According to the Drought Early Warning System (DEWS), a real-time drought monitoring platform in India, about 42% of India’s land area is facing drought, with 6% exceptionally dry- four times the spatial extent of drought in 2018. Maharashtra is one of the states that are worst hit with water crisis. Almost 60% of the state of Maharashtra is facing extreme water scarcity, with the lack of drinking water being a major issue in the Marathwada, North Maharashtra and Western Vidarbha regions (Tirodkar, 2019).
As of February 2019, Maharashtra government declared drought in 151 of the 358 talukas. In these talukas, 28,524 villages have been declared drought affected. Of this, 112 are severe drought hit (Pillay, 2019). This is the third drought in Maharashtra in a period of five years and continues to be one of the major causes of agrarian crisis in the state. The recurring drought cycles in the state, particularly Marathwada and Vidarbha regions, are indicative of the fact that the crisis is not solely caused by natural reasons that are bad monsoon, which can vary periodically. Hence, it is imperative to analyze the implementation of the government policies directed towards drought assessment, management and to understand the long term impact of these measures and policies.
Drought Management Manual (2016)
The Union Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare released the Drought Management Manual in December 2016 for assessment of drought in the country based on scientific indices and satellite technology. The manual tends to do away with the traditional practices of identifying a drought such as annewari/paisewari/girdawari system of eye estimation and crop cutting experiments. However, the manual has been criticized by agriculture sector experts and the farmers who claim, owing to the conditions of the manual, a number of droughts would be underreported. This will drastically change the way droughts are assessed and declared in the country.
The Maharashtra government used to follow the paisewari system for declaring a drought. If the paisewari system is applied today, then at present 9,000 villages, including 3,500 villages in Marathwada have reported paisewari less than 50 paise. But, officially these 9,000 villages are not drought affected according to the indices in the new drought management manual. Hence, the new drought management manual will have an impact on the independent assessment of the droughts by the state government. It will also have an impact on the funds received from the Centre for relief measures. The 2016 manual makes it clear that only if the calamity is of severe nature, can the state government submit a memorandum for financial assistance under the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF). For mild and moderate droughts, the states will have to shell out their own funds (Jamwal, 2018).
Crop productivity is an important factor and is missing from the manual. Many factors that were traditionally worked into compensation (for example, whether farmers were forced to do a second or third sowing after a crop failure) have now been made irrelevant. The emphasis on satellite data — that cannot capture second sowing- ensures this (Sainath P. , 2018). The drought management manual, hence, adds to the woes of the drought distressed in Maharashtra.
Tanker Economy
The scarcity of drinking water in Marathwada, northwestern Maharashtra and the Vidarbha regions has resulted in the upsurge of demand for tankers in various pockets of the water-scarce regions. The tankers provided by the state government have increased by six folds as compared to 2018. This year, almost 1,200 tankers have been running in this region. At the state level, the number of tankers goes up to 6,300. Even then, there are serious complaints from various corners of the state about tanker shortage (Tirodkar, 2019). There are villages in the Marathwada that are solely dependent on water tankers as the wells have all dried up and the water extracted from the borewells is contaminated and cannot be used for drinking purposes. This has boomed the tanker industry and the tanker water industry which are already gigantic profit-making industries.
Deploying tankers to cater to the extreme drinking water scarcity in the villages is an immediate and merely a temporary remedy to a much intense problem. However, it is also important to understand that the tanker industries are given the space to flourish by lawmakers who are reluctant to make any long term provisions. The core of the tanker economy lies in the failure of the innumerable government schemes that are worth thousands of crores of rupees. With the collapse of these schemes, the villagers are compelled to buy water from the tankers and are further exploited by the private owners of these tankers who charge exorbitant amounts making it difficult for the poor farmers and labourers to access the water. In May 2016, India Today conducted a sting which exposed local administrators selling water tankers meant for drought-hit farmers to rich businessmen (M.N, Our water crisis is man-made, 2019). Many of the corporators and MLAs are directly or indirectly involved in the tanker business.
Anyone who had been watching the tanker economy closely for a period of five years, for a single town in Marathwada would transact over rupees 5 million over water tankers in a day (M.N, Our water crisis is man-made, 2019). Knowing the conducive environment for business in the state, many water suppliers have emerged in the past decade that would run into immense losses if the state sincerely implements its policies on paper. They shuttle between their water sources and desperate sections of the public. However, the largest amount of water goes to industries that buy in bulk. “The tanker owners transact between Rs.6 million to Rs.7.5 million in sales each day,” says Laxman Raut of the Marathi daily Loksatta. “That’s what this single sector of the water market is worth – in this single town.” Raut and his fellow reporters have tracked this region’s commerce in water for years (Sainath P. , Tankers and the economy of thirst, 2013).
Borewell Economy
Of the 5,264 completed large dams, 2,069 are in Maharashtra, which is the highest number of completed large dams, according to the National Register of Large Dams (updated in 2016). And 285 more are under construction (Paraste, 2019). Reserved water in the dams of the state has gone down to 13% till May 28. Marathwada is the worst affected region in the state where only 2.9% of water stock is left in different reservoirs. The state’s irrigation officials are suggesting that in almost 45 dams of the state, the level has gone down to 0% (Tirodkar, 2019).
During the green revolution, widespread electrification at the farm level led to an increase in the extraction of groundwater and surface water storages. Borewell technology became much cheaper and available to the small and marginal farmers which led to a virtual race among small, marginal and large landowning farmers to drill more borewells in their farms. Several deep borewells assisted farmers to extract a huge amount of groundwater, enabling them to grow different cash crops on large areas (Kale, 2017).
The borewell industry is a key sector of, as denoted by P. Sainath, the ‘Thirst Economy’ and is worth billions. If the most visible vehicle on the roads is the water-tanker, in the fields it is the borewell rig. These may be operated, sometimes even owned, by a local in the district. Of the Rs.1, 50,000 a farmer spends on a 500-foot borewell, a little over 70 per cent goes on the steel pipe, submersible pump, cable, and setting and transpiration costs. The rig operator collects the remaining Rs.40, 000. That’s for the drilling: Rs.60 per foot for the first 300 feet. Then, Rs.10 more per foot for every 100 feet thereafter. And Rs.200 per foot for the casing pipe protecting the bore. That can go down to 60 feet. Even if all the 30,000 in the crisis districts went no deeper than 500 feet, that would have been a business worth Rs.2.5 billion (Sainath P. , Drilling holes in the Thirst Economy, 2013). Many farmers in the agrarian region of Marathwada have gone bankrupt in their quest to strike water which leads to indebtedness and other farm distress, thus continuing the crisis cycle. Sinking a borewell costs more than Rs. 1 lakh, with completely uncertain outcomes. If the spot at which a farmer drills turns out to be dry, the money is wasted. The dejection of a failed borewell, however, fades before the hope of drilling a successful one (M.N, Wells of despair, 2017).
The provisions of the Maharashtra Groundwater Act, 2009, if implemented effectively, could have controlled the drought crisis, said Eshwer Kale, a senior researcher with WOTR. The Act forbids digging wells beyond 60 m (200 ft) and mandates that crop patterns be decided to take into account the water availability in the region (Paraste, 2019).
Incorrect Crop Patterns
Multiple reports on the drought situation in Maharashtra emphasize the impact of incorrect cropping decisions by farmers who grow cash crops that will yield them more profits than other suitable crops. Ecological illiteracy coupled with self-interests of those in power has induced farmers into growing crops that are not conducive to the agro-climatic conditions of the region. This is one of the major causes of the agrarian crisis as continuous cultivation of unsuitable crops can lead to agricultural droughts (inadequate soil moisture leading to crop stress). Marathwada is one such region in the state where the cropping patterns have miserably failed and experts warn of the future desertification of the region. Earlier drought-resistant crops like oilseeds and pulses were grown in the region, but now the predominant crops are soya bean and BT cotton which dominate more than 80% of Marathwada’s 50 lakh hectares of cultivable land (Banerjee, 2019).
In Maharashtra sugarcane is a profit-yielding crop and was a ‘political crop’ and was a tried and tested method of becoming a politician in Maharashtra. Of the 200-odd sugar factories in the State, nearly 50 are located in Marathwada. According to water expert, Pradeep Purandare, to produce 1 kg of sugar, 2,500 litres of water are required. This is tantamount to diverting water for human beings and livestock to maintain the sugar factories of the political elite. These mills have sucked the dams dry (Banerjee, 2019). However, there has been an upsurge in the sugarcane cultivation by 25% in Maharashtra.
Changing the crop pattern is essential. Even with 300 mm rainfall, or 3 million litres of water, one life-saving crop and basic necessities can be covered if water conservation is planned in a scientific reach-to-valley manner (Paraste, 2019). There are provisions under the Maharashtra Irrigation Act of 1976 wherein the government can notify people not to cultivate water-intensive crops in situations of acute water scarcity. However no effort has been made by the government to control the cultivation of sugarcane and switching to drought-resistant crops like oilseeds and pulses (Banerjee, 2019).
Policy Failure and Water Commodification
Along with multiple news reports, research papers and opinion pieces interpreting on the causes and impact of recurring drought cycles in Maharashtra, a discussion with independent journalist Parth M.N who has conducted extensive field reportage in the drought-hit areas and Eshwer Kale, a senior researcher at the Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR), one can see a repeated emphasis on the fact that the core of the crisis lies in inadequate, ecologically ill-informed policy of the state government and in the failure, mismanagement or unregulated implementation of the schemes leading to loss of resources, marginalization of a section of farmers and fostering the privatization or business of water resources.
In 2016, the state government embarked on its project, Jalyukt Shivar Abhiyan to become a drought-free state by 2019. Jalyukt Shivar Abhiyan (JSA) aimed at making Maharashtra a drought-free state by deepening and widening streams as well as constructing cement and earthen stop dams, nullahs and digging farm ponds. According to Professor Rajendra Singh, the Waterman of India who was closely associated with the JSA, the failure of the project was caused by the contractors handling the scheme who emphasized more on extracting profits and the work project worked well in regions wherein local residents helped in the execution of the project (Khapre, 2019). Apart from this, the crop insurance schemes like Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (PMFBY) and the Pradhan Mantri Pik Vima Yojana (PMPVY) have failed to provide compensation to farmers on time. Two key PMPVY provisions of advance compensation — ‘prevented sowing or failed germination’ and ‘mid-season adversity’ — designed to provide immediate relief to farmers, have also not been implemented. Farmers’ experiences and documents obtained about PMPVY implementation in Parbhani reveal a track record that debunks Fadnavis’s assurances about the government keeping a check on insurance firms and providing compensation (Kulkarni, 2019).
An assessment of the above-mentioned policies and measures of immediate aid along with several other schemes and state government acts for water regulation, it would neither be incorrect nor an exaggeration to say that the state of Maharashtra is facing an induced or a manufactured drought with low rainfall merely being a kicker to all the leading failures and the ensuing marketifying of water. The systemic failure is gradually or has already given much space for treating water as a commodity. In the process, only the ones who can pay and end up getting access to water and the poor is repeatedly snatched off of their fundamental needs.
Conclusion
India has faced deadly droughts in 1965 and 1967 in Bihar and in Maharashtra in 1972 but there was a different political and social response to the crisis and also to the policy on using water resources. The priorities for the purpose of using water were defined. Today, in Maharashtra, there are huge diversions of water in the last 15 years to huge industrial projects and private companies in the lifestyle business. It is also a state where there has been a significant increase in the number of golf courses in a decade that consume huge amounts of water. In the last 15 years, the only regulatory frameworks the State has put in place lead to greater privatization of water. Maharashtra worked hard to get to the crisis it now faces. Private swimming pools amidst oceans of dry despair (Sainath P., How the other half dries, 2016).
As Parth M.N stated, “If one has to assess the drought situation in the worst-hit regions of Maharashtra today, it would be the same as it was in the preceding two year period.” This continual phenomenon indicates that we are in the midst of a mega water crisis and poses a much greater challenge on all the stakeholders and the spectators, that is, to define the priorities with which we use water. A precursor to all the developments in water management is to address a greater social question, is water a fundamental human and existing species’ right or is it a mere natural commodity that can be vested in the hands of few to be bought and sold?
References
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