize the Arctic, Pentagon reports now indicate an increasing Chinese military footprint in the region. China has also invested heavily in natural resource projects by attempting to buy large swathes of land in Iceland, Denmark, and Norway as part of its goal to project itself as a "near-Arctic" state, despite being 900 miles away.
As the Arctic battle between competing powers intensifies and as the region gears up to become a hotspot for future great power politics, where does India stand? Does it have a coherent strategy to claim and protect its interests, if any?
Both India and China, along with countries like Japan and South Korea, were granted the observer status in the Arctic Council in the year 2013, which has eight member states, namely, Russia, Canada, the United States, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark. Thus far, Asian countries have adopted different strategies, from scientific and governance oriented approach to more commercial and sovereignty based practices, with varying degrees of success.
Indian efforts in the region are currently focused on scientific research and a few investments in energy projects. India's priorities reflect its fears of the effects of the Arctic melting on its monsoon season and, consequently, on its agriculture industry. While the Ministry of External Affairs has laid out an expansive definition of Indian interests in the region–encompassing "scientific, environmental, commercial as well as strategic" concerns–its efforts have largely focused on the scientific and the environmental sphere.
At the moment, India lacks a clear-cut policy on its objectives and strategies in the Arctic, which has left it trailing behind countries like South Korea, which released its Arctic Policy Document in 2013, and China, which published a white paper on its Arctic vision. Having said that, the Ministry of Earth Sciences' decision to rename the "National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research" to the "National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research," does mark a new beginning and monumental shift in India's Arctic policy and strategy.
Looking ahead, though, India needs to do more. A rejig in the diplomatic setup, by appointing a special representative or appointment of a senior diplomat overlooking polar affairs, or creation of a polar desk will show how much importance the government attaches to the region.
Simultaneously, it must acknowledge its position of relative subordination to traditional powers in the region and leverage its relationship with traditional ally and regional powerhouse, Russia. Moscow, which supposedly sits on 80% of oil & gas under the Arctic shelf and dominates the waters with its massive and ever-growing fleet of icebreakers, is India's gateway to the Arctic. The asymmetry of power is most evident when we see the numbers of icebreakers the littoral states of the Arctic possess. While the United States has two, with plans to take the number to six, Moscow has a massive fleet of forty, with nine of them being nuclear powered. The Russian-proposed Northern Silk Route (NSR), touted to be the new artery of global shipping, must be taken advantage of, especially when China aims and moves toward building a "Polar Silk Road" as a part of its larger Belt & Road Initiative.
Thus, the Indo-Russian joint statement after Modi's visit to Vladivostok, which proposed a route from Chennai to Vladivostok, was a welcome step and indicated India's desire to increase its Arctic footprint by leaning on its alliance with Russia. Sections of the Arctic Sea Route near Russia witness cargo shipment volumes up to 15 million tonnes, increasing five times since 2013. Estimates suggest that by 2025, over 60 million tonnes of energy resources will be transported via the Northern Sea Route, including coal and Yamal Energy project-produced LNG.
Recent trends suggest a Sino-Russian convergence, particularly in the maritime and Arctic arenas. The China National Petroleum Corporation has a 20% stake in the $27 billion-valued Yamal LNG plant in the Arctic that is owned by a Russian entity. In fact, in July 2019, it sent its first LNG cargo to China via the Arctic. Despite a recent divergence of Indo-Russian maritime interests at the Raisina dialogue, India should not be dissuaded by Russia's growing alliance with China. In fact, compared to other regions across the globe, Russia wants more Indian presence in the Arctic, not just for economic gains but also to hedge against China and limit its presence in a region where the lines are blurred when it comes to sovereignty. Hence, although Russian-Chinese economic cooperation and coordination in other parts of the world are increasing, India should not be discouraged from pursuing closer relations with Moscow in the Arctic.
However, New Delhi's efforts have not extended much further than the symbolic Vladivostok joint statement. Despite indicating its desire and "willingness to play a significant role in the Arctic," agreements and deliberations have not been forthcoming. While Indian state-run corporations have invested roughly $5 billion dollars in the Russian Far-east, by partnering with Rosneft and Vostok energy projects, the two sides have not moved beyond the "reiteration of their interest in potential participation of the Indian partners." This shows that the hopes of India potentially being "the first non-arctic state to extract resources from the Arctic," made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, a far-fetched dream.
Alongside its commercial interests, India has also made little progress in its strategic and scientific objectives. While Russia is building a nuclear-powered icebreaker, and China has commissioned two indigenously-built polar icebreakers, Xuelong I & II, dubbed as "Snow dragons," India does not have a single polar vessel, forcing it to lease private vessels in the time of need. Even on the scientific front, India has only one research station, named Himadri, in Norway, since 2008.
Aside from its partnership with Russia, India must channel its diplomatic efforts into securing more research stations and space for observer ports by investing and cooperating more with like-minded countries who welcome Indian presence and see it as a stabilizing force. For instance, Norway's emphasis on the need for Indian leadership in cooperation between developed and developing nations, and Norway's "India 2030 vision", is a great step.
Unlike Antarctica, the Arctic is not yet free from territorial claims and counterclaims. The Antarctica Treaty of 1959 limits the use of its land for scientific and peaceful purposes. And although observer countries in the Arctic Council essentially have to concede sovereignty and give up any territorial claims in the region, China's white paper on the Arctic has left its position open to revision and interpretation. For Beijing, exporting the South-China Sea model will not be feasible as long as Russia is unwilling to let it.
On the other hand, despite its limited power and influence in the region, India works within the existing framework of Arctic governance, India has an opportunity to be one of the pioneers of a multilateral system with agenda-setting capabilities. India can continue to participate in meetings of the Council's Working Groups, which tackle issues ranging from disaster preparedness to biodiversity conservation, but also consolidate their relationships with countries like Norway, which have gone out of its way to welcome India as a genuine stakeholder in the region.
The geopolitical rise of the Arctic is no passing trend. However, India must strike while the iron is still hot and take advantage of the vast strategic and economic benefits offered by the region. By focusing solely on environmental stewardship, which may garner international praise and support, India's risks being overshadowed by the strategic astuteness of other actors. And even if India benefits from incubating a cooperative environment, strategic maneuvering is imperative before the multiple opportunities in front of it melt away with the polar ice.
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