Shortly after being appointed as Iran’s Foreign Minister in August 2021, Hossein Amirabdollahian wrote on Instagram that “prioritising relations with neighbours and Asia” will be a core aspect of Tehran’s foreign policy under President Ebrahim Raisi. Almost a year later, Amirabdollahian is staying true to his word and has had a busy schedule for over a month, owing to successive meetings with Central and South Asian leaders.
Since late May, the leaders of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan have met with both Raisi and Amirabdollahian. The FM also met with his Azerbaijani counterpart earlier this week and travelled to India and Pakistan last month. Raisi also met with the presidents of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan during the sixth Caspian Summit in Ashgabat on June 29.
These meetings come as Tehran continues to face increased security challenges from its rivals in the Middle East and its neighbourhood at large. For instance, the United States has proposed the establishment of a regional air defence system in the Middle East specifically aimed at addressing missile attacks from Iranian proxies. A group of American congresspersons introduced a bipartisan bill last month called ‘Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022’ to “unite Middle East partners against Iranian aggression” and integrate the air defences of all the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt.
Similarly, it is generally accepted that the Abraham Accords, which normalised ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, also act as a counter to Tehran. According to an analysis by the Russian International Affairs Council, the Accords are meant to “contain Iran’s influence in the region” and has shifted the Middle East’s balance of power in favour of Israel.
Therefore, in light of its waning power in the Middle East, Iran has sought to counter the emerging anti-Iran alliances in the region by aligning with Central and South Asian countries. For instance, it recently became a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which enables it to increase security cooperation with China, Pakistan, India, Russia, and various Central Asian powers.
Iran also recently applied for membership in the BRICS grouping, stating that it would bring “added value” to the organisation.
-Iran & Russia are completing the International North–South Transport Corridor.
— Seyed Mohammad Marandi (@s_m_marandi) June 29, 2022
-Iran is applying to join BRICS. -Iran's oil & gas sell well.
-Kazakhstan & Turkmenistan ask Iran to establish a transport corridor.
Maximum pressure has failed & the US must accept Iran's rights. pic.twitter.com/mIN9Rnmqhn
In a similar vein, President Ebrahim Raisi last month urged Caspian Sea countries—Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran—to improve security cooperation. Raisi called on countries to turn the region into a “sea of cooperation” and jointly prevent foreign militaries from using the Sea for military purposes.
The move to join these regional forums follows Tehran’s increasing isolation in the Middle East and economic problems due to the US-imposed sanctions.
Tehran’s eastward push also comes at a time when arch-rival Israel has not only been able to strengthen its regional footprint but also launch back-to-back attacks on Iranian soil. In May, Iran blamed Israel for assassinating senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Saied Khodaei in Tehran, an allegation that Israel has all but confirmed. Less than a month later, Iran once again blamed Israel for murdering two IRGC officials working in the aerospace programme. Iran also believes that Israel was responsible for poisoning two nuclear scientists in June.
While Israel has assassinated Iranian scientists and sabotaged nuclear plants in the past, the quick succession of the recent attacks has alarmed Tehran. Senior officials have admitted that Israel’s espionage ring has been able to infiltrate deep into military and political circles. This has led the IRGC to purge itself of members allegedly spying for Israel.
Against this backdrop, Iran has turned to Central and South Asian countries to plug gaps in its security strategy. Last month, Iran established its first foreign drone factory in Tajikistan. Middle East scholar Eric Lob states that Iran aims to “complicate Israeli efforts” to further sabotage its military programme, as Israel would think twice before attacking a base in Tajikistan, with whom it enjoys friendly relations.
In fact, Iran stepped up efforts to improve ties with several of Israel’s allies. For instance, Raisi met with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev in Ashgabat last month and vowed to further develop ties. Earlier this week, the FMs of both countries met in Tehran and Iran’s top diplomat said that Baku and Tehran “have left behind misunderstandings and opened a new chapter in their relations.”
Not long ago both countries had locked horns over Iranian military drills along their border in response to Azerbaijan preventing Iranian truck drivers from travelling through Karabakh. Azerbaijan is a close security ally of Israel and it is believed that Israel has a military presence in the country. By improving relations with Azerbaijan, Iran would reduce the risk of Israel using Azerbaijani territory as a launchpad for any attack on Iran.
Production Line Inaugurated in Tajikistan for Iranian UAVs; Similar Drones Are Already in Use by Palestinians, Houthis, Hizbullah #Iran #Tajikistan #Houthis #hizbullah #hamas #drones pic.twitter.com/1ix79DfaW0
— MEMRI (@MEMRIReports) May 22, 2022
Iran has also sought to kickstart relations with India, another Israeli ally. India and Israel are close security partners, and India is the largest client of Israeli weapons. In contrast, Tehran’s ties with New Delhi have been lacklustre since India stopped energy purchases from Iran owing to US pressure. However, during a recent visit to New Delhi, Amirabdollahian said Tehran is willing to add more impetus to the development of the Chabahar Port after years of delays, which India hopes would give it direct access to Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Iran has also been keen on maintaining the stability of its border with Afghanistan amid several security challenges from the Middle East. In this respect, Tehran has reached out to the Taliban to boost previously fraught ties. Tehran had supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance between 1998 and 2001. The Iran-Afghanistan border has been a scene of constant clashes between Iranian and Taliban security forces. To prevent the Afghan border situation from further deteriorating, Tehran has been making manoeuvres to boost ties, including promising to improve economic and trade ties and sending humanitarian aid. Iran is also cooperating with Pakistan to ensure that Afghanistan remains stable.
Finally, ties with Central, South, and East Asia enable Tehran to improve its economy, which is reeling under the weight of US sanctions. Iran has already expressed interest in joining China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and accordingly signed a 25-year deal with Beijing last year. Iran also reduced oil prices in order to increase supply to China. Furthermore, it has sought greater energy ties with Caspian Sea countries and proposed integrating the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with more Asian countries as well as expanding the Chabahar port project to include more countries.
Therefore, as its power in the Middle East declines and security threats emerging from the region increase, Iran has looked to the east to both secure its borders and protect its highly vulnerable economy. Despite the pressure of US sanctions, conditions for Iran expanding ties with eastern countries appear favourable. A common concern for Iran and Central Asian countries as well as India, Pakistan, and China is the evolving situation in Afghanistan. All sides are keen to ensure that the country is stable and not used as a launchpad for terrorism. Moreover, they have all have expressed interest in improving transport connections across the region—through the Chabahar port, the BRI, and the INSTC. Iran has significant military capital and almost all regional infrastructure projects pass through the country. In this context, mutual cooperation appears mutually beneficial, suggesting that Iran’s efforts to improve ties with the tast have all the ingredients required for success.