On October 26, US President Donald Trump announced that Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had died during a US Special Forces operation in Barisha, a village in North-Western Syria, killing himself and his children with a suicide vest, after what Trump describes as a lot of “trembling” and “crying”.
Aside from Trump's contentious announcement speech–with defense officials and others privy to information on the operation unable to corroborate his narrative–the fact remains that one of the most violent minds in the contemporary world is now dead. But does this mean that ISIS will die out too?
There is an ongoing debate among policymakers and counterterrorism strategists about the effectiveness of leadership decapitation in large-scale terrorist organizations. In a trend now mirrored around the world, after 9/11, US counterterrorism policies placed a special emphasis on targeting leadership. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), formulated in 2003, states that the removal of leaders is likely to result in the collapse of organizations since leaders are essential to the activity of terrorist groups. The demise of the Shining Path and the Kurdistan People’s Party are examples of how arrests of leaders have dismantled organizations.
Yet, others believe that the removal of a leader does not necessarily mean that factions will stop functioning altogether, especially in the cases of large-scale organizations with a branched presence in different regions in the world. The most glaring example of this would be the continued presence of the al-Qaeda even after the killing of Osama bin Laden. Its subgroups, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, continue to grow with smaller independent factions joining in as affiliates.
Another example is al-Baghdadi himself. After the assassination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq) in 2006 by US forces, several different leaders tried their hand at running the outfit. In 2010, al-Baghdadi took over the organization and introduced a shift in its ideology. By 2011, he cut off the outfit’s affiliation with the al-Qaeda and renamed it the Islamic State in Iraq with a new goal of creating a singular Sunni caliphate to rule over the Arab world. Two years later, it was renamed again to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, in order to reflect a greater ambition of including the Levant in its ambit.
Under al-Baghdadi’s leadership, the ISIS has garnered a widespread presence across the world, and has also decentralized its approach, allowing other franchises and followers to carry out attacks as affiliates. Furthermore, the group was quick in naming Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi as their new leader.
Therefore, while leadership decapitation seems like an appealing tactic for a variety of reasons–especially to placate domestic audiences in the West and their fear of transnational jihadist terrorism–most scholars still argue that at best, it is ineffective and at worst, counterproductive, at permanently destabilizing terrorist groups.
Moreover, even the NSCT recognizes that the effectiveness of leadership decapitation is variable–depending on the size and reach of the outfit in question–and that some organizations may be immune to such attacks.
While removing a leader may increase the mortality rate of a terrorist outfit in the long-run, many like the former al-Qaeda in Iraq find it more sustainable to regroup under different names and different leadership once they are recognized and targeted by international counterterrorist forces.
The continued life of the al-Qaeda and the inevitable–albeit dampened–continuity of the ISIS are also proof that the structural models and hierarchies governing these groups are failing in achieving the objectives of jihadist activism. Nevertheless, as Anthony Celso opines, the continued presence of such groups points to the fact that leadership decapitation and organizational capitulation fails to eradicate the fanaticism such organizations are borne out of.
This move also triggers a larger conversation about the moral legitimacy and legality of such targeted assassinations in counterterrorism strategy and the actors that practice it.
Can the scare tactics, collateral damage and loss of life involved in such raids justify the end result, especially since trends indicate that they only have a temporary effect on large-scale organizations? Concurrently, can the resources and finances spent on such missions be better utilized on formulating alternate long-term counterterrorism methods and the effective deradicalization of captured terrorists?
While these questions appear redundant, it is necessary that they are addressed, especially in the US, which has been at the forefront of the so-called War on Terror. Domestic terrorism and mass shootings pose a bigger threat to Americans than transnational jihadist attacks, yet, fueled in part by their numerous foreign interventions, administrations have prioritized international counterterrorism for decades.
Currently, facing heavy criticism from all sides for its decision to withdraw troops from Syria, al-Baghdadi’s death comes as a reclaiming factor and a necessary political tool to stay in power for the Trump administration. In this regard, the raid can be deemed a success. But al-Baghdadi’s suicide and the kidnapping of his family may not have as large an effect on the ISIS as one may expect it to. One hopes that the outfit does not perceive this threat as an instigating factor to continue and escalate their operations in the West.
Reference List
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Celso, A. (2014). Al Qaeda's Post-bin Laden Resurgence: The Paradox of Resilience and Failure. Mediterranean Quarterly, 25(2), 33-47. doi: 10.1215/10474552-2685749
Frias, L. (2019). Official says ISIS leader al-Baghdadi 'whimpering' and 'crying' before his death sounds like something Trump 'made up'. Retrieved 8 November 2019, from https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/news/official-says-isis-leader-al-baghdadi-whimpering-and-crying-before-his-death-sounds-like-something-trump-made-up/articleshow/71861264.cms
Hamid, S. (2019). What America Never Understood About ISIS. Retrieved 8 November 2019, from https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/what-america-never-understood-about-isis/601156/
Hincks, J. (2019). A New ISIS Recording Names al-Baghdadi's Successor. Here's What to Know About the New Leader. Retrieved 8 November 2019, from https://time.com/5716061/isis-leader-baghdadi-hashimi-al-quarashi/
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Turkey captures sister of slain ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. (2019). Retrieved 8 November 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/turkey-captures-sister-slain-isil-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-191104231322259.html
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