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Myanmar’s Military Regime Has No Intention of Returning the Country to Civilian Rule

The lethal combination of international inaction and brutal crackdown on dissent and past leadership has allowed the regime to thrive and delay any action that it is being pressured to take.

June 11, 2021

Author

Chaarvi Modi
Myanmar’s Military Regime Has No Intention of Returning the Country to Civilian Rule
SOURCE: FRONTIER

Myanmar’s military, otherwise known as the Tatmadaw, has consolidated its control over the government during the course of the last four months after it dismantled the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and placed General Min Aung Hlaing in charge. The Tatmadaw has since repeatedly justified the February coup and the ensuing violence that has resulted in the deaths of at least 800 civilians by claiming that it is simply acting on its duty to protect and ensure democracy. As Myanmar’s military government continues to erode whatever little freedoms citizens still possess, it must be asked whether the Tatmadaw can reasonably be expected to return the country to civilian rule.

At the very outset of the unwelcome putsch, the Tatmadaw said that it foresees taking over power for a period of one year in order to safeguard democracy. In April, however, it backtracked on its commitment and increased the timeline of its rule to “two years maximum,” following which it claimed that it “will invite international actors to monitor a free and fair election”. If this is any hint for how events can be expected to unfold in the near future, it is safe to say that the military intends on prolonging its rule for as long as possible.

To begin with, its very claim to power is grounded in baseless allegations of electoral malpractice. In the November general election held last year, the NLD won in a landslide victory with 83% of the votes. Viewing this resounding victory as an erosion of its own influence, the military alleged that widespread voter fraud was involved, pointing to supposed “huge discrepancies” such as duplicated names on voting lists in 314 districts. On this basis, the new government was essentially rendered unlawful. Taking further advantage of the situation, the Tatmadaw cited a section of the military-drafted constitution that allows it “to take control in times of national emergency” and subsequently seized control of government machinery. These allegations of voter fraud were denied by the country’s election commission but that did not stop the Tatmadaw from pursuing its goal.

Against this backdrop, Russia and China’s open support has further emboldened the military regime to continue its unlawful seizure of power. Both countries are permanent members of the 15-member United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has allowed them to repeatedly veto or delay resolutions condemning the coup and instituting arms embargoes. Moscow and Beijing are motivated by their desire to protect their own vested interests in Naypyitaw as the two powers are respectively the world’s first and second-largest arms suppliers to Myanmar’s military. Simultaneously, given its deep-sea access to the Indian Ocean, Myanmar is a crucial pillar of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Representatives from both countries also regularly attend military parades and diplomatic events in Myanmar and such blatant shows of support have further encouraged the military to strengthen its hold on power.

Keeping in mind the UNSC’s failure, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) stepped in to mediate the conflict between the junta and the shadow democratic government, called the National Unity Government (NUG). Although it is a rare move for the bloc to intervene in a member country’s “internal matters,” its approach lacks the firmness that is necessary to control the unapologetic military leadership and has allowed the junta to continue treating ASEAN’s efforts as diplomatic formalities. 

The Special ASEAN Summit held in Jakarta in April completely ignored the NUG by only inviting army chief Min Aung Hlaing to the negotiating table. The NUG criticised this move, arguing that the invitation extends the bloc’s recognition to the military regime. On the upside, however, a five-point consensus was agreed on and included the immediate cessation of violence and the appointment of an ASEAN envoy to facilitate dialogue “among all concerned parties to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.” While the consensus was hailed as “encouraging,” it is undermined by the absence of deadlines to achieve the points of the consensus and the lack of penalties on the military junta if it fails to implement the stipulated changes. 

The Tatmadaw did not miss the opportunity to take advantage of the fragility of these clauses. Killings of civilians opposing the coup d’etat have continued even after the summit. Within less than two weeks of the summit, eight people were reported to have died after the military opened fire on protestors. Moreover, after initially having agreed to accept an international envoy to help facilitate the path to peace and democracy, the junta is now reneging on this commitment. A few days after the summit, the military announced that it would not agree to a visit by an ASEAN envoy until it could “establish stability.” Considering the vagueness of the military’s perception of a state of “stability,” we can expect this appointment, and any further progress on the matter, to be indefinitely delayed.

To further corrode the country’s existing democratic leadership, the military continues to impose new charges on former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been held by the military along with former President U Win Myint since February 1. On June 10, the country’s military junta formally charged the civilian leader and other officials with corruption charges for allegedly accepting cash and gold in bribes. This most serious charge yet could potentially lead to 15 years of imprisonment for Suu Kyi. Over the last four months, the now-former leader has been charged with superficial charges such as the violation of the Natural Disaster Management law (which carries a maximum punishment of three years in prison), and the Import and Export Law (for the possession of “illegally” imported walkie-talkies that were not registered). Moreover, the former leaders have also been denied access to their legal teams and fellow politicians to be able to chart out any future course.

This lethal combination of international inaction and brutal crackdown on dissent and past leadership has allowed the regime to thrive and delay any action that it is being pressured to take. In the process, common people have borne the brunt of speaking out against its dictators. While some Western countries have imposed sanctions against the country, this uneven pressure is not enough as Asia largely sits asleep at the wheel. Under these circumstances, the Tatmadaw has shown that it harbours no intentions of giving democracy a chance anytime soon. 

Author

Chaarvi Modi

Assistant Editor

Chaarvi holds a Gold Medal for BA (Hons.) in International Relations with a Diploma in Liberal Studies from the Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University and an MA in International Affairs from the Pennsylvania State University.