Since the Soviet Union’s departure from the Korean Peninsula at the end of the Korean War, the United States (US) and China have emerged as the primary players in the region that was historically the battleground for proxy wars between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Russia’s role on the Korean peninsula diminished after the now-defunct six-party talks to denuclearise the region. Along with China, Japan, the US, and the two Koreas, Russia was originally a member of the talks; however, the group failed after members were unable to trust the intentions of one another. In recent months, however, Moscow has been strengthening its relationship with North and South Korea.
Last month, keeping in mind the “famine-like” situation in North Korea, Russia, along with China, urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to remove sanctions on inter-Korean rail and road cooperation projects and on North Korea’s statues, seafood and textiles exports. They also called for a removal of bans on North Korean citizens working abroad and a withdrawal of caps on the country’s refined petroleum imports.
Moscow also maintains a functional diplomatic relationship with Pyongyang. Earlier this year, even though its offer was rejected, Russia offered almost three million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to the North as part of its vaccine diplomacy efforts. Likewise, North Korea is reportedly considering restarting rail transport with Russia and sending around 1,000 workers as loggers.
Furthermore, Russia has invested in North Korean infrastructure projects and companies, and is looking to further expand into the market. Russia’s trade with North Korea accounted for a mere 1% in 2013. But according to a research paper by Liudmila Zakharova, a senior researcher at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russia at the time set the goal of increasing its trade volume with North Korea by a factor of ten by 2020. While it remains unclear if Russia achieved this goal due to unreliable and scarce statistics, news reports claim that trade between the two countries reached $47.9 million in 2019, a 40% increase.
Simultaneously, despite recalibrating ties with North Korea, Russia also remains wary of the prospect of arming the volatile state and has thus maintained a relatively balanced position in multilateral negotiations, particularly with regards to Pyongyang’s nuclear programme. To this end, President Vladimir Putin held Russia’s first summit to discuss denuclearisation with North Korea in 2019.
This seemingly balanced approach has led Seoul to believe that Moscow, which has diplomatic and trade ties with Pyongyang and is a permanent member of the UNSC, could exercise influence over the secretive regime and prevent it from indulging in provocative activities that put its neighbours at risk. In a best-case scenario, Russia may even be able to convince North Korea to return to the table for currently stalled nuclear talks.
As a testimony of this hope, South Korean Foreign Minister (FM) Chung Eui-yong has met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov twice this year to discuss the urgent need for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. This has been the result of a steady culmination of efforts taken by Moscow and Seoul to improve relations over the past few years.
Despite its clearly growing influence on the peninsula, however, Russia still has a lot of catching up to do it is to match China and the US’ footprints.
In addition to having signed bilateral missile defence accords and holding annual joint military exercises with Seoul, South Korea also falls under the US’ security umbrella. The US also has about 28,500 troops deployed at the Korean demilitarised zone. It represents the US’ third-largest military presence outside of its borders after Japan and Germany. To further highlight Pyongyang’s importance to US foreign policy, Washington also has a dedicated special representative for North Korean affairs.
Furthermore, the US has held head-of-state-level talks with North Korea. In 2018, then-President Donald Trump met with Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore. It was the first meeting between the two countries’ heads of state, during which they signed a joint statement agreeing to security guarantees for North Korea, new peaceful relations, the denuclearisation of the region, the recovery of soldiers’ remains, and follow-up negotiations between high-level officials. Despite the promising nature of the discussions, however, talks collapsed after Pyongyang felt that the US had returned to the negotiating table with “empty hands.” Nevertheless, the US has repeatedly offered to meet again with “no pre-conditions.”
Meanwhile, China is the North’s largest economic benefactor and has often tried to prevent multilateral organisations from taking punitive measures against it. At the same time, it has also imposed UN sanctions on North Korea in 2017 as a punishment for nuclear and missile tests. Yet, despite certain points of contention, the two sides remain engaged diplomatically. Most recently, they renewed the China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for another 20 years. Besides the cultural, economic, technological, and social exchanges that the treaty promotes, Article 2 of the treaty requires the two nations to undertake all necessary measures to oppose any country or coalition that might attack either nation.
In addition, China also hires North Korean workers and maintains a robust import-export relationship. In fact, Beijing accounts for over 90% of North Korea’s external trade, thereby essentially acting as its economic lifeline. In 2018, the trade volume between the two countries was recorded at $2.43 billion. To this end, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has previously said that China’s tremendous control over the North’s economy gives it the most power out of anybody to pressurise Pyongyang and come to the negotiating table.
In contrast, Russia does not station troops on the peninsula or hold regular military drills with South Korea. Conversely, it has even infringed on South Korean airspace. In 2015, Russia expressed interest in conducting joint drills with China, North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and Brazil, but has thus far only done so with China.
Russia’s diplomatic engagement with North Korea remains minimal as well and has not extended beyond expressing hope for denuclearisation or included measures to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table. For instance, during a 2019 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, Moscow took potshots at the US’ negotiating strategy but failed to offer any solutions of its own beyond rhetoric.
A comprehensive analysis of Russia’s influence on the peninsula remains challenging due to the lack of data with regards to North Korea. However, what is clear is that Russia lags behind both the US and China in terms of its diplomatic and economic engagements in the region. While it is unlikely to match China’s economic indispensability to North Korea or the US’ military presence, it nonetheless stands to gain by boosting trade ties with both North and South Korea and bolstering strategic relations by conducting more joint exercises in the region.
In spite of its relative lack of influence, Russia’s growing influence on the peninsula has not gone unnoticed. The US, for example, has expressed interest in including Russia in dialogue. Where Russia offers value to these talks lies in its refusal to create a values-based foreign policy, unlike the US. Washington is openly dismissive and intolerant of Kim’s regime and Pyongyang thus views it as a “hostile.” Russia, on the other hand, albeit a method to deflect attention from its own domestic shortcomings, says that such actions undermine states’ sovereignty and constitute interference in their internal affairs. This pacifying approach makes it easier to find common ground with rogue actors like North Korea. In this respect, Russia’s recent moves at the UNSC to call for a removal of sanctions on North Korea can only help. That being said, given the unpredictability of Kim’s regime, Russia must remain acutely aware of enabling and empowering a crazed dictator who amplifies regional and indeed global instability.
Negotiations on the Korean Peninsula Must Find a Way to Leverage Russia’s Unique Value
In recent months, Russia has been strengthening its relationship with North Korea, but it has a long way to go to make effective change.
November 30, 2021
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un shake hands during their meeting in Vladivostok, Russia, April 25, 2019 IMAGE SOURCE: AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko