Negotiations between the Taliban and the incumbent Afghan government, which were abruptly suspended in January 2021, have restarted. Yet, violence continues to ravage the country, with insurgent groups often attacking civilians, public officials, and Afghan security personnel. In fact, since the beginning of these negotiations in September, an unprecedented number of such civilian casualties have been reported. According to a report by the United Nations, the number of casualties reported in the last quarter of 2020 was 45% higher than the same period in 2019, with the majority of the attacks attributed to the Taliban. This has raised doubts about the Taliban’s commitment to achieving peace and stability in the region and has forced stakeholders to turn to regional powers to help expedite negotiations or, at the very least, pressurise the Taliban to declare a ceasefire. While most of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including India and China, have both the ability and desire to help with the peace negotiations, one key player that can make or break the peace process is Pakistan. The Afghan-peace negotiations provide Pakistan with a unique opportunity to not only further its own agenda in Afghanistan and South Asia but also earn goodwill with Western nations with whom relations are currently frayed.
Pakistan has already proven its ability to influence the Afghan peace process materially. The Pakistani Army and ISI maintain close ties with the Taliban leadership, and this relationship played a critical role in getting the Taliban to the negotiation table with the United States (US), which then led to the US-Taliban Peace Deal in February 2020. This was achieved by Pakistan’s decision to release Mullah Abdul Ghani Bardar, who, upon his release, took up a position as the Taliban’s top negotiator in the discussions. Pakistan’s contribution was acknowledged by the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, who applauded Islamabad’s “sincere and unconditional support”, without which the February 2020 deal would not have been possible.
Nevertheless, apart from Pakistan’s ability to contribute to the success of the peace process, stakeholders must also be wary of Islamabad using this leverage to further destabilise the region and add more obstacles to the negotiations. Over the years, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has often accused Pakistan of providing a “safe haven” to Taliban militants, thereby allowing them to continue orchestrating violent attacks in Afghanistan. This opinion has also been echoed by the US, whose 2019 Country report on terrorism accused Pakistan of providing protection to Taliban members and the outfit’s affiliated Haqqani Network. Moreover, a majority of the Taliban’s leadership—which includes its top commanders, its leadership council, and clerics—are known to reside in Quetta.
Pakistan’s primary interest in Afghan peace negotiations stems from its desire to curb the impact of a violence-prone neighbour on its own national security. Inevitably, the instability in Afghanistan has a spillover effect in Pakistan by percolating insurgency, the influx of refugees, and a surge in illegal drug trade. Additionally, with a bilateral trade potential of $5 billion, Pakistan’s ambitions in Afghanistan also go beyond the scope of security interests and expand into the economic sphere, too.
It is likely that Pakistan will use its unique bargaining power to push for a power-sharing agreement that ensures the participation of the Taliban, with whom it shares close ties. Not only will this provide an opportunity for the Pakistani government to influence decisions in the reformed Afghan government, but it will also act as a counterweight for the region to keep a check on other insurgent groups. Through its negotiations with the US and the Ghani-led government, the Taliban has been in close contact with groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, reassuring them of its commitment to the common “Islamist ideology” that both groups wish to see featured in any future governance model for Afghanistan. Consequently, they have managed to keep these groups from expanding their footprint in the region and toppling the government altogether. Hence, the Taliban's participation in the government will act as a counter-balance to other active groups in the region, something that a solely democratically elected government may not be able to achieve with such ease.
Foreign actors must, however, remain wary of assuming that the facilitation of a power-sharing agreement will immediately remove instability that has been cemented over decades. The empowerment of the Taliban must be complemented with a slow withdrawal of foreign security forces to avoid repeating what happened in the 1990s, when the Soviet Union’s departure from Afghanistan drove the country into political chaos and exponentially increased terrorist activity and violence in neighbouring Pakistan.
Simultaneously, Pakistan can utilise its involvement in the intra-Afghan peace negotiations to foster a more harmonious relationship with the Afghan government. Currently, the Ashraf Ghani-led government has adopted a pro-India stand by enhancing economic and diplomatic ties. The two countries have further bolstered their cooperation through medical and pharmaceutical diplomacy, with Ashraf Ghani applauding India’s efforts in helping the country meet its vaccine demands. Conversely, Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan has been tainted by distrust due to Islamabad’s close ties with the Taliban. Pakistan has been working hard to turn this around by hosting Afghan leaders and paying visits to Kabul to meet with Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the head of the High Council for National Reconciliation. These efforts can be further strengthened if Pakistan helps the authorities in Afghanistan achieve the long-sought-after peace deal.
Beyond the immediate purview of South Asia, Pakistan will also be provided with an opportunity to engender goodwill with Western states, who have been growing increasingly critical of the use of Pakistani territory to fund and breed terrorist groups. Some progress was made in this regard following Pakistan’s assistance in the US-Taliban negotiations, with Pakistan cushioning the negative consequences of accusations of its support to terrorist activities. In fact, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a bail-out which it had previously refused after Pakistan failed to introduce crucial reforms to enhance its economic surveillance and tackle rampant terror financing and money laundering in the country. With Pakistan now once again facing the threat of being added to the Financial Action Task Force’s “blacklist”, which would make it increasingly difficult for authorities to receive aid from financial institutions, the intra-Afghan peace process emerges as a ray of hope.
While the motivation for Pakistan to positively influence the peace process in Afghanistan is clear, it still needs to be guided in the right direction by the international community. Luckily, Pakistan’s unique ability to make or break the peace process has not gone unrecognised by the internal and external stakeholders of the intra-Afghan peace process. In the run-up to the resumption of the negotiations in Doha, just last week, the Russian special envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov visited Pakistan to discuss its role in the upcoming dialogues and the need to push for an expedited conclusion to the talks. On the same day, US Central Command head, General Kenneth F. Mckenzie, met with Pakistani Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa to discuss the same issue. In addition, last month, Afghan President Ghani called upon Pakistan to use its leverage with the Taliban to help secure peace in the country.
The international community—the United Nations, NATO, and other stakeholders in the peace process—must continue to offer incentives of diplomatic and economic concessions to effectively wield Pakistan’s unique influence on the Afghan peace process and guard against Islamabad derailing hard-earned progress. Otherwise, it risks ushering in a new era of violence and instability, this time with the Taliban in the government. Authorities must also be careful to strike a delicate balance that ensures that Pakistan is still held accountable for failing to adequately tackle the issues of state-sponsored terrorism, terror financing, and money laundering. Ultimately, Pakistan holds somewhat of a trump card in the ongoing peace talks, which have been stalled by a US-Taliban blame-game, with each side blaming the other for violating the terms of their agreement. Amidst this statement, the US, Russia, Afghanistan, and the Taliban must seek to tap into Pakistan’s regional clout. However, given Islamabad’s penchant for fomenting instability in the region at large, stakeholders must remain wary of Pakistan misusing its power.
Pakistan Can Make or Break the Peace Process in Afghanistan. Here’s Why.
By using its leverage to bring the Taliban to compromise on several sticky issues, Pakistan can use its regional influence to facilitate progress in the stalled Afghan peace talks.
February 25, 2021
SOURCE: VOICE OF AMERICA