Last week, the European Commission (EC) unveiled the “New Pact on Migration and Asylum”, bringing forth long-overdue reforms to the bloc’s policies on the issue. The proposal was introduced shortly after a fire broke out in the Moria camp in Greece and ravaged the shelters of over 13,000 residents. The incident led to several questions being raised about the abysmal conditions of refugee camps in Greece and other frontline members of the European Union (EU). Consequently, several calls urging the bloc’s authorities to take concrete actions and adopt a humanitarian approach to the migrant issue emerged across the continent. However, while the policy superficially addresses these demands by using ornamental phrases such as “mandatory solidarity”, in essence, it does very little to prevent another Moria-like disaster or even assist the overburdened frontline countries.
The debate on implementing a migration policy has always been highly polarised. However, Margaritis Schinas, the Vice President of the EC, believes that while the approach is not ideal for anyone, it will, and should, be accepted by all. During his speech on September 23, he revealed that the migration pact has three key aspects. The first is the external dimension, which requires forming alliances and partnerships with the migrants’ countries of origin, such as Syria and Libya, and countries of transit, such as Turkey. By doing so, the policy intends to reduce the number of migrants who have no real claim for seeking asylum from arriving at the shores of the continent. Further, this will also smoothen the “return and readmission” of the migrants whose applications are rejected following assessment by European authorities.
The second prong of the policy focusses on strengthening the external borders through “mandatory screening at all borders of all arrivals”. Hence, the current system, which merely requires registration of the asylum seekers, will have to include additional “security, health and identity checks”. Here is where the policy creates even more problems for authorities in already over-burdened frontline countries. To begin with, the new proposal retains a controversial aspect of the existing law on the issue—the Dublin regulation, according to which the responsibility for processing asylum applications lies with the country where the migrant first entered the bloc. This regulation has often been criticised by frontline states like Greece, Italy, Spain, and Malta, whose systems are growing increasingly overburdened as a direct consequence of this policy. These countries have repeatedly urged EU policymakers to implement a law that requires mandatory relocation of migrants in order to ease the burden on their crumbling asylum processing systems and overcrowded and unsanitary detention centres.
Yet, instead of providing any real and tangible relief, the policy now requires these frontline members to conduct a more stringent screening process, and that too in an expedited manner. Sergio Carrera, a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, predicts, “The speedy procedures at external borders will be counterproductive and increase systematic inefficiency in countries like Greece.” The new robust screening process mandated under the proposal will consequently add to the growing backlog in the frontline countries’ systems, thereby increasing the strain on their already vulnerable infrastructure.
Moreover, while the applications of the asylum-seekers are being processed, the migrants will continue to be housed in Moria-like detention camps in the frontline member states, which are already overcrowded and have often been criticised for their failure to provide the residents with sanitary and safe facilities. With the burden of the asylum procedure continuing to be borne by the same countries that are already shouldering the majority of the responsibility, there is no relief for the frontline countries on this front either. Moreover, with the increased screening formalities, which will inevitably take longer for the authorities to process, the number of migrants being housed in such facilities is also likely to increase, thereby causing more problems than it solves.
The issues deepen as we move to the third prong of the policy, which features the shallow concept of “mandatory solidarity”. This dimension proposes a unified approach that acknowledges the diverse concerns of the EU members about the bloc’s migrant problem. However, this call is entirely cosmetic, as the new migration pact ignores the demand for relocation quotas, which countries like Greece and Malta have long advocated for. Conversely, it allows countries with overtly anti-migrant policies, like Hungary and Austria, to refuse to assist the frontline members and disallow the relocation of migrants into their territories. Instead, they can choose to contribute through “return sponsorship”, wherein they fund the return journey of the asylum-seekers whose applications have been rejected. This will create further complications for countries on the frontline, who are now at the mercy of member states who can easily choose the easy way out and sponsor the migrants’ return, rather than taking responsibility for the refugees being housed in Europe.
A more in-depth analysis of the proposed migration pact makes it clear that the EC merely aimed to secure the long-sought-after political consensus in the parliament by formulating a policy to satiate the demands of the nationalist governments in central and eastern Europe who have often refused to accept the frontline countries’ call for mandatory relocation. The proposal mainly focusses on incentivising and regulating returns rather than mandating, or even promoting, the relocation of these migrants from the currently overburdened countries. In fact, the policy calls for the appointment of an EU coordinator for return but fails to create a similar position for relocation. Hence, it is clear that the “solidarity” is merely symbolic, and that the policy essentially prioritises the reservations of the nationalist anti-immigration governments of the bloc.
The commission has also taken the support of its frontline members for granted, knowing that their governments are in no position to deny any form of help from the bloc. This is primarily because countries like Greece, unlike other members, cannot choose to refuse to house migrants due to their international obligations. Hence, by proposing a return-centric policy, rather than one which is centred around relocation, the EC has presented a document that outwardly has humanitarian intentions but in truth merely aims to secure unanimous political support to give a semblance of unity within the bloc, while failing to give due consideration to the interests of both the refugees and the frontline countries.
The frontline members have time and again reiterated that there is an urgent need to streamline the process of relocation of migrants arriving at their shores. Without mandatory relocation of asylum-seekers, their systems will continue to remain strained, and Moria-like incidents will continue to be a constant threat in their detention camps. Despite big talks of the policy adopting a comprehensive and unified approach, the EC has clearly failed to relieve its most vulnerable members from the dangers of the issue. What is even more concerning is that the policy could even worsen the situation for these countries. Hence, while the desperation of the frontline members could deter any strong opposition to the proposal, the policy is failing to achieve what it seeks to, which is to mandate solidarity and equally distribute the responsibility for the migrants among member-states.
Europe’s New Migration Pact is Not the Solution to its Migrant Problem
The proposed extensive screening process and the policy's failure to mandate relocation will further burden frontline countries like Greece, Spain, Malta, and Italy.
October 1, 2020
Recent fire at the Moria camp in Lesbos, Greece. SOURCE: CNN