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Cameroon is gearing up to hold double elections–legislative and municipal–on February 9, 2020, amidst a worrying socio-political crisis and heightened insecurity in the Anglophone northwestern and southwestern parts of the country.

The central government deployed hundreds of troops to English-speaking towns to emphasize its commitment to conduct ‘free, fair and safe’ elections in these regions, and is urging civilians to trust the forces and cooperate with them. However, members of the leading opposition party, Social Democratic Front (SDF) warn that the current security landscape will make it impossible to achieve this goal, with various offices of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM) in the northwestern parts deserted and nonoperational, and many contenders from SDF being held hostage or attacked by armed separatists.

In the face of an ongoing civil war, many have questioned the reason for the government’s prioritization of these elections rather than focusing its efforts on creating dialogue between the warring parties and bringing peace to a nation that in the last four years has seen the death of more than 1800 civilians, the destruction of 170 villages, has displaced over 530,000 people and has kept more than a million children out of school. The government, led by President Paul Biya however, is determined to conduct these elections as planned and vowed that the state will “play its might” against trouble makers who threaten to disrupt the polls. This could be attributed to the fact that holding regular elections has been a key element in Biya’s mission to uphold the façade of the democratic legitimacy of his rule.

Election fraud in Cameroon is not a new phenomenon and has been a common feature of the country’s political history. Its persistence is made possible by an electoral system that many consider to be tailored to favour Biya's party. This has unfortunately led to a situation where the population does not consider the elections credible, which is evident from the voter turnout which has dwindled dramatically over the years. In the last general election in 2018, 85-year-old Paul Biya, who has been in power since 1982, won his seventh term in office with 71.3% of the vote. However, only half of Cameroon's voting-age population took part in the polls. In the country’s two English-speaking regions, voter turnout was as low as 5%, with tens of thousands of people unable to vote due to security concerns.

President Paul Biya’s 38-year rule has been a tumultuous one, having witnessed an economic crisis and a shift from single-party to multiparty politics, coupled with endemic corruption and a significant reversal of democratic gains.  However his moderately repressive, laissez-faire style of ruling and strong support from Francophone regions–which comprise 80% of the total population–may be the reason for his longevity in office. Over the years, he has gone out of his way to hold regular elections and has allowed for independent–but weak–media to function, making the elites and others within the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) his staunch defenders, operating firmly on the fictitious assumption that the regime is democratic. This gives the government free rein to do as it pleases and protect its own interests at the expense of vulnerable populations in dire need of assistance.

This is evident in the government’s handling of the current socio-political crisis in Cameroon. Stemming from deeply-rooted grievances of Anglophone Cameroonians and the divide between the French and English-speaking regions of the country, what started as a peaceful protest against the imposition of the French language in schools and courts in English-speaking regions has mutated into a bloody civil war. Thousands have been forced to flee their homes, killed, or left with no source of livelihood amidst increasing violence by armed militias that are demanding secession. However, the government has shown no real commitment to addressing the situation. In September 2019, in a rare ‘address to the nation’, Biya took on a defiant tone, insisting that his government had already addressed the demands made by protesters in 2016, that their concerns were generally unfounded, and that any efforts made by the leadership were being hampered by radical elements endorsing a separatist agenda.

Additionally, in late December 2019, Cameroon’s parliament approved a bill that would grant “special status” to the country’s two Anglophone regions, stating that it would provide the regions greater autonomy over local affairs and settle historical grievances. The bill would establish various indirectly-elected organs with semi-administrative responsibilities. Each region would have a new bicameral Regional Assembly, a House of Regional Representatives composed of 70 members, and a new Regional Executive. The nature of the powers vested in these institutions, however, remains unclear. It is likely their responsibilities would largely be determined by laws implemented in Cameroon’s capital city, Yaoundé.

The government insists that these measures will be enough to address the grievances of the Anglophone population when in reality it has refused to engage in any conversation with secessionist leaders, who are experiencing severe infighting within their own ranks and are terrorizing populations suspected of siding with the government. Separatists have also rejected the legitimacy of this measure and have boycotted talks because of the government’s refusal to discuss institutional reform. Unsurprisingly, civilians are bearing the grave consequences of this faulty approach and will continue to do so until both parties come to the table willing to make concessions and engage in constructive dialogue. Cameroon’s international partners–especially the US and France, who consider Cameroon a strong ally in the fight against Boko Haram–must put pressure on Yaoundé to take real action. If not, Biya’s administration will sit back, deploy more troops to create a false sense of security and concern, and exacerbate what is already an overwhelming humanitarian crisis.

If the February 9 elections take place, apart from misrepresenting the true sentiment of Cameroonians, they will also serve as an added opportunity for Biya to pat himself on the back for a job well-done on leading a ‘stable’ African democracy, while simultaneously pushing Cameroon further and further away from that ever becoming a real possibility.

Author

Janhavi Apte

Former Senior Editor

Janhavi holds a B.A. in International Studies from FLAME and an M.A. in International Affairs from The George Washington University.