While the United States (US) was busy investing billions of dollars worth of aid in Afghanistan for two decades, China quietly worked in the background to emerge as one of the country’s largest trading partners. Rather than focusing on nation-building, China flexed its economic prowess by providing Afghanistan millions of dollars in aid for medical assistance, hospitals, a solar power station and more. Against the backdrop of US withdrawal and the rise to power of the Taliban, many have speculated that the staggering security void left behind by the US will now be filled by China. In fact, evidence of China’s camaraderie with the Taliban was visible even before the group took over the reins in Kabul.
During the initial takeover in August, China was one of the few countries to offer some form of support to the Taliban government, saying that it “respects the right of the Afghan people to independently determine their own destiny” and that it will develop “friendly and cooperative relations with Afghanistan.” China’s State Councillor and Foreign Minister (FM), Wang Yi, also called the Afghan Taliban an “important military and political force.”
Beijing went a step further in its endorsement of the Taliban government last week by going as far as to say that the new interim administration announced by the Taliban has put an end to “anarchy” in the country. It also called it a “necessary step” to restore order. Recognition from a country as powerful as China gives the Taliban much-needed leverage and international legitimacy while much of the West refuses to acknowledge it. To this end, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban, met with China’s Wang Yi, before its Kabul takeover and called China “a reliable friend of the Afghan people.”
Given these developments, it becomes crucial to ask what both sides have to gain from one another. In a guest essay for The New York Times, Zhou Bo, a former senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for 17 years and an expert on the Chinese Army’s strategic thinking on international security, said that China “can offer what Kabul needs most: political impartiality and economic investment.” Similarly, in turn, Afghanistan can offer something that China highly values: “opportunities in infrastructure and industry building—areas in which China’s capabilities are arguably unmatched—and access to $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits, including critical industrial metals such as lithium, iron, copper and cobalt.”
However, given the instability of the country, how flexible is Beijing willing to be in its dealings with the Taliban? Especially when years of financial investment is at stake. Some experts contend that Chinese investment is not a “strategic priority” in a less stable Afghanistan and that US in fact provided a blanket of security to Chinese investments in the country.
Zhou, however, argues otherwise, positing that the exit of US troops from Afghanistan also means that a 20-year war with the Taliban has ended, which removes barriers for Chinese investment on a large scale. He added that “Chinese companies have a reputation for investing in less stable countries if it means they can reap the rewards,” before noting: “That doesn’t always happen so smoothly, but China has patience.”
Moreover, the Taliban has already assured Beijing that Chinese investments in Afghanistan will continue to remain protected. If the Taliban keeps this promise, Afghanistan could prospectively join President Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which would allow China to open up a shorter land route to gain access to markets in the Middle East. This would also cushion the blow served by India’s unwillingness to join the massive infrastructure investment project.
Nevertheless, although the relationship appears rosy so far, it is not one without uncertainties. As welcoming as China may be, it is worried about the resurgence of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uyghur militant group that the Taliban helped train years ago, and their relationship with each other now that the Taliban is in power.
The Chinese government is as anxious to crush dissent as the ETIM is to carve out a sovereign nation of East Turkestan from the Xinjiang province. While ETIM is based in Xinjiang, it reportedly moves fighters from Afghanistan to China and is also active in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, UN records show that the Taliban, along with al-Qaeda, has a history of supporting the ETIM in the 2000s. The US Treasury Department wrote in a statement in 2002: “[The] ETIM has a close financial relationship with al-Qaeda and many of its members’ received terrorist training in Afghanistan, financed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. A number of ETIM and ETIM-linked militants were captured in Afghanistan last fall fighting alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban.”
This changed in 2020, when the Trump administration controversially removed the ETIM from its terror list on grounds that “there has been no credible evidence” of its continued existence for over a decade. China, however, maintains that the ETIM is active in the northwestern frontier province of Xinjiang, which has a 70km border with Afghanistan, and that it is stirring up unrest in the autonomous region.
In fact, Chinese FM Wang expressed this fear during his meeting with Taliban deputy Baradar, saying that the ETIM, which is an international terrorist organization designated by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, “poses a direct threat to China’s national security and territorial integrity.” He thus urged the Taliban to “make a clean break with all terrorist organizations, including the ETIM, and resolutely and effectively combat them” to enable “conditions for security, stability, development and cooperation in the region.”
Therefore, despite China being eager to fill the void left behind by the US and its allies and its apparent flexibility in its interactions with the Taliban, there still exists a tipping point in their relationship that could theoretically prevent China from offering the Taliban-led Afghan government the type of benefits it has currently put on the table. The Taliban, however, has assuaged this fear for now. Baradar told Wang that the group will “never allow any force to use the Afghan territory to engage in acts detrimental to China” and that ETIM militants have long left Afghanistan.
That being said, the Taliban has backtracked on its statements in the past. For example, in a recent interview with CNN News 18, top Taliban leader Anas Haqqani stressed that the group had no intention of interfering in Kashmir and that Afghan soil would not be used for anti-India activities. “Kashmir is not part of our jurisdiction, and interference is against policy. How can we go against our policy? We will not interfere,” But earlier this month, the group said that they have the right to raise their voice for Muslims in Kashmir.
Given that Xinjiang is populated by Muslim residents who are being discriminated against, it is not unreasonable to suggest that a similar shift is possible in the Taliban’s relationship with China. If this happens, one only needs to look at China’s trade relationship with Australia to see how Beijing is willing to sacrifice long-standing and seemingly mutually beneficial ties.
During the ongoing pandemic, Australia has called for investigations into the origins of the coronavirus, disputed China’s claims in the South China Sea, and spoken out against the Asian giant’s human rights record. In return, China has levelled a number of bans and trade restrictions against Australian exports and engaged in highly vitriolic rhetoric. Only 20 Chinese investments were recorded in 2020, in contrast to the peak of 111 in 2016, marking a 61% drop.
Given everything that the Taliban gains from China and recognition from a superpower, it seems unlikely that the group would jeopardise its relationship with Beijing. Likewise, given the level of investment China has made in Afghanistan over the years, a stable Afghanistan is in China’s interest. However, while China, unlike several other international actors, may be willing to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses in Afghanistan, there nonetheless does exist a point at which this flexibility in its relationship with the Taliban is likely to wear thin. Given their mutually beneficial relationship, while reaching that point seems unlikely at this stage, one cannot entirely discount the possibility of the Taliban changing its tune on the ETIM, Xinjiang, and generally wading in on China’s internal affairs.
How Flexible Is China Willing to Be In Its Relationship With the Taliban?
Although the Chinese government has offered recognition to the Afghan Taliban, it will not give it unconditional liberty. Beijing expects the Taliban to help crush the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.
September 21, 2021
SOURCE: AP