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Is There a Way Out of the US-Iran Nuclear Stalemate?

Biden is facing an early test of his ‘diplomacy first’ approach to foreign policy, as the US tries to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.

March 3, 2021
Is There a Way Out of the US-Iran Nuclear Stalemate?
US President Joe Biden
SOURCE: AXIOS

Ever since taking office on January 20, United States (US) President Joe Biden’s administration has directed its energies on delivering on its campaign promise of “rescuing” America from the harmful legacy of its former leader. Seeking to turn the page from his predecessor’s ‘America First’ foreign policy, Biden has moved swiftly to re-engage with allies, re-join important international agreements and organisations, and re-focus the country’s efforts on protecting the most vulnerable across the globe, in an attempt to restore American credibility on the international stage, and showcase its commitment to multilateral diplomacy. Now, the president faces an early test of his ‘diplomacy first’ approach, as the US tries to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran that Biden says Washington exited “recklessly” under President Donald Trump nearly three years ago.

Though both parties have expressed willingness to return to the terms of the landmark 2015 nuclear agreement in recent months, their uncompromising demands and intense distrust have resulted in a stalemate, with neither side willing to make the first move. Iran, for its part, has vowed to fully implement the pact if (and after) the US lifts crippling sanctions on the country, which formed an important part of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran during his presidency. However, Washington has said that removing the restrictive measures will not be possible until it is sure that Iran is complying with the deal. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also noted that the US wants to work on an agreement that is “longer and stronger” than the original one, and engage on issues that were not part of the original negotiations, including Iran’s destabilising actions in the region and its ballistic missiles program.

Now, it is no surprise that the Iranians have categorically rejected Washington’s proposition and offers to negotiate on the matter. Given that it was the US who decided to unilaterally withdraw from the deal in 2018, it is strange logic to put the onus of providing proof of commitment on the party that was in observance of the agreement, instead of the one that reneged on it. Tehran has made its position on the issue abundantly clear numerous times, and it is unlikely that it can be persuaded to give in to the US’ demands, especially in the face of the upcoming presidential elections in the country.

That being said, however, Tehran’s position is just as unrealistic as Washington’s. The expectation that the US will lift all nuclear-related sanctions and return to the deal is a non-starter, and it is not helped by Iran’s consistent violations of the pact, whether it’s enriching uranium to 20% purity, developing uranium metal, or challenging IAEA access to its plants. Though Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has made it clear that Iran’s actions can be easily (and quickly) reversed as soon as the US agrees to fulfil its own obligations, and the country has even struck a deal with the IAEA to allow for inspections for another three months, the fundamental lack of trust between the two sides has led to many within the American leadership calling on Biden to stay out of the “problematic” agreement. Lawmakers have expressed their concerns about giving in to Iran’s threats, which they say would basically allow the country to get the concessions it needs without any guarantees that it will actually do what it says, and without being answerable for its disruptive actions in the Middle East and beyond.

This is in line with the challenges that came up during the original JCPOA negotiations between 2013 and 2015 as well, wherein Middle Eastern nations—led by Saudi Arabia, Israel, UAE, and others—expressed their vehement opposition to extending sanctions relief to Tehran without the Shia power being forced to reign in its expansionist agenda in the region that has been undertaken by its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and numerous proxies in the Syria, Yemen, and other conflict areas. Given that the last four years have seen greater Israel-Arab alignment on the issue of Iran (courtesy of Trump’s Abraham Accords), Biden will have to consider these new developments and alliances carefully to chart a way forward and secure the interests of the US and its allies in the Middle East.

What is certain, though, is that expanding the scope of the JCPOA to include, nuclear, regional, and bilateral US-Iran issues all at once will not work. When the deal was first signed in 2015, it was possible only because the parties isolated the nuclear problem, and Iran has said that going back and linking extraneous matters like its ballistic missiles program and regional policies to the agreement is totally unacceptable to it. To this end, experts have suggested that compartmentalising issues is the best way to engage with Iran and that the JCPOA should only be about Tehran’s nuclear program, with other concerns being pursued in other fora. Robert Malley, former head of the International Crisis Group (ICG), and now Biden’s Iran envoy, concurred and said soon after the US elections that any follow-on negotiations attempted by the US regarding the JCPOA were bound to be fraught. “As soon as you start opening anything up [...] you complicate it and by definition then you’re in a longer negotiation and you run the risk during that period of seeing things go sideways,” he told the Financial Times.

While both sides returning to the agreement is the right move, it will only work if Washington and Tehran take steps together, perhaps in a “choreographed” manner, which is something that Iran has said it would be open to. However, this will require significant technical discussions between the parties, and Biden should take the first step in opening the doors for such talks.

If the full range of sanctions relief (as promised earlier) is not palatable to the US, according to economic and nuclear arms experts Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Sahil Shah, Biden could explore some other options, such as helping Iran receive financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to address its current trade deficits and the humanitarian impact of sanctions or easing Tehran’s access to its foreign exchange reserves to lower the country’s skyrocketing inflation and its detrimental effects on ordinary Iranian citizens. Such actions
will signal the US’ willingness and determination to properly engage on the matter, and at the same time underscore the necessity for Iran to also take reciprocal steps, which should offer him enough political cover with critics.

Breaking out of this deadlock will require the president to be bold. Though there is no guarantee on how such an approach will unfold, it is worth giving diplomacy a shot. Four years of aggressive “maximum pressure” have clearly failed. Perhaps now is the time to try something new.

Author

Janhavi Apte

Former Senior Editor

Janhavi holds a B.A. in International Studies from FLAME and an M.A. in International Affairs from The George Washington University.